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2“How much have I forgotten that I  thought I  knew; how many things am 
I perplexed about, which once were as clear to me as sunlight? ”
Elias Canetti, 1955*
* The Human Province (London: Picador) 1986
Abstract
At independence, a government of a third world country inherits 
a set of international economic relations and a set of international 
political relations. The latter, being dominated by intergovernmental 
links, are more easily refashioned to the design of the new regime. The 
former, having been forged by a combination of external factors 
(international markets, international commodity regimes, trade treaties, 
transport routes) and diverse internal factors (private sector and public 
sector actors, production patterns, import necessities and export 
opportunities) are less responsive to governm ent intervention. 
International economic relations will therefore almost inevitably remain 
at variance with the pattern of political relations and alliances that the 
new regime wishes to develop.
The inevitability of this discrepancy does not lessen the dilemma 
for the government of a newly independent state, especially one with a 
revolutionary or radical public posture. The problem for a third world 
government in such a situation is not therefore to reconcile its 
international political and economic relations, but to develop a coherent 
and plausible explanation for the discrepancy between them which does 
not at the same time diminish the regime’s credibility.
On 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent. Since then, 
Zimbabwe’s cabinet has been dominated by a party, ZANU(PF), that 
came to power with a revolutionary ethos and an avowedly Marxist- 
Leninist world view. Today, Zimbabwe's role on the world stage and its 
network of international political and economic relations only very 
partially reflects ZANU’s pre-independence positions.
Despite its inevitably unique aggregation of experiences, 
Z im babw e shares po litical, econom ic, social and h istorical 
characteristics with a number of other countries. This study attempts to 
delineate the principal factors, whether individual or common to other 
third world states, that shaped the way Zim babwe forged its 
international links in the first fourteen years after independence. It 
argues that government attempts to restructure international economic 
relations since independence have largely failed. While such failure has 
been recognised, it has been neither acknowledged nor adequately 
explained to the Zimbabwean electorate.
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6Introduction
Zimbabwe: one of a kind? A brief outline of the domestic and 
international events which brought Zimbabwe to independence in 1980 
and the expectations that a ZANU(PF) victory engendered. Demisting 
the analytical window.
At independence, a government of a third world country inherits 
a set of international economic relations and a set of international 
political relations. The latter, being dominated by intergovernmental 
links, are more easily refashioned to the design of the new regime. The 
form er, having been forged by a combination of external factors 
(international markets, international commodity regimes, trade treaties, 
transport routes) and diverse internal factors (private sector and public 
sector actors, production patterns, import necessities and export 
opportunities) are less responsive to government intervention short of 
diktat. International economic relations will therefore almost inevitably 
remain at variance with the pattern of political relations and alliances 
that the new regime wishes to develop.
The inevitability of this discrepancy does not lessen the dilemma 
for the government of a newly independent state, especially one with a 
revolutionary or radical public posture. Recognising the inevitability 
would be tantam ount to adm itting an unacceptable degree of 
powerlessness. While structuralist explanations of the international 
system (a controlling core, a controlled periphery) lend intellectual 
credence to such admission, they are not - at least overtly - a viable 
basis for government policy. Non-Alignment - one of the declared 
cornerstones of Zimbabwean foreign policy - would also lose much of
7its symbolic attraction if its parameters of action were seen to be 
externally defined.
On the other hand, a refusal publicly to recognise external 
constraints could lay a government open to charges of hypocrisy or 
incompetence. The problem for a third world government in such a 
situation is not therefore to reconcile its international political and 
economic relations, but to develop a coherent and plausible explanation 
for the discrepancy between them which does not at the same time 
diminish the regime’s credibility.
This problem is admittedly felt less keenly by those governments 
adopting an ideological approach of non-intervention (or retreat from 
intervention) in the economy. Even where a government has no 
ideological preference for non-intervention, it may be able to invoke the 
strictures of a “structural adjustment programme” which will ultimately 
lead to more jam  tomorrow. Yet given the awesome array of unmet 
social needs in the countries of the South, such a hands-off approach is 
not generally received with spontaneous enthusiasm by the local 
citizenry.
Most governments - at least those working within systems that 
demand some degree of accountability to the population - will feel most 
pressured to reconcile their rhetoric on international affairs with 
domestic political and economic initiatives . That is not to suggest that 
they feel obliged to act on principle. The so-called rhetoric-reality gap 
is often evoked in a way that conflates rhetoric and principle. It is worth 
bearing in mind that rhetoric can equally be used to mask a diversion of 
action from principle.
As far as international relations are concerned, Claude has spoken 
eloquently of the academic preference for inter-state dealings to be 
governed by principle. The preference is stated wistfully or plaintively,
8he suggests, as an ideal far from realisation: “We like intellectual 
tid iness, the kind of regularity  and uniform ity perm itting 
generalisation.”1
The effort which a government puts into developing explanations 
for its international behaviour may, however, simply reflect the extent 
to which domestic pressure exists for one and the degree to which 
pressure is perceived from counterparties in the network of 
international economic and political relations, either for overt positions 
on specific issues or for more general declarations in bilateral or 
multilateral meetings.
Third world governm ents may tend to overestim ate the 
importance of foreign relations to their citizens since the world stage 
provides public relations opportunities to demonstrate a government’s 
international standing. Leifer observes, for example, that:
The practice of foreign policy within South East Asia has been confined 
to elite circles with only limited response. Where popular response has 
played a role in the foreign policy process, it has usually been the 
product o f governmental initiatives which seek to utilise foreign policy 
for domestic political purpose.2
The case of Zimbabwe
On 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent. As Southern 
Rhodesia, it had, since 1923, officially been a self-governing British 
colony, but with power firmly entrenched in the hands of the white 
minority. Although Britain retained certain reserve powers allowing it 
to veto any discriminatory legislation, it never exercised them.
Pressure for change grew, however, both internally, from the 
majority and externally, from the independent former colonies of
9Britain, still bound together in the Commonwealth. In November, 1965, 
the government of Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front party declared 
independence unilaterally, with the aim of ensuring the long-term 
continuation of white control and domination. The country spent the 
next fourteen years as an international pariah. UDI was unrecognised by 
all member states of the United Nations, including those whose practical 
sympathy allowed the Smith regime to survive 12 years of international 
sanctions and a gruesome seven-year liberation war.
Despite Rhodesia’s diplomatic isolation on the world stage, 
initiatives aimed at finding a negotiated exit from this political cul-de- 
sac were launched fairly regularly. Well documented elsewhere - and 
therefore saved from the diplomatic dustbin - are the early meetings 
between Ian Smith and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on the 
unfortunately named British navy ships HMS Tiger and HMS Fearless in 
1966 and 1968, the Smith-Home agreement of 1971, the abortive 
Geneva talks of 1976, not to mention the numerous official and semi­
official emissaries including Lord Goodman (Harold Wilson’s solicitor), 
Henry Kissinger, David Owen, Cyrus Vance, Andrew Young and others 
whose efforts created few ripples3.
A local attempt at an “internal settlement” involving a new name - 
Zimbabwe Rhodesia - and a new constitution was implemented 
following the signing of an agreement in March 1978 by Ian Smith, 
Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau. Smith’s 
three co-signatories were, however, seen by the two main African 
Nationalist movements, ZANU and ZAPU (united in the Patriotic 
Front), as sell-outs and the new dark green Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
passport opened no new international doors.
The stage for a successful negotiated settlement was set by the 
Commonwealth. At the August 1979 Commonwealth Conference in
10
Lusaka, leaders of Commonwealth countries signed a nine point 
agreement calling on Britain to assume her colonial responsibility and 
convene a Constitutional Conference aimed at breaking the Zimbabwean 
political deadlock.
In addition to Commonwealth initiatives, UN resolutions, 
sanctions and other appeals had, according to Robert Mugabe, a catalytic 
effect. Addressing the UN General Assembly a few months after 
independence, he acknowledged that “the totality of those resolutions 
was an effective pressure which combined with the pressures of our 
armed struggle.”4 
Great Expectations
The implications of this cocktail of forces for subsequent foreign 
policy decisions by Zimbabwe’s government will be examined in later 
chapters. Initially, however, some understanding is necessary of the 
expectations of and from that government at the time of independence.
Since the lowering of the British flag in the presence of Prince 
Charles and Bob Marley, Zimbabwe’s cabinet has been dominated by a 
party, ZANU(PF), that came to power with a revolutionary ethos and 
an avowedly Marxist-Leninist world view, albeit through an electoral 
process and with certain limits on its freedom of action imposed by the 
Lancaster House Constitution (see Chapter 2). Today, Zimbabwe’s role 
on the world stage and its network of international political and 
econom ic relations only very partially reflects ZA N U ’s pre­
independence positions. Party dogma on the structure of the 
international system and Zimbabwe's role within it as part of the 
exploited South remains intact, but its impact on actual policy decisions 
- debatable at the best of times - has grown increasingly tenuous. 
Individual foreign policy decisions are therefore not adequately 
explained by this theoretical identification.
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Thematic context
A trawl through the library shelves will reveal that while 
Zimbabwe has been the focus of much academic work over the past 
decade, its international political and economic relations have received 
scant attention. This hole in the academic road can, however, be filled in 
different ways with a variety of methods and materials. It may look 
bigger to some than to others, depending both on perspective and 
distance and on choice of analogy to describe the lacuna.
The aim of this study is, simply put, to make the hole look 
smaller. Whether it succeeds or not depends as much on the way it is 
read as the way it is written. It is therefore important to set out here the 
reasons for the apparent lack of an explicit theoretical framework. The 
word “apparent” is used advisedly, since some readers may legitimately 
be able to infer such a framework, should they feel it necessary to do 
so.
No serious scholar would claim to be free of preconceptions 
affecting the shape of his or her research efforts. These are inevitable, 
if only in the pre-selection of criteria considered worthy of attention. 
Nevertheless, many an academic brow has sweated over the strain of the 
epistemological contortions necessary to squeeze a particular body of 
work into the confines of an overt paradigmatic frame in a specific 
subject area. Although situated broadly and most conveniently within 
the field of “international relations”, this study acknowledges, but does 
not heed, the boundaries of knowledge which may have evolved in 
academe by default or job design. Where borders are recognised, they 
are treated as open.
Academic discussion of Zimbabwe’s international relations has 
tended to take place in the context of broader examinations of 
Zimbabwe’s post-independence development. The two most valuable
12
sources to which reference is made throughout this study are 
“Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986” edited by 
Ibbo Mandaza5 and a chapter in Shaw and Tandon’s “Regional 
Development at an International Level” by Hasu Patel entitled “No 
Master, No Mortgage, No Sale.”6 Both M andaza and Patel were 
involved as members of ZANU(PF) in the struggle for independence 
and as such produce an insider’s view, though not uncritical, of 
Zimbabwean government policy. These works provide an underlay to 
the present thesis. I take issue with certain assertions made by each 
author. I am also not concerned to engage in the debate on the extent to 
which the Zimbabwean transformation contains the seeds of a “genuine” 
anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle. The reasons for this 
reluctance are explained in more detail later in this chapter (see 
“Polemical pitfalls” and “To Marx and Back”). Nevertheless, there is far 
more of direct relevance in these two works than in any other studies.
Herbst has produced a study of the locus of political decision 
making in Zimbabwean state politics.7 Despite its antagonistic reception 
by Mandaza among others, it provides useful observations on both the 
formation of government policy and the role of ZANU(PF) in the 
decision-making process.
A discussion of the available literature on the politics of 
Zimbabwe’s transformation is provided in Stoneman and Cliffe8. While 
their book is situated firmly within the Marxian tradition, they point out 
in their preface that “the literature, and indeed our own perspective, is 
ambiguous, and this is no doubt in part a consequence of the very 
recentness of the emergence of Zimbabwe as an independent African 
state in 1980”. The validity of this observation is strengthened by the 
profound changes in South Africa in the 1990s, the long-term regional 
implications of which remain unclear.
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Paradigm detour
The study of international relations has often been presented in 
terms of com peting paradigms, essentially Realist, Pluralist and 
Marxist/Marxian, each including a range of variants. The radical 
reshaping of international economic and political relations since the 
collapse of the Communist governments of Eastern Europe has, at the 
very least, challenged defenders of these paradigms to demonstate their 
continued usefulness as analytical frameworks.
This study devotes little energy to testing the relevance of each 
paradigm to the Zimbabwean case. Halliday has reminded us of Kuhn’s 
observation that “any decent paradigm, any ‘historically significant’ 
theory, can come up with an explanation, ‘more or less’.”9 A profound 
exploration of the Zimbabwean experience through each paradigm 
would no doubt yield much of value. Hopefully, those who are 
committed to such an approach will be able to use the material in this 
study to carry their work forward.
At the same time, journalistic description is, on its own, clearly 
an inadequate substitute for analytical bite. It is therefore necessary to 
map out the structure of the study, while acknowledging that many of 
the boundaries are arbitrary.
Despite its inevitably unique aggregation of experiences, 
Z im babw e shares po litica l, econom ic, social and h istorical 
characteristics with a number of other countries. Two works, in 
addition to Patel, have proved helpful in identifying the impact of such 
common elements on the formation of international political and 
economic relations. These are Clapham’s Third World Politics10, and 
Ojo, Orwa &Utete’s African International Relations11. While neither 
offers a grand setting, they do provide useful points of reference. In 
addition, a number of personal interviews helped to structure the thrust
14
of the study, while others provided an opportunity to test and refine any 
tentative conclusions.12
This study attempts to delineate the principal factors, whether 
individual or common to other third world states, that have shaped the 
way Zimbabwe has forged its international links since independence.
Chapter One examines the raw material of inheritance: the 
economic and political legacy of the Rhodesian experience along with 
the network of relations formed by the nationalist movements during 
the years of struggle. This gives some insight both into the extent of the 
new governm ent’s desire to refashion the country’s international 
relations and the magnitude of the task confronting it.
The second chapter outlines the constraints that the new 
government faced in setting about that task. Some are identified as 
common to most LDCs; others are specific to the Zimbabwean context. 
The former include, inter alia, a scarcity of available resources, the 
marginalisation of Africa, and the need to interact with the world 
market. Among the latter are the Lancaster House constitution (of 
decreasing importance) and the country’s trade patterns. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, debt is considered of less, though growing, significance.
Chapter Three explores the way that foreign policy is made in 
Zimbabwe. In forging political relations, the importance of Robert 
Mugabe, initially as prime minister and then as president is stressed, 
with the foreign minister providing commentary and the ministry 
supplying the functionaries. Economic relations are shown to have come 
under less direct central control, notwithstanding an initial desire to 
bring them under the political umbrella.
The pattern of relations resulting from the Mugabe government’s 
attempts at diversification is laid out in Chapter Four. This includes the
15
sequence of establishment of diplomatic relations, a geographical profile 
of sources of economic assistance and the role of private investment.
The remaining six chapters attempt to show in greater detail how 
important elements of Zimbabwe’s network of international relations 
have been constructed. The choice of countries and organisations 
considered is of necessity partial. In some cases, the reasons for the 
choices will be more obvious than others. Chapter Five, for example, 
covers Zimbabwe in the region. This could include Zimbabwe’s 
relations with each of the front-line states in addition to South Africa. 
Nevertheless only South Africa and Mozambique are singled out for 
detailed treatment, as they have represented the two greatest dilemmas 
in foreign policy facing the Zimbabwean government in the first 
fourteen years of independence. Zimbabwe’s relations with other front­
line states are considered in the context of the two main regional 
organisations: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA).
Chapter Six, though relatively short, is devoted to relations with 
one country only: the UK. This is justified on three counts at least. 
First, is the tangled history of relations between the two entities going 
back to the founding of Rhodesia as a commercial venture of the British 
South Africa Company. Secondly, as producer, stage manager and chief 
fire officer of the Lancaster House Conference, Britain is at least as 
responsible as the Zimbabwean participants for the shape of the 
Constitution and its subsequent impact. Thirdly, Britain remains 
Zimbabwe’s largest aid donor and second largest trading partner.
Chapter Seven explores the shape of links with, for want of a 
better term, the major powers: the roller coaster with the USA as 
Zimbabwe fell in and out of favour (and in again) with the State 
Department; the failure to break the ice between Parties in the case of
16
the USSR; and the surprising modesty, though largely fulfilled, of Sino- 
Zimbabwean ambitions.
Zimbabwe and Europe is the focus of Chapter Eight. Following a 
general introduction, the three cases considered in depth are Sweden, 
France and Romania. These may appear strange choices, but they have 
the benefit of providing vivid studies in contrast: Sweden as the epitome 
of the conscientious donor and one of ZANU(PF)’s few active western 
supporters during the independence struggle; France as the “enlightened 
hand of self-interest” ; and Romania as the ally attempting to translate 
declared ideological affinity into meaningful trade.
In Chapter Nine, the Middle East is viewed through the prism of 
three specific conflicts: Israel/Palestine, which in the first decade of 
independence assumed a Zimbabwean media profile second only to 
South Africa; Iran/Iraq, in which Zimbabwe remained studiously 
neutral; and Iraq/Kuwait, where Zim babw e’s stand against Iraqi 
aggression was out of step with many of its fellow members of the Non 
Aligned Movement (NAM).
Finally, Chapter Ten examines Zimbabwe’s behaviour on three 
specific international stages. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 
has benefited little from the energy Zimbabwe has invested in its 
performance on the international stage. In contrast, the United Nations 
has provided a platform  for some of Z im babw e’s weightiest 
international (verbal) interventions, both in the General Assembly and 
during the country’s two stints on the Security Council. Two bodies — 
NAM and the Commonwealth — perhaps deserve greater attention than 
I have given them. They are, however, discussed in the context of 
particular international issues.
Conclusion: running the international affairs of an LDC is a tough 
assignment, but it could be done more efficiently were the government
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to submit to some form of internal yet open political audit. In the case 
of Zimbabwe, there is no indication that this has been attempted, either 
at party or government level. With the “commanding heights” of the 
economy still largely in private hands since independence, the failure of 
evident efforts to bring Zimbabwe’s international economic relations 
within the government’s operational ambit is, in itself, not surprising. 
Yet it remains largely unexplained 
Polemical pitfalls
One trap that has been debated with a degree of rancour in 
academic circles is that of a supposedly innate perspective deriving from  
the origin of the researcher. Some radical third world scholars have 
been critical of studies emanating from western academic institutions. H. 
Ekwe-Ekwe refers disparagingly, for example, to “W esterners who 
have arrogated themselves the status of guardians of African and Third 
World studies.”13
Either such studies are accused of colonial assumptions or they 
are seen as reinforcing a dubious strain of revolutionary romanticism, 
which hinders post revolutionary reconstruction through sustaining 
unrealistic expectations14.
In both cases, the essential charge appears to be a lack of 
empathy. Certainly, many studies of the third world are suffused with 
implicit assumptions of all kinds, but this is no less true of published 
work emanating from institutions within the third world itself. There is 
therefore no reason to treat such scholarship as any less diverse or 
error-prone than that germinating in Northern conditions. This 
particular work has been written by a Zimbabwean based mainly in 
London during its genesis and is therefore the product of numerous 
influences. As far as possible, however, it is based deliberately on 
Zimbabwean sources, both primary and secondary. While it obviously
18
takes two to tango, we focus here on the footwork of the Zimbabwean 
partner.
A revolution betrayed?
Was there a revolution in Zimbabwe? The question is complicated 
by the lack of a commonly accepted working definition of revolution in 
social science. The issue is further clouded by the fact that, in 
Zimbabwe, a ‘revolutionary’ movement engaged in a purportedly 
revolutionary struggle finally won power through elections under a 
compromise constitution.
Clearly the change that occurred at independence was far more 
profound than that normally ensuing from an opposition victory at the 
polls. Whether there was a revolution in the Skocpolian sense with its 
emphasis on societal change is debatable. Clapham defines revolution as 
“a rapid, violent and irreversible change in the political organisation of 
a society.” He stresses that any social transformation, however critical, 
is “made possible only by the prior conquest of political power and by 
deliberate political decisions as to how that power is to be used.”15 That 
conquest certainly occurred and political power passed to the group that 
espoused revolution during the struggle.
Arguments over whether the profound and fundamental change 
that occurred in Zimbabwe scores high enough to be inducted into the 
revolutionary hall of fame continue to arouse academic passions. 
Stoneman16, noting the overt allegiance of ZANU(PF) to Marxism- 
Leninism at independence, suggests that the constraints imposed by the 
circumstances of the transfer of power left one of Lenin’s key precepts 
-  ’’the need for a victorious revolution to smash the state apparatus of 
the old regime" -  unfulfilled.
He identifies four strands of criticism in relation to Zimbabwe's 
revolutionary credentials in the first decade of its independence. The
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first saw the outcome of the Lancaster House negotiations as evidence of 
the petty bourgeois domination of ZANU(PF). The second saw the 
revolution as having lost its way around the time of independence. The 
third saw objective constraints and paper agreements as denying 
freedom of manoeuvre to the government until political consciousness 
and productive forces had been strengthened, while a fourth saw a 
national democratic revolution as a prerequisite to a second socialist 
option.
A caveat is applicable here. Assuming a revolution did occur, 
there is a strong tendency to measure its successes in terms of the 
expectations that were rhetorically nurtured during the independence 
struggle.
Mandaza17 alludes to the distortions this approach imposes on 
scholarship:
The analysis of the historical factors and processes leading to 
independence constitutes a necessary pre-condition for understanding 
the present and future developments of any post-colonial society. In the 
Southern African situation, however, even this task is clouded and 
obstructed by the mythology that has developed around the issue of 
armed struggle.
Referring to Wallerstein's proposition that revolutionary myths 
sustain the troops during the long struggle18, Mandaza argues that the 
role of such myths, if imbibed and reimposed by scholars, be they local 
or foreign, can be negative:
The contribution o f African radicals to the developm ent of a 
‘revolutionary mythology’ cannot be underestimated. For it was mainly
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the radical intellectuals who articulated and wrote the radical speeches 
and publications that increasingly projected the liberation movements as 
revolutionary and Marxist-Leninist. Whatever disparity there was - and 
there was - between this conception of the struggle by a few radicals on 
the one hand, and that of the reality o f the mass of the people on the 
other, was lost as part of the overall revolutionary mythology that had to 
sustain and defend the struggle against its many enemies. *9
How a revolutionary movement portrays itself during the struggle 
is thus not always an accurate pointer to its policies as a party in power. 
Keller, for one, betrays a certain disappointment at the ‘im pure’ 
outcome of the Zimbabwean revolution:
Self-designation, while important, is not sufficient to ensure that a 
regime can be transformed into a viable, credible Afro-Marxist regime.
Nor does it guarantee that, once declared, an African scientific socialist 
regime will forever ‘stay on course’. The regime of Robert Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe has pledged to reorganise his society along scientific socialist 
lines. However, because objective conditions inhibit Mugabe, he has 
not been able to translate ideology into praxis. Indeed, he has yet to 
even clearly articulate his ideological orientation. 20
Although such disappointment exists within Zimbabwe itself to a 
large degree, it results from far more concrete daily hardships, the 
causes of which are vigorously debated. Nevertheless, the fact that post­
independence Zimbabwe has fallen short of external expectations will be 
addressed in Chapters Two and Three in the context of policy formation 
and the constraints thereon.
To Marx and Back
21
In itia lly  reform ist, the Zim babwe nationalist movement, 
incarnated primarily in the two rival parties of ZAPU (Zimbabwe 
African People's Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National 
Union), developed in the early 1970s a radical nationalism based on 
armed struggle and people’s war. Even then, independence, rather than 
socialist transformation, remained the central goal. Marxism-Leninism 
eventually took hold, in Mandaza's words, “in the form of an anti­
im perialist analysis and self-identification and solidarity” . 
Nevertheless, the revolutionary ethos of the liberation movements rested 
on the overthrow of a political regime. The ordering of socio-economic 
relations along certain lines was a later consideration. This is not to 
deny the impact of Marxism-Leninism on the independence movement 
and the way it presented itself. It is rather something to bear in mind 
when trying to locate the dividing line between success and failure of 
the revolutionary enterprise.
According to M. Sithole, ZANU, at its 1963 inception, declared 
itself as embracing nationalism, pan-Africanism and socialism (in its 
Fabian sense)21. M arxism-Leninism and Maoist thought became 
conspicuous in the Zimbabwe nationalist movement in the 1970s. At its 
formation in 1971, Frolizi - a short lived attempt to unite elements of 
ZANU and ZAPU - claim ed that these two movements were 
ideologically bankrupt, lacking a Marxist-Leninist scientific outlook. 
The official adoption of Marxism-Leninism by ZANU took place in 
1977 and was reaffirmed in 1984. Yet it is Sithole’s contention that:
throughout the liberation war , ZANLA (the Zimbabwe National 
Liberation Army, allied to ZANU) was inspired much more by the 
sentiment of nationalism and opposition to white settler political
22
domination than by a Marxist analysis o f the capitalist colonial 
economy.22
While land expropriation was a rallying call to garner popular 
support, particularly in the rural areas, the guerrilla armies were 
essentially seeking the political kingdom. It has been suggested that this 
is fairly representative of third world revolutionary movements with an 
ostensible commitment to socialism. A forthright expression of this 
view is to be found in Hobsbawm, who has argued that
while on paper these movements belonged to the old revolutionary 
family of 1917, in reality they clearly belonged to a different species, 
inevitably so given the differences between the societies for which 
Marx's and Lenin's analyses had been designed, and those o f sub- 
Saharan post-colonial Africa.2 3
[He wisely allows “the economically developed and industrialised 
settler capitalism” of South Africa as an exception, given the integral 
role of the South African Communist Party and the trade unions in the 
destruction of apartheid]
Popular expectations for a post-independence Zimbabwe centred 
largely on redressing domestic grievances. International relations could 
therefore be forged by policy makers within the limits of constraints 
which, as will be explained in Chapter Two*, were and remain primarily 
external.
With that in mind, the question of how far the ‘revolution has 
sold ou t’ is not considered of central importance. In addressing 
discrepancies between performance and pronouncement, much of the 
acrimony surrounding that debate can perhaps be evaded by judging
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success or failure not against abstract standards but against the targets 
explicitly outlined by those who set them and are responsible for 
implementing them. This allows us to acknowledge the peculiarities of 
any particular situation, but also to recognise that failure in the face of 
overwhelming odds is still failure. While odds can be entered in 
mitigation, unwillingness to recognise them cannot.
At the same time, attempts at special pleading, allowing states to 
derogate from rhetorically or oratorically enunciated standards of 
integrity and morality can be dismissed. All scholars experience 
disappointment in the course of research. When confronted with the 
unwelcome, criticism may turn to accusation and sympathy to apology. 
While elements of both may appear in this study, it is not intended that 
either should dominate.
Finally, while government performance in the first fourteen years 
of independence is assessed and judged, no attempt is made to predict. 
This is in line with Strange’s assertion that social science can never 
confidently predict, since the irrational factors involved in human 
relations and the various combinations and permutations of them, are 
too numerous. The one social science that has most notably aspired to 
predict is, she points out, economics:
“But its record of success is so abysmal that it should make all those that seek to 
emulate the economists and to borrow from them try something else.”24
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Chapter one: Zimbabwe’s Inheritance
The foreign relations of the Smith regime, ZANU and ZAPU
Between UDI in 1965 and independence in 1980, the Smith 
regime became increasingly isolated politically, though trade continued 
with many of the countries which had broken off diplomatic relations. 
Conversely, ZANU & ZAPU's political relations expanded as 
representative offices were opened in various capitals around the world, 
but economic relations, inevitably one-way, were confined to financial 
assistance for humanitarian, educational and administrative purposes, to 
the free provision of military training and, in a few cases, to the supply 
of military equipment.
UDI & the Economy
The Rhodesian economy at the time of UDI in November 1965 
could be characterised by the relatively high contribution of foreign 
trade to GDP and by the degree of foreign ownership of capital stock. 
British prime minister Harold W ilson’s belief that the Smith regime 
could be brought down by economic rather than military measures was 
therefore not entirely devoid of reason:
In theory, there were good reasons why the imposition of sanctions 
should have worked. Rhodesia was a small landlocked country, 
dependent on foreign oil supplies and foreign trade. About thirty five 
percent of its gross domestic product was earned from exports and a 
large percentage of these exports was bought by Britain.1
Wilson expected the economic decline resulting from sanctions to 
create internal dissent and pressure on the Smith regime to recant. Yet 
his piecemeal application of economic measures allowed both the
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Rhodesian government and the private sector valuable time to adjust to 
new conditions. Immediately after UDI, Rhodesia was excluded from 
the sterling currency area, selective exchange controls were imposed, 
access to the London financial market was denied and Commonwealth 
preferences on Rhodesian goods were withdrawn. By mid-December, 
Rhodesian Reserve Bank assets in London had been seized and the 
import into the UK of Rhodesian tobacco, sugar, minerals and meat had 
been prohibited. The Rhodesian Front cabinet responded to the financial 
measures by defaulting on British loans and those World Bank loans 
under British guarantee, thereby making a considerable fiscal saving.
On 17 December, the British government imposed an oil 
embargo and by the end of January the ban had been extended to cover 
all trade between Britain and its rebel colony. It was not until 1966, 
however, that Britain asked the UN to impose mandatory sanctions, at 
first selectively and finally, in 1968, comprehensively. By then, the 
country had embarked on a significant import substitution programme 
and had made considerable progress in finding alternative trading 
partners.
A deeper analysis of the significance of both foreign trade and 
foreign capital to the Rhodesian economy would perhaps have tempered 
W ilson’s optimism and suggested to the British authorities the 
complexity of an approach based solely on economic sanctions. With 
diverse trading and investment links primarily in private hands, both the 
motives and the avenues for evading centrally directed restrictions were 
numerous, though, paradoxically, one impact of economic sanctions was 
to increase state intervention in the economy.
The post-UDI “miracle” was the result of a state-led effort to survive 
and flourish under a strict import substitution regime. Smith forbade
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foreign firms to remit profits or dividends to parent companies and 
individual shareholders, and they could not import many essential 
materials and equipment, divest holdings, or transfer them to other 
companies without state agreement. Key monetary, fisca l and 
infrastructural operations came under state control, and an industrial 
development parastatal courted South African capital.2
From 1965 to 1972 the economy achieved fluctuating growth 
rates averaging 6% per annum, despite adverse movements in the terms 
of trade resulting from the need to pay premiums in sourcing imports 
and to absorb discounts and intermediary costs in export earnings. The 
role of South Africa and Portugal both as trading partners and conduits 
notwithstanding, other countries took advantage of trading opportunities 
with Rhodesia or were less than diligent in bringing sanctions breakers 
to book. Sylvester cites South Africa, Portugal, France, Greece, Italy, 
Belgium, Brazil, Japan and the US as among the “well-documented cases 
of violators.”3 The comprehensive list is much longer.
Restrictions on access to international financial markets had, 
according to X. Kadhani, the paradoxical effect of widening the 
country’s access to investible financial surpluses, “primarily in the shape 
of the large blocked balances that would otherwise have been remitted 
abroad”.4 With these surpluses either redirected towards domestic 
reinvestment or at least retained within the domestic economy, the 
involvement of foreign capital actually increased over this period. 
MNCs with subsidiaries in Zimbabwe maintained operations although 
the link with the parent company was officially severed.
The Role of the Private Sector
The degree of concealment in Rhodesia’s economic relations has 
been a subject of great speculation. Certainly the mechanics of
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disguising the origins, content and transport routes of much bilateral 
trade during the UDI period involved a variety of state and non-state 
actors. A common assumption is that the Rhodesian government used 
the country's economic relations as a cover for political contact. This 
appears to be overstating the case, if one takes into account the opinion 
and perceptions current among members of the local business 
community at the time.
Unlike the sourcing of oil and the search for markets for bulk 
primary exports, the manufacturing sector benefited little from 
Government involvement in trade which appeared in most cases to be 
limited to bureaucratic controls. There was little co-ordination between 
government and business and little perception of government assistance.
In general, the business community was hostile to UDI, primarily 
on economic grounds. The advent of sanctions, however, presented 
commercial and personal (rather than articulated political) challenges to 
those involved. Individual enterprises and their representatives played 
the dominant role in establishing and maintaining trade contacts, both 
before and during the UDI period. Similarly, contacts in other countries 
were with private companies. In most cases, the governments concerned 
turned a blind eye, rather than participating directly themselves. 
Exceptions were, perhaps surprisingly, Britain and USA, which actually 
fined certain infringers of the sanctions.
A ready excuse available to governments of countries with a 
largely capitalist economy was the impossibility of tracking all private 
transactions. False end-user certificates and other customs documents 
were commonly employed to obscure the trail of dealings with 
Rhodesian firms. The practice that, in international trade, the last 
country of dispatch is of more significance than the country of origin of 
a product in a particular transaction served the Rhodesians well.
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Ironically, a number of state-controlled agencies in Eastern 
European countries were involved in direct purchases of Rhodesian 
primary products. In Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, for 
example, tobacco sales were arranged by a visiting Rhodesian 
businessman. The People’s Republic of China meanwhile exported 
pharmaceutical raw materials to Rhodesian production companies, 
though it is possible that in that case the final destination was unknown, 
since the contracts were arranged and paid in Europe and the goods 
delivered to South Africa5.
South Africa became an important conduit for the shipment of 
goods to Zambia, one of Rhodesia’s main trading partners, which as far 
as possible applied direct trade sanctions. Goods were first sold to South 
Africa then resold to Zambia and shipped back through Rhodesia to its 
northern neighbour at significant cost to the Zambian economy. In some 
cases, the goods did not even leave Rhodesia, but were collected by 
South African transport companies on their way through to Zambia. In 
addition to South Africa and Portugal (until 1974), neither Greece nor 
Switzerland made any pretence of applying sanctions, though they were 
more important as conduits than as markets in themselves.
The major changes in the direction of trade over the UDI period 
were therefore the reductions in importance of UK and Zambia, to the 
profit of South Africa and a number of continental European countries 
(see table 1.1).
Diplomatic relations
In 1965, prior to UDI, Rhodesia hosted a sizeable diplomatic 
community. Britain was represented by a High Commissioner and South 
Africa by an Accredited Diplomatic Representative. Japan, France, 
USA, Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, West Germany and Belgium all had 
consuls-general. India, Canada, A ustralia, Switzerland, Greece,
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TABLE 1.1
Comparison of direction and composition of trade in 1965 and 1980
EXPORTS 1965
Composition Direction
tobacco 28.8% Britain 22%
m inerals (ore & 33.0% Zambia 19%
processed)
manufactures 27.2% South Africa 9%
meat 4.3% West Germany 9%
cotton 3.6% USA 6%
sugar 2.9% Malawi 5%
gold (unreleased) Japan 5%
Zambia was the major purchaser of manufactures and Britain of tobaco
EXPORTS 1980
Composition Direction(Aug-Dec)
manufactures 32.0% South Africa 17%
crude materials 18.9% West Germany 11%
beverages/ 13.6% UK 5%
tobacco
gold 12.8% Italy 5%
food 11.4% Belgium 4%
Other 11.3% Botswana 3%
IMPORTS 1965
Composition Direction
Food products 10.0% Britain 30%
Crude materials 11.7% South Africa 23%
Capital goods 34.7% Europe 14%
Manufactures 43.5% USA 7%
Rest o f Africa 6%
IMPORTS 1980
Composition Direction (Aug-Dee)
m a ch in ery  and 25.8% South Africa 27%
transport equipment
mineral fuels and 24.1% UK 8%
electricity
manufactures 18.5% USA 7%
chemicals 13.5% West Germany 7%
other 18.1% Japan 4%
[source: Central Statistical Office, Harare]
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Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Finland and Turkey were 
represented at lower levels, while a number of other countries6 did not 
have resident representatives, but had accredited diplomats with 
jurisdiction in Rhodesia. Rhodesian political or commercial attaches 
were posted to London, West Germany, M ozambique (officially 
Portugal) and USA.
Despite the quasi-universal condemnation of UDI on the 
international stage, the closure of foreign missions in post UDI- 
Rhodesia was not carried out in haste. On 20 August 1966, the Minister 
for External Affairs, Lord Graham told parliament that since UDI, the 
UK had withdrawn its high commissioner and closed its diplomatic 
office, leaving a residual mission; South Africa had kept its existing 
representation; Finland, Sweden, and Turkey had closed their honorary 
consulates, while Denmark, France, Belgium, West Germany, Greece, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland had maintained their 
representation at the same level.
By 10 October 1967, only six consulates and trade missions had 
been completely withdrawn. Of those remaining, some were more 
particular than others in limiting the scope of relations. T.J. Stoklasa, 
the honorary commercial counsellor for the Belgian Consulate- 
General’s office commented at the time: “I don’t complain about trade, 
but I cannot tell you anything about that.”7 In early June, 1968, 
following the UN Resolution, Japan closed its consulate general. Just 
over a year later, on 25 June 1969, Britain closed its residual mission 
and tried, without success, to persuade the US to do the same.
A greater catalyst to diplomatic rupture appears to have been the 
unilateral assumption of republican status by the Smith regime on 1 
March 1970, following a referendum in 1969 on a new constitution.
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That month saw something of a haemorrhage. In the first week 
Norway and D enm ark broke off consular relations. The USA 
announced its intention to close its consulate general on 17th, though the 
Rhodesian G overnm ent Inform ation Office planned to continue 
operating in Washington. (Although it had no official diplomatic status, 
it was registered as an agent of a foreign government.) On 12th, the 
French announced closure, and the Swiss that they were reconsidering 
their position. The following day the West German consulate general 
ceased functioning, leaving Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Greece, 
South Africa and Portugal and Netherlands. By the end of the month, 
only the Portuguese and South Africans remained with Malawi 
maintaining a liaison office.
The Smith regime tried where possible to maintain a diplomatic 
presence abroad. In August 1966, foreign missions existed in Lisbon, 
Portugal (with five Rhodesians and seven local employees), Louren9 0  
Marques, Mozambique (four Rhodesians and five locals) and South 
Africa (six Rhodesians, eight locals). Lord Graham, described the 
London Mission as a “holding operation....until we know which way the 
cat will jump”.8 The former Rhodesian High Commissioner in London, 
Brig. Andrew Sheen suggested that the London mission should not be 
considered the most important. He listed them in order of significance 
as South Africa, Portugal and Mozambique.
In the absence of diplomatic representation, there were also a 
number of Rhodesian Information Offices, which survived throughout 
most of the UDI period. On 21 September 1977, for example, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to attempts to close down the RIO 
in Sydney, issuing a press statement that the Australian government 
should allow the office to remain open in the interests of freedom of 
speech [!]. A previous attempt to close the Office by Gough Whitlam’s
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labour government had floundered on legal grounds. Since then, 
however, the UN had passed the Resolution of 27 May 1977 calling on 
member states not to permit the funding of Rhodesian government 
agencies in their territories. In the event, the RIO received a reprieve in 
November when Australian Foreign Minister Peacock rejected the draft 
legislation as “too dragnet”, while government MPs were divided on the 
issue.9
However extensive the network of unofficial contacts may have 
remained, both the Rhodesian government and its supporters among the 
white population considered the governments and people of South 
Africa and Portugal as their only “ real friends” , despite periodic 
assurances from  foreign sym pathisers, particularly British and 
American, that their more hostile governments did not reflect the true 
feelings of their citizens.
On a political level, South Africa and Portugal provided overt 
support to the Smith regime. Econom ically, they provided the 
Rhodesian economy with a lifeline. With the introduction of the oil 
embargo, the British navy blockaded the port of Beira in Mozambique, 
from which an oil pipeline ran to Rhodesia. As a result, some trade was 
diverted to Lourenso Marques, Mozambique’s capital (now Maputo) and 
main Southern port . Blockade of Lourenso Marques was not feasible 
given its use by South Africa, which became not only Rhodesia’s 
principal trading partner, but also the most vital link in its trade routes.
Even with its two firmest allies, relations showed signs of tension, 
both at government level and among the white populations of the two 
countries, as Rhodesia’s dependence on the two countries increased. The 
Portuguese in Mozambique were suspected by the Rhodesians of 
incompetence in the fight against FRELIMO, the Mozambican liberation 
movement. In January, 1972, Portuguese Prime Minister Marcelo
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Caetano, in a none too prescient comment, rebuked the Rhodesians for 
showing unease over the military situation in the Tete province of 
Mozambique. “Some of our neighbours, with less experience do not 
conceal their fears,” he said. “They have been told more than once that 
there is no reason for their great fright.”10
In addition, the popularity of Beira as a holiday resort for white 
Rhodesians led to a certain amount of cultural friction. One Beira 
resident, Rebelo da Silva Gomes, with two teenage daughters, was 
quoted in the Sunday Mail as complaining that
a few years ago I was unquestioned head of the family. Now, my kids 
talk about drugs, they use ugly western expressions and dress in a 
manner that would shock my mother. This is the Rhodesian  
influence. 11
Following the Portuguese revolution there was, despite historical 
antagonism, some initial sizing up between FRELIMO and the Smith 
regime. On 18 September, 1974, Joaquim Chissano, then a high ranking 
FRELIMO official hinted at a possible policy of non-interference. 
However, addressing an OAU Liberation Committee meeting in Dar es 
Salaam in January 1975, Samora Machel declared that Mozambique 
would support an armed struggle in Rhodesia if the negotiations then 
underway failed.
Within nine months of Mozambican independence, relations had 
deteriorated significantly. On 3 March 1976, Rhodesian Minister of 
Defence and Foreign Affairs PK van der Byl went on radio and 
television to announce that news reports of a call by Samora Machel for 
a state of war and a closing of borders were incorrect, though the latter
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had called for Mozambique to defend itself against supposed Rhodesian 
aggression. Van der Byl explained that:
We have from time to time gone into Mozambique in hot pursuit o f  
terrorists and this is in complete accord with international law and 
custom, and Samora Machel has only himself to blame for this.12
He added that Machel “harbours terrorists” and “admits it 
openly.”13 In fact Machel had announced a closure of borders and the 
severance of all communications with Rhodesia along with the 
imposition of sanctions and the expropriation of Rhodesian assets in 
Mozambique, in a speech delivered in the presence of Abel Muzorewa, 
then head of the ANC, which served as an umbrella Zimbabwean 
nationalist movement for a brief period. Nine days later, Mozambique 
government accounts in Rhodesia were frozen.
The Rhodesian government set about training and supporting the 
MNR, also known as RENAMO, as an anti-FRELIM O irritant, 
providing propaganda back up with a radio station, Voz de Africa 
Libre, using Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation transmitters. The first 
MNR recruits received their training at Bindura in August and 
September 1976.
Nationalist Links
Pre-UDI, the Nationalist movements devoted much of their 
energy towards persuading Britain, both directly and through the UN, 
to act on their demands. After the abortive Tiger and Fearless talks, the 
realisation that diplomatic pressure would not produce the desired 
results led both ZANU and ZAPU to adopt a policy of armed struggle, 
support for which was sought among neighbouring independent 
states, the OAU, the Comecon countries and China. The exiled
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movements maintained political and military headquarters and camps in 
Zambia and Tanzania. After the victory of FRELIMO in 1974, ZANU 
shifted its major bases to Mozambique.
Most material support for the armed struggle came from the 
USSR and Warsaw Pact in the case of ZAPU and China and the 
Scandinavian countries in the case of ZANU. Soviet support for ZAPU 
right up to the post-Lancaster House elections was to retard the 
subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations with independent 
Zimbabwe (see Chapter Seven).14
At a party youth seminar in 1983, Mugabe explained the genesis 
of the armed struggle and the assistance received therein:
When most o f the leaders were detained or restricted, a few including 
Herbert Chitepo, remained outside the country. Accordingly, we, in 
restriction at Sikombela, held a meeting in the period August-October 
1965, and drew up a brief document in which we spelt out the form of 
struggle that should be carried out and then mandated those members of  
the Central Committee outside the country to constitute, under the 
leadership or chairmanship of Herbert Chitepo, a Revolutionary Council 
to organise and train a guerrilla force for the prosecution of the struggle 
which congress had tasked to prosecute. ^
Some military training had already begun in 1963 with the 
dispatch of a small group to China and a larger group of fifty to 
Ghana. The setting up of the Revolutionary Council or Dare in 1966, 
however, led to a more co-ordinated approach. Training camps were 
established in successive stages in Tanzania. In addition to the training 
facilities in its own country, China providing instructors for the 
Tanzanian camps.
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Mugabe makes it clear that ZANU had some initial difficulty 
convincing its potential backers that its formation in 1963 by dissatisfied 
ZAPU members had been necessary. Although ZANU subsequently 
came to be seen as the larger of the two movements, residual distrust 
remained on the part of Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and for a 
time, of Samora Machel as leader of FRELIMO:
At the same time, its external existence was never firmly assured, for 
those who had accepted ZAPU found it difficult to comprehend the 
raison d'etre for the formation and so for the existence o f ZANU. Thus, 
for a long time, ZANU was regarded as a minor party whose major 
counter-part was ZAPU....The death of Chitepo in 1975 was one of the 
saddest blows the party has suffered, because in its wake, Zambia 
arrested all the cadres in the country plus all members o f Dare.16
Mugabe further criticised the front-line states, at least implicitly 
for their “unwitting strategy” in 1974 “as they shepherded us into the 
ANC fold led by the politically naive and counter-revolutionary Bishop 
Muzorewa”.
Following the independence of Mozambique in 1975, the support 
patterns of the movements became clearer, with ZANU moving its 
headquarters and bases to Mozambique. Since 1970, ZANLA, ZANU’s 
military wing, had maintained rear bases in the liberated areas of 
Mozambique - an invitation initially extended to ZAPU but, which, 
according to Sylvester:
...lapsed when it became clear that ZAPU was in the throes of an 
incapacitating leadership struggle between v ice president James 
Chikerema and more militant strategists Jason Moyo, Edward Ndhlovu,
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and George Silundika that was set off by debates about the prosecution 
of the war.17
The war had begun in a small way in 1964 with plans for acts of 
sabotage. Action was, however, sporadic until 1972, when the scale and 
frequency of operations by all parties escalated significantly. The first 
real engagement, in the case of ZANU, took place in April 1966 with 
the battle of Sinoia and for ZAPU in the form of a short lived military 
alliance in 1967 and 1968 with the South African ANC, which first sent 
a joint force into the Wankie area. Although that alliance achieved little 
of practical significance, it was one factor in the subsequent strained 
relations between ZANU and the South African ANC and partially 
accounted for ZANU(PF)’s lobbying after Zimbabwe’s independence 
for greater international recognition of the rival PAC. It also heralded 
the direct and continuous involvement of South African military and 
paramilitary forces on the side of the Rhodesian Front regime.
The OAU Liberation Committee, set up in 1963 was supposed to 
provide financial support through its Liberation Fund, established in 
1964. The fund, however, depended on contributions from member 
countries and proved inefficient. It was revamped in Accra in 1973 
when the Liberation Committee set a budget for 1973/74 of £1.4m. 
Seventy percent of this was earmarked for the Portuguese colonies, 15% 
for South African and Namibian liberation movements and 5% for the 
rest. ZANU and ZAPU were theoretically allocated £35,000 each, 
provided all subscriptions were paid. In fact, well under half the total 
budget was collected18.
Despite these disappointments, it seems that international support 
for the military struggle did pick up between 1975 and 1979. Since 
independence, Mugabe has been generous in his praise for help received
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during this period. At his first OAU summit as Zimbabwe’s prime 
minister in May 1980, he saluted the part played by the Liberation 
Committee of the OAU and by the front-line presidents in trying to 
secure assistance, as well as by socialist countries, progressive western 
countries and humanitarian organisations. Certain individual members 
of the OAU were also mentioned:
I would certainly sound an ingrate if  1 did not refer to the very 
substantial material military aid that came to us from Nigeria, Socialist 
Ethiopia, Algeria and Libya, especially during the last two years of our 
struggle, which aid brought about a qualitative transformation in our 
national armed struggle.19
Although a late-comer to involvement, North Korea has been 
singled out for particular gratitude. In 1978 Mugabe first went to 
Pyongyang in quest of military aid and met Kim II Sung for the first 
time. “My memory of our first visit is still extremely vivid,” he told his 
Pyongyang hosts at an official banquet on his first post-independence 
visit in October 1980.
He had heard, he said, all about me and the national struggle I was 
leading. My request for aid would thus be granted substantially as 
submitted because our just cause was also the just cause of the Korean 
people and the Workers' Party of Korea. And the aid was truly given us 
in accordance with that undertaking.2^
Older debts have also not been forgotten. On a visit to Dar es 
Salaam in 1983, Mugabe reaffirmed the importance of Tanzania in 
Zimbabwe’s liberation:
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We feel deeply indebted to you Mwalimu, to Chama Cha Mapinduzi and 
to the government and people of Tanzania for that crucial and unequalled 
role, demanding immense sacrifices, which you played in rendering us 
abundant assistance.
Indeed, when the history of the liberation o f not only Zimbabwe but the 
whole central and southern Africa is finally written, the crucial role 
which Tanzania played must necessarily portray it as the main 
revolutionary mould in which our various territorial struggles took 
shape and content...And when that Federation was dismantled in 1963, 
here it was that the people of Zimbabwe found a sound venue for the 
development of their armed struggle...Tanzania, thus, became the 
melting pot of the revolutionary theory and practice of each liberation 
movement. Several military training camps accordingly emerged where 
our cadres were equipped with guerrilla skills for the overthrow of the 
colonial enemy.
In the case of Zimbabweans alone, our cadres were trained and groomed 
for their military and political role at such centres as Chunya, Itumbi, 
Mgagao, Morogoro and Nachingweya. It was indeed in Tanzania that 
our national struggle for independence underwent a qualitative 
transformation and our cadres were systematically instructed in the art of 
guerrilla struggle for liberation. 21
Referring to the feuding within the nationalist movement, Mugabe 
admitted that the Zimbabweans “abused Tanzanian hospitality not only 
once but on several occasions”.
Diplomatic pressure continued throughout the UDI period 
through support groups and representative offices in several countries, 
notably those with a high concentration of Zimbabwean exiles. The UK
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was pivotal in this regard, despite a lack of faith in any the British 
government's intentions.
A friend of a friend?
Although both main nationalist groups had offices in the same 
countries, relationships with the host government were rarely of equal 
warmth. Despite sharing a common view of the colonial enemy, the two 
movements fought on different fronts with weapons and aid sourced 
from different countries. In fact, those countries whose governments 
were closer to ZAPU during the struggle had more difficulty 
establishing significant relations with the ZANU(PF) government than 
did countries in Western Europe accused of being less than vigorous in 
isolating the Smith regime. The USSR was the last major country to post 
an ambassador to Harare.
Romania was one Comecon country on the side of ZANU. During 
a state visit to Zimbabwe by the Ceaucescus in 1983, Mugabe referred 
to:
[the] more than 2000 comrades [sent] to be trained in Romania, which 
used its own aeroplanes to carry them. And outside Africa, Romania 
was the country which gave us the most help in training many people.22
Prior to independence, Mugabe clearly placed his movement’s 
fight in the line of other liberation struggles:
It is necessary that if  we are to promote our revolution and the 
attainment of its goals, our struggle should be placed in the context of 
identical struggles and our national front should be strengthened by an 
international alliance with our allies and friends in the international 
community.2 3
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The struggle against imperialism, colonialism and capitalism was, 
he suggested, as much international as national:
Let us thank and never forget our allies, especially the front-line states, 
socialist countries and progressive o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 2 4
When Zimbabwe took its seat at the UN General Assembly on 26 
August 1980, Mugabe took the opportunity to thank these countries 
most fulsomely:
..There can never be sufficient recompense for the assistance given and 
supreme sacrifices made by the front line states and their nationals.
Where we died, they also died; where we were harassed, bombed and 
massacred by the enemy, their people were also harassed, bombed and 
massacred by the enemy. Where we went hungry, their people also 
went hungry. They fought with us and suffered with us the whole way 
through.25
Mugabe also thanked “several socialist countries” for supplying 
“huge quantities of effective weaponry and other material needs of 
support.” As for the west, there were amongst them:
...progressive states who made it their policy annually to budget for the 
amelioration of the physical and social needs felt by our people during 
the protracted war period. Although they did not give us arms, they 
gave us equally essential commodities for the maintenance of body and 
soul, for the welfare of our refugees and our fighters.2^
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The support received by ZANU and ZAPU during the latter war 
years and the impact of sanctions on the ability of the Smith regime to 
finance and source its growing military requirements helped to ensure 
that by the end of the 1970s, the Rhodesians were fighting a losing 
battle. Ultimately, however, it was the war weariness of the frontline 
states and the erosion of support by the South African government for 
the Rhodesian position that ensured the presence of the Patriotic Front 
forces and the internal settlement signatories at the final signing of the 
Lancaster House Agreement, which set the stage for the constitutional 
transfer of power and granting of independence.
Following the victory of ZANU(PF) in the pre-independence 
general election, Robert Mugabe was invited to form a government. 
While maintaining an overt allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, Mugabe’s 
decision to include a form er member of the Rhodesian Front 
administration in his first cabinet, David Smith, in the post of 
Com m erce and Industry M inister, suggested that im m ediate 
transformation of the country’s economic ties was not his first priority. 
Nevertheless, the contrast between ZANU(PF)’s political friendships 
and the trade and investment patterns of the country at independence 
was stark. Few of the former had previously had any diplomatic 
representation in the country; few of the latter were with countries that 
ZANU(PF) regarded as having been supportive during the liberation 
struggle. The initial focus on national reconciliation notwithstanding, 
this incongruence would need to be addressed.
1 M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country (Pan) London 1980, p.57
-  C. Sylvester, Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development (W estview) Boulder 1991, p. 47
^ ibid, p.46
4  X. M. Kadhani, The Economy: Issues, Problems and Prospects, in Mandaza (ed), p. 105
5 This information was gathered in a non-attributable interv iew' with a retired senior executive o f the 
pharmaceutical company concerned. A rather purple account o f foreign tobacco sales under sanctions is 
provided in P. Armstrong, Tobacco Spiced w ith Ginger: The Life o f Ginger Freeman (Harare: Welston) 
1987
6 Argentina (London-based), Brazil (based in Lorenzo Marques - now Maputo), Israel (Johannesburg- 
based), Pakistan (Nairobi-based), Spain (Cape-Town-based)
7  Rhodesia Herald. 10/10/67
8 Hansard: 16/9/66
9 Undated press clipping in Diplomatic and Trade Missions file (vol 2), Ministry o f Information 
library, Harare
10 Rhodesia Herald. 18/1/72
11 Sunday Mail. 27/1/74
12 Transcript o f broadcast made on RTV and RBC, 3/3/76, in Mozambique file (vol.3), Ministry of 
Information library, Harare
13 ibid
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Chapter two: Constraints
Constraints on LDC governments in the international arena. Domestic 
and international limits on policy action with specific reference to 
Zimbabwe. The impact of Lancaster House. Debt and trade.
There are a number of factors which if combined in their worst 
cases can lead to the conclusion that anything other than complete 
paralysis on the international stage is a miraculous outcome for a 
developing country.
At the simplest level, constraints are evident in the internal 
resources available for commitment to international issues. Tied to this 
is the degree to which the populace is willing to see resources 
committed to issues which they may feel are of only indirect relevance 
to them.
If, however, we were to assume a level playing field in terms of 
internal influences on foreign relations, there remains an array of 
potential external constraints.
One elastic limit exists in the extent to which countries whose 
power relations dominate the international system perceive a need to 
interact with others in their own national interests. In the post cold war 
period, the declining significance of Africa in this respect has been a 
focus of attention in a number of studies. Callaghy, for example has 
written that:
The increased marginalisation of Africa is twofold — economic and 
politico-strategic — and both aspects are tightly linked in their 
consequences. The first, primarily economic aspect is that Africa is no 
longer very important to the major actors in the world econom y  
(multinational corporations, international banks, the economies o f the
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major western countries, or those of the newly industrialising countries 
such as Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and M exico) and that econom y’s 
changing division  o f labour. The second aspect o f A frica’s 
marginalisation is that, with the end of the cold war, African countries 
have little politico-strategic importance for the major world powers.1
While pessimistic about reversing this broad trend, Callaghy does 
not imply that it is terminal. Furthermore, on a case by case basis, an 
individual country’s importance may vary in relation to specific 
situations and events, a common example being contiguity to a conflict 
area. Individual LDCs may therefore appear more “empowered” at 
certain times than at others.
Non-state actors from  LDCs face particularly  stringent 
constraints in developing significant cross border links. Domestic 
businesses are perhaps an exception, though where trade is in goods and 
services considered of strategic importance, government parastatals 
often intermediate. NGOs may have close and frequent interaction with 
foreign counterparts, but the primary arena for such interaction 
remains domestic. In the majority of LDCs, the polity’s international 
relations are vulnerable to fairly easy scrutiny, either by design or 
simply as a result of the “small town” syndrome of everyone knowing 
everyone else’s business. This can occur even in heavily populated 
developing countries, since large swathes of the population - rural, 
urban marginal, and even urban working - to whom tickets to the 
international arena are not normally sold, will be considered ipso facto  
powerless to influence events other than through mass action.
While the structuralist paradigm has been somewhat frayed by the 
collapse of command economies and the reconciliation, reluctant or 
otherwise, of national authorities across the political spectrum with the
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international market, it nevertheless continues to provide a useful 
restraining influence on flights of fancy. A sober reading encourages 
modesty in measuring the potential influence of a peripheral country on 
both the metropole and the system as a whole. Writing about what they 
term the Afro-Marxist regimes of Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, 
Rothchild & Foley find that:
they are limited in their capacity to implement their policy preferences
throughout the domains nominally under their control Moreover, the
export-oriented nature o f their commodity- and mineral-producing 
economies perpetuates their dependence, much as in the rest of Africa, 
upon the powerful industrial economies of Western Europe and North 
America. Despite dramatic change of regime goals and values, the newly 
emergent Afro-Marxist regimes find themselves no more capable of 
breaking out o f a structure of dependency and unequal exchange than 
other regimes the continent over. 2
As an explanation of the shape of the international system, 
structuralism has gained wide currency in the peripheral countries 
themselves. There is a point, however, where structuralism meets 
dependency theory, that LDC authorities must begin to look elsewhere 
for relief from their condition of marginality. “Orthodox” dependency 
theory implies a certain fatalism  that can never be comfortably 
integrated into government rhetoric. Chan has argued that:
One of the major objections to dependency theory is...the mockery it 
makes of the nationalist struggles for independence. Far from struggling 
for independence, the nationalists were mere pawns in a calculated
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procedure to alter the appearance and personnel of formal rule, leaving 
the underlying apparatus o f exploitation u n t o u c h e d .  3
Nor is breaking with the world market a viable policy option for 
a third world government with precariously scarce resources to 
allocate. Even if such a break were hypothetically possible, the 
adjustment period from the adoption of such a policy to the achievement 
of relative autarky would, in the best of cases, require a degree of 
hardship and sacrifice from the general population. Only a supremely 
(and perhaps terminally) confident government would assume that the 
majority of its citizens share with it the requisite degree of ideological 
commitment to adopting such an approach. Even Andre Gunder Frank 
has acknowledged that:
The usefulness of structuralist, dependence, and new dependence 
theories of underdevelopment as guides to policy seems to have been 
undermined by the world crisis of the 1970s. The Achilles heel of these 
conceptions of dependence has always been the implicit, and sometimes 
explicit, notion of some form of ‘independent’ alternative for the Third 
World. This theoretical alternative never existed, in fact -  certainly not 
on the noncapitalist path and now apparently not even through so-called 
socialist revolutions. The new crisis o f real world development now 
renders such partial development and parochial dependence theories and 
policy solutions invalid and inapplicable.4
Coping with compromise
It should not be assumed that all constraints are accepted with bad 
grace. Even overt foreign policy derives from the interplay of a range 
of factors which do not necessarily pull in the same direction. The
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a.ggrega.ti°n of these factors will result in some action which will reflect 
certain influences more than others. Competing opportunities and 
objectives are inevitably constraining. The more the ultimate course of 
action followed can be seen to reflect a deliberate choice from a range 
of competing alternatives, the less such constraints will be resented.
States are also likely to prioritise their international objectives. 
Where they involve what Utete refers to as “core values”5, such as 
territorial integrity, vast resources will be invested to safeguard them. 
Regional issues, such as economic integration or a dispute between two 
neighbours may also absorb substantial diplomatic resources, since they 
are perceived as having a significant impact, direct or indirect, on 
domestic affairs.
Where, on the other hand, a global issue is concerned, involving 
numerous participants with divergent aims -  many of which are 
symbolic rather than instrumental -  then compromise is more likely to 
be acceptable. Utete6 points out that, at a continental and global level, 
African involvement tends to be multilateral. This in itself requires 
compromise.
What foreign policy?
There is an argument expounded by Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, one of 
the most prolific Zimbabwean political analysts, that Zimbabwe and 
countries like it do not have a foreign policy in the full sense of the 
word, but rather react to situations and developments. Such a view is 
echoed by Wright:
One or two individual [African] states have been able to maintain a high 
profile in world affairs because of national economic conditions. The 
best example in sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria, whose oil wealth in the 
late 70s allowed it a very active role in world politics and gave the
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country some semblance of being the “champion” of Africa. But even 
this apparent leadership was illusory, as Nigeria was unable to 
marshal Africa's diversity o f opinions into a consolidated stand on
policy By the mid-1980s, Nigeria itself [had] succumbed to harsh
economic realities and [had] reorientated its foreign policy to concentrate 
on regional - rather than global - affairs.7
While recognising that individual acts by LDC governments may 
not impact on world events in the same way as those of industrialised 
nations, such governments nevertheless intend to have an impact and do 
have an impact on how their country and its citizens relate to the outside 
world. It is in that context that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is addressed. 
Furtherm ore, regional affairs can in themselves have global 
implications. Southern Africa itself provides several examples.
Rites of remembrance
At Chimoio, Mozambique in 1977, ZANU adopted the position 
that its socialism would be based on the principles of Marxism- 
Leninism.8 Such principles were not the driving force behind the 
liberation movements, whose active struggle against the political and 
economic status quo long pre-dated the adoption of this particular 
ideological umbrella. It nevertheless reinforced a set of solidarity links 
with other independence movements and supporters of anti-colonialist 
positions. Post-independence foreign relations have - on a formal level - 
expanded to take these into account. There has, however, been no 
concomitant downgrading of relations with “metropolitan” countries. 
Despite much domestic criticism of the historical role of these states in 
maintaining the “Rhodesian” system, they remain Zimbabwe's bread- 
and-butter relations.
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For some, this situation is inevitable. Mandaza states bluntly that, 
since the Lancaster House agreement, “international finance capital” has 
been “the major factor in the character of the internal and external 
policies of the state in Zimbabwe.”9
He is equally blunt on the government's ability to develop a 
dynamic approach to its foreign relations:
..it is in the field o f foreign policy that the government is most keen to 
project the impression of independence o f action, even though it should 
be obvious that international relations by definition prescribe and 
proscribe the limits of that ‘independent’ action on the part of the 
individual state. The major powers define the arena and control it; the 
small states respond. 10
Patel appears to accept the structuralist assessment of Zimbabwe's 
position in the international system , while playing down the 
deterministic implications of dependency theory. He points out that the 
attainment of independence itself was a “historically significant remedial 
action” by the colonised countries in the then-existing and seemingly 
perpetual system of colonial domination:
Even though Zimbabwe is still primarily dependent on the W est...[its] 
foreign policy already exhibits, at the very least, meaningful attempts at 
the dispersal of dependence. 11
The notion of a dispersal of dependence is a novel one, 
suggesting that if it can be spread across a sufficient number of 
metropolitan countries, this dispersal can somehow provide increased 
leverage for the LDC. Although competition for the favour of small
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states does not currently appear on the agenda of the industrial North to 
any visible degree, the attraction of potentially viable markets in 
developing countries could yet change that perception as trade barriers 
are reassessed. However, the absence of such leverage removes a 
bargaining chip for the advancement of an LDC’s international goals 
and weakens a potential line of defence to external pressures.
The Uses and Abuses of National Interest
While national interest is commonly cited by governments in 
explanation of their actions on the international stage, this is not 
necessarily in contradiction with recognition of imposed constraints. 
National interest can include action to avoid harm as well as pursuit of 
positive gain. Even white flags can be seen in certain circumstances to 
be in the national interest. On the other hand, a government is unlikely 
to promote its acceptance of constraints as a reason for any particular 
foreign action or policy.
Witness Mangwende, Zim babwe’s foreign minister during the 
“form ative” post-independence years, has provided a convenient 
example of the uses of national interest as an explanation for 
government action:
It is worth making a clear distinction between non-alignment and
neutrality in world p o litics  The essence of non-alignment (or
“positive neutrality” as it is som etim es called) is a deliberate and 
calculated refusal to enter into any military or political commitment with 
any o f the major powers or to permit the establishment of foreign 
military bases on a state’s territory. The critical point is that the state 
must not automatically take sides on the critical issues of world politics, 
rather, a country's position should be dictated by its own national 
interests first and foremost.12
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Such an approach creates the framework for any action to be 
presented as a deliberate step in the national interest. Yet on the same 
occasion, Mangwende recognised the limitations on the Zimbabwean 
government’s room for manoeuvre:
It is, o f course, true that economic dependence often imposes severe 
constraints on the extent to which an under-developed and dependent 
state -  particularly a land-locked state like Zimbabwe -  can pursue a 
genuine policy of non-alignment without compromising, even if  
temporarily perhaps, some of its most cherished ideals. It is also an 
accepted fact that while nations are free to choose their friends (and 
occasionally their enemies too), they cannot, however, choose their
neighbours.1 ^
Mugabe himself pointed to non-alignment as the key to explaining 
Zimbabwe’s post-independence pattern of relationship management:
On a bilateral basis, Zimbabwe has signed co-operation agreements with 
several African countries, as well as with Eastern and Western 
countries. Our policy of non-alignment enables us to be friendly on a 
bilateral and mutual basis, with Eastern as well as with Western 
countries, without jeopardising our sovereign will and freedom. To 
date, we have opened missions in some nine countries: Mozambique, 
Zambia, Tanzania, Britain, the United States, Ethiopia, Sweden, 
Belgium and West Germany. Several other missions will no doubt be 
opened in 1981 in socialist and non-socialist countries.14
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Speaking 11 months before Mangwende, he was, however, 
adamant that this diplomatic openness was a result of choice rather than 
compromise:
A s we enter into bilateral relations, o f either a diplomatic nature or by 
way of trade, economic or technical agreements with any nation, we are 
always careful to emphasise these principles, even though we may be 
the principal beneficiary in the relationship. It is important that we do 
not allow our benefactors to become our masters. Our independence and 
sovereignty are, accordingly, not matters for mortgage.15
Exercising choice
There are bound to be some constraints that are effectively more 
powerful than others at any point in time. In the case of Zimbabwe, the 
value of US aid and goodwill was not deemed sufficient to inhibit the 
government's condemnation of the US intervention in Grenada or its 
refusal to support the US in the Korean airlines incident (see Chapter 
Seven). Both actions led to a cut in US aid.
Two regional organisations, SADC and PTA, provide examples 
of attempts to reduce economic dependence on existing trade patterns 
(see Chapter Five). Yet a South African trade mission with quasi- 
diplomatic status remained open in Harare after independence, despite 
occasional threats of enforced closure.
Lancaster House
Mandaza has suggested that on the eve of Lancaster House, the 
national liberation movement, largely as a result of the paternalism of 
the front-line states who were keen for a settlement, was less than 
resolute in its revolutionary priorities. Britain wanted a constitutional 
compromise and got it; Lancaster House produced a settlement
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which left the machinery of government largely intact. Promises of 
massive aid from the US and UK held the country in the Western sphere 
of influence.16
While it is true that Britain came out of the conference happier 
than any of the participants, subsequent events did not bear out the 
implication that Zimbabwe was “in the bag” . The British government 
was as surprised as Bishop Muzorewa that his UANC did not sweep to 
victory in the pre-independence elections. The economic embrace of 
Zimbabwe by western industrialised countries including Britain pre­
dated Lancaster House and was simply confirmed by it. Greater 
resolution in the negotiations would more likely have led to a 
breakdown in the talks than a more revolutionary rearrangement of 
economic links.
The most direct constraining impact of the agreement was on the 
new government’s ability to re-order internal economic relations, 
specifically the distribution of land. The procedures established for land 
acquisition depended on funding from UK and US for a willing 
seller/willing buyer approach. Although some may see this as a 
deliberate locking in of Zim babwe to the western dom inated 
international economic system, the Patriotic Front must have been 
convinced either that it had no achievable medium term alternative or 
that it would eventually inherit a copy of the key along with the lock.
Part of the argument about the constraining impact of Lancaster 
House relates not to specific clauses of the resulting constitution, but to 
the compromises inherent in constitutional rather than military conflict 
resolution. It is certainly true that the Patriotic Front was tempted on 
more than one occasion to walk away from the conference and that 
Mugabe subsequently described himself as “not a happy man” as he 
signed the agreement:
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I felt we had been cheated to some extent...that we had agreed to a deal 
which would to some extent rob us of the victory that we hoped to have 
achieved in the field.17
Whether such a victory would have allowed greater room for 
manoeuvre is debatable. Samora Machel, who did achieve a battlefield 
victory in neighbouring Mozambique, apparently did not think so and, 
along with the other front-line presidents, exerted considerable pressure 
on the Patriotic Front to see the negotiating process through. 
Ultimately, Mugabe too made the judgement that he could live with the 
ensuing constitution. He described it as:
a necessary compromise of the interests o f our people for the sake o f  
international peace and security. The basic framework it provided is 
despite its imperfections, flexible enough to allow for our programme 
for the next phase of our national struggle aimed at the consolidation of 
our independence and the social transformation of our country and 
people.18
Debt
Heavy debt burdens are often considered the ball and chain on 
third world economic development regardless of the particular path 
chosen by the individual country. Mugabe has himself spoken eloquently 
and forcefully on this issue.19 Unlike many of its neighbours, 
Zimbabwe has not been saddled with crippling debt repayments.
Debt inherited at independence amounted to Z$1.6bn (approx. 
US$2.5bn based on 1980 exchange rates). This included loans incurred 
both locally and abroad. Of the total inherited, over Z$1.2bn had been
repaid by March 1992, a commitment to take over these loans having 
been assumed at Lancaster House.
In the first twelve years of independence, Zimbabwe borrowed 
just over Z$14.6bn, both internally and externally. External borrowings 
that had been disbursed by March 1992 amounted to Z$8.4bn plus a 
further Z$2bn committed under the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme introduced in January 1991, making a total equivalent to 
US$2bn. The debt service ratio in March 1992 was 22% of exports, 
down from a peak of 35% in 1987. Total disbursed debt was less than 
170% of one year's exports compared to a 1991 sub-Saharan African 
average of 340%.20
During 1987, there was some pressure exerted by creditors and 
bankers for Zimbabwe to reschedule. This would have been favourably 
regarded, given Zim babw e’s scrupulous repayments record. The 
pressure was nevertheless rejected.
The desire to maintain its credit standing obviously requires a 
government to consider measures which it believes will allow it to 
generate funds to service its debt. So long as this is achieved, the 
country’s existing obligations are likely to be less of a rein on foreign 
policy initiatives than trading links, which require more frequent 
renewal.
Where, however, the need for further borrowing is envisaged, 
there is likely to be an implicit if reluctant recognition that competition 
for funds is strong and that potential creditors need wooing. In the case 
of Zimbabwe, that process has gathered momentum over the past 
decade.
Trade
Clapham has observed that the most important political fact about 
the revenues of third world governments is their dependence on
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international trade, since the domestic revenue base is insufficient to 
meet government spending needs. Revenue can be gathered in the form 
of duties on imports and exports, levies on MNCs, taxing of foreign 
exchange transactions and the form ation of parastatal trading 
monopolies. (Aid and loans are also an obvious source of revenue.)
The most basic political consequence of this reliance on 
international trade is, says Clapham:
that it becomes almost impossible for most third world states to 
contemplate any strategy for econom ic development which would 
involve any substantial reduction in their participation in international 
trade.21
For third world states, international trading relations are thus of 
political consequence in a directly tangible way. Despite a desire to 
promote a convergence between economic and political relations, the 
Zimbabwean government early on recognised the constraints imposed 
by the international trading system. In fact, customs and excise duties 
increased as a percentage of central government revenue from 9.5% in 
1979/80 to 25.1% in 1984/85.22
Addressing the Zimbabwe Economics Society in September 1980, 
Mugabe described the country’s trading ambitions thus:
We are currently trying to find an accommodation of our beef, sugar and 
other products in the Common Market, as we, at the same time, are 
making appeals for grants, soft loans, and investments. As a third world 
country, the constraints analysed and indicated by the Commonwealth 
experts in terms of their sum total effect upon economies will soon catch 
up with us.23
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Faults in the system
Systemic iniquities are regularly highlighted by Zim babwe’s 
representatives to international fora. On the occasion of the U N ’s 
fortieth anniversary, an address delivered by Foreign M inister 
Mangwende on Mugabe’s behalf dwelt in large measure on the impact of 
the mid-eighties global recession:
If Trade is to be beneficial to all countries, developing countries should 
be guaranteed just and equitable prices for their exports. Indeed, no 
durable economic recovery can take place unless urgent steps are taken 
to safeguard the incomes o f primary commodity producers.24
Zimbabwe has consistently argued the case for a return to 
multilateralism in revitalising the global economy and in fashioning 
systemic change. It has nevertheless made efforts at a bilateral level to 
overcome inflexibility in trading patterns. These have met with very 
limited success, as individual cases addressed in later chapters, illustrate. 
Direct impact
The constraints outlined above, whether internal or external, 
fall into one of two categories: those which impact on a state’s 
ability to implement foreign policy in general; and those which 
influence the nature of the policy itself.
In summary, Zimbabwe shares many of the constraints associated 
with developing countries. Scarce internal resources and competing 
objectives provide a fiscal rein on foreign policy ambitions as a whole. 
The budgetary needs of the foreign affairs ministry must compete with 
often more compelling domestic priorities such as education and health 
and more demanding constituencies such as the defence establishment.
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Popular attitudes to such spending will, however, only be 
constraining to the extent that the governm ent considers itself 
accountable to its electorate. Mugabe has, for example, acquired the 
none-too-respectful nickname of ‘Vasco da Gama’ for the frequency of 
his foreign trips, but they have not become any less frequent for that.
Counterparty perceptions of the importance of a relationship can 
also limit a country’s ability to project its international concerns. 
Zimbabwe benefited in the first decade of independence from a view 
that its geopolitical and economic role was at least potentially significant 
both regionally and in international fora. Zimbabwean government 
representatives therefore found it easier than many of their peers to put 
their positions across on the international stage. There is, however, little 
evidence that such advocacy was ultimately persuasive to the target 
audience.
The formulation of specific policy was constrained by trade 
considerations. The need for the government to protect revenues 
derived from trade meant an unwillingness to inhibit existing trade 
patterns, though this could be seen as a logical consideration of the 
broader national interest and therefore a foreign policy objective in 
itself.
Prior to Zimbabwe’s independence, trade was largely in the hands 
of the private sector, with the state acting as a regulator of foreign 
transactions. Lancaster House, with its entrenched clauses on property 
rights, has been posited as a further constraint on the government’s 
ability to refashion economic relations through a radical restructuring 
of ownership and control of the economy.
Negotiated settlement involves compromise by its nature. These 
compromises should not be measured against the demands of the parties 
on the battlefield. If there were a serious chance that they could have
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been achieved, the ultimate decision to negotiate would have been 
obviated. This does not necessarily imply that the war was unwinnable 
in theory, but that the necessary support structures to ensure long term 
victory were either absent or declining. Even without Lancaster House, 
it is a matter of speculation whether the new government would have 
launched headlong into restructuring the economy.
We are prim arily concerned here with how Zim babwe’s 
international relations have been fashioned in the light and knowledge of 
the constraints faced both by the government and by the array of 
national economic actors. The extent to which these relations reflect 
coherent policy will depend partly on the ability of policy makers to 
recognise the limits of their influence.
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Chapter three: Policy making
Competition and co-ordination among Ministries, Cabinet, Party and the 
President. Explicit policy guidelines and their applicability.
As a political case study, Zimbabwe provides researchers with a 
number of attractions. Herbst cites three: the government’s aim to use 
the state apparatus to correct the inequities of the past; the ability to 
investigate the original decisions and gain access to the decision-makers; 
and thirdly, the fact that “Zimbabwe provides dramatic contrasts in 
organisations that seek to influence the state”.1 To this may be added a 
fourth: that many of the same decision makers are still in positions of 
power within the state or government apparatus. Studying their public 
discourse both over time and before different audiences helps to provide 
a useful composite picture of policy development and change. 
Foundations
The first official declaration on Zim babwe’s foreign policy 
principles was made by President (Rev.) Canaan Banana at the opening 
of the first post-independence parliament on May 14 1980. The speech 
identifies four key support pillars for the state’s external relations: non- 
alignment; Africa; free exchange of ideas, culture and trade; and 
reordering the International Economic Order.
On 26 August 1980, in a speech before the General Assembly on 
the occasion of Zimbabwe’s admission to the UN, Robert Mugabe, then 
Prime Minister, identified five political principles guiding the country’s 
foreign policy:
(1) belief in “national sovereignty and equality among nations”. 
Zimbabwe would establish relations with all countries “large or small, 
socialist, and capitalist” which “respect our right to an independent 
socio-economic development”.
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(2) since Zimbabwe was “dedicated to the attainment of a 
socialist, egalitarian and democratic society” , it welcomed assistance 
from  socialist states in reconstruction and developm ent, while 
recognising that Zimbabwe's socialism “will have to take place in full 
cognisance of the concrete situation in our country and in the sub- 
region”.
(3) the right of all peoples to self-determ ination and 
independence, and consequent support for liberation movements, of 
which SWAPO, PLO and Polisario had already been cited on several 
previous occasions.
(4) “non-racialism at home and abroad” , support for South 
African liberation movements, attempts to disengage from South Africa 
and increasing ties with the rest of Africa.
(5) “positive non-alignment and peaceful coexistence among 
countries having different socio-economic systems”. Zimbabwe would 
co-operate with other countries to uphold the principles of independence 
and self-determination among nations, big or small and would not wish 
“to have our friends choose for us who should be our other friends”. 2
Of the above five principles, the fifth and last provides the 
greatest room for manoeuvre. The extent of its application has varied, 
however. Patel argues for example that:
On questions of liberation, Zimbabwe clearly cannot be non-aligned and
therefore ...supports a number of liberation movements in Africa and
elsewhere.^
Although he regards the symmetry between principle and practice 
as high, Patel recognises a number of “asymmetries” which illuminate 
certain constraints and contradictions. Among these constraints are size,
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geographical situa tion , dependence and underdevelopm ent. 
Nevertheless, the principles outlined above allow for ample freedom of 
movement in foreign policy on a case-by-case basis.
Any apparent contradiction between Zimbabwe’s commitment to 
socialism and its support for positive non-alignment and peaceful 
coexistence has usually been resolved in favour of the latter. In 1987, 
Mugabe produced a vigorous defence of Zimbabwe's acquisition of 
military hardware from “the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and 
Asia” who, he argued:
are willing to give us weapons to defend ourselves against Apartheid’s 
onslaught. And when they do so there are those who question our non- 
alignment. This is mischievous and inaccurate. None o f us fought for 
our independence to become the proxy o f anyone else. Nor are we. The 
vast bulk o f our trade is with the Western countries, and they also 
provide most of our development aid, but this does not make us a proxy 
of the West any more than arms from the socialist countries make us 
their proxy.4
The Impact of the Party
Developing a theory of the locus of decision making is, says 
Herbst, particularly important in Africa because of the problem of the 
party. The Western concept of party puts it outside the state: parties are, 
at most, groups of people who occupy the state for certain periods of 
time.
However, in Africa and elsewhere in the third world, he argues, 
some parties must be considered part of the resource allocation process. 
He cites Mugabe’s claim in 1984 that ZANU(PF):
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is more important than the government, and....the Central Committee is 
above the cabinet because Ministers derive their power from  
ZANU(PF)....In the future there will be no separation of the party from 
state organs, because after the national congress in August, government 
programmes will be based on the resolutions o f the ZANU(PF) Central 
Committee.5
Mugabe had already asserted the primacy of the party long before 
that. In his New Year’s address to the nation on 31 December 1981, he 
declared that:
The policies that my government pursues emanate from the ruling party. 
ZANU(PF) has adopted socialism as its ideology. The last meeting of 
our central committee has taken fundamental decisions in respect o f the 
relationship between the party and the government. Government in the 
sense o f the cabinet will in future only adopt and influence those policies 
which the central committee of the party has approved.^
The party’s positions as outlined by Mugabe contained no 
reference to foreign affairs. Nevertheless, his belief in a correct 
hierarchy of policy decision making had been clearly expounded in 
Pyongyang, North Korea, on the occasion of his official visit there in 
October 1980. At a state banquet in his honour, he told Kim II Sung:
It cannot be doubted that the basic political instrument for the 
formulation of your politico-socio-economic goals and the identification 
of the correct means of achieving them has been the Workers' Party of 
Korea.7
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He expressed admiration for the way the party had become both 
an instrum ent for galvanising the masses and for developing 
programmes for government.
For, if the people are truly to be masters of their destiny in the exercise 
of their sovereignty, then the party which is the expression of the mind 
of the people as well as their collective voice must also comprise a 
dominant instrument of government policies.®
While Mugabe continued, at least rhetorically, to place the mantle 
of ultimate decision maker on ZANU(PF) throughout the first decade of 
independence, there was little evidence of the party playing such a role 
in practice. Certainly those occupying the most “ideological” ministerial 
posts of foreign affairs and information came from the higher echelons 
of the party hierarchy. Yet no clear consultative framework was put in 
place to subject government action to regular party scrutiny, either 
proactively or in retrospect. Party primacy thus remained a rhetorical 
fiction, in much the same way as did the people’s collective voice within 
the party. Until its abolition in 1992, the Ministry of Political Affairs 
served as a conduit for the flow of public funds to party structures but 
with little apparent consequence for state governance. Its replacement 
with a Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Co­
operatives can in fact be seen as an implicit, if reluctant, response to 
pressure for a process of delinking state and party.
ZANU(PF) did, however, continue to forge its own links with 
foreign counterparts in the first decade after independence. These were 
often affirmed through reciprocal delegations to fraternal meetings, but 
had little impact on the ties established at government level. The ruling 
party still retains a nominal involvement in foreign policy formulation
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through the Central Committee's secretary for foreign affairs. It is 
difficult to detect any practical impact from this quarter. Its own 
fraternal party relations notwithstanding, ZANU(PF)’s role on the 
international stage now appears largely ceremonial - cynically put, the 
keeper of the flame.
Pyramid selling
In contrast to Mandaza, Patel observes an apparently deliberate 
and conscious decision to engage in an active or visible rather than 
passive or reactive foreign policy style, attributing this to Mugabe’s 
deep interest in global issues.
In a speech to trainee diplomats in November 1981, Foreign 
Minister Witness Mangwende explained the foreign policy hierarchy as 
follows:
All Zimbabwe's diplomats must understand that the Prime Minister 
defines foreign policy...; the Minister o f Foreign Affairs articulates that 
policy; and under the Minister's direction, the Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs implements the policy or the dispensation from the top.9
Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore has little of the 
domestic clout within the machinery of government that might be 
traditionally attributed to institutions such as the American State 
Department and the British Foreign Office. Its primary functions might 
be described as research, collation and distribution. It is also tasked with 
carrying out what Holsti refers to as the “noncritical transactions 
between states.” 10
The only apparent internal tension over foreign policy has been 
on the implementation of economic directives resulting from political 
policy statements. Throughout the 1980s, the most sensitive area of
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disagreement was the approach to the application of sanctions against 
South Africa. On more than one occasion, the political will to 
implement sanctions was restrained by economic arguments for a more 
gradual and selective disengagement. These were, however, advanced at 
cabinet level by other ministers rather than by officials within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Chapter Five).
One road?
Frequent reference has been made in official speeches by Mugabe 
and others to the organic link between the independence struggle, 
domestic policies and foreign policy. Addressing the Zimbabwe 
National Army at a Staff College graduation ceremony, Foreign 
Minister Mangwende reiterated his definition of foreign policy as 
essentially the pursuit of the national interest:
[A] nation’s foreign policy emanates, in large part, from its own 
domestic environmental conditions and represents the strategy by which 
[it] seeks to express abroad, the substance o f its internal, domestic 
policy, and by which it seeks to reconcile internal policy objectives with 
conditions prevailing in the international arena....In defining that foreign 
policy, we are strongly influenced by those same beliefs that so inspired 
us as a liberation movement, and which guided us to a successful 
victory over the forces of oppression and reaction.11
Of prime importance, said Mangwende, was “a continuing belief 
in ourselves as a people in charge of our own destiny — aligned to and 
controlled by no other power”. Second, he cited respect for other 
nations and peoples and their right to chart their own destiny free from 
any interference from external sources, “or internal forces working 
against the wishes of their broad masses”.
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This fear of internal subversion is reflected in the Zimbabwean 
government’s UN voting pattern.12 It has generally abstained in 
resolutions concerning human rights violations, other than in countries 
where the regime is regarded as the legitimate target of a liberation 
struggle.
In domestic policy, the articulation of socialism as a goal was 
central throughout the first decade of independence. How did this 
translate into international affairs? At one level -  largely symbolic -  
declarations of solidarity and fraternity were given great prominence. 
Mangwende spoke of:
..continuing co-operation with other nations who, like ourselves, are 
actively engaged in the struggle to preserve an independent identity and 
to match our political freedom with an econom ic freedom from 
superpower colonial control. Thus the co-operation and understanding 
we established as a liberation movement with all the world’s progressive 
forces is maintained by government and will continue to develop. ^
He described as of over-riding importance, the Government’s 
continuing commitment to the socialist ideology “adopted by ZANU(PF) 
so very long ago” . The means of production and the distribution of 
wealth should be controlled by the workers and peasants and the 
capitalist mode of production should be exorcised. At an international 
level, this has meant support of “beleaguered brothers and sisters 
around the globe” , still struggling. Mangwende cited specifically 
SWAPO, ANC & PAC, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Palestine, 
and East T im or.14 He also expressed the government’s opposition to 
external interference and the presence of foreign troops in Kampuchea, 
Afghanistan and the Southern part of the Korean peninsula, as well as
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“imperialist intervention in the internal affairs of El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.” At the regional level, he described SADCC and the PTA as 
key along w ith disengagem ent from South A frican econom ic 
colonialism.
Mangwende’s interpretation of non-alignment owes as much to 
perceptions of national interest as it does to the principles of the Non- 
Aligned Movement:
We refuse to become attached to either the Eastern or Western world’s 
blocs. We are not neutral. By non-alignment we mean that we reserve 
the right to examine issue areas o f foreign policy on the basis of merit, 
and within the context, on each occasion, o f either promoting or 
protecting our own interests.15
This has meant disengagement from certain conflicts where 
established relations exist with both sides, such as the Iran/Iraq W ar16 
and the Falklands/Malvinas conflict:
Despite our close historical ties with one side, and our understanding of 
the frustration of the other, we nevertheless made known our opposition 
to the use o f force by both sides in the conflict and let them know that 
we were bitterly disappointed by the failure to take full advantage o f the 
possibilities offered it to reach a peaceful negotiated solution.17
Guns and butter
Foreign economic and political relations are rarely perceived to 
fall under the same degree of central control other than in command 
economies. The Zimbabwean government has nevertheless been at pains 
to highlight its independence from economic pressure on the one hand
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and its goal of congruence between economic and political relations on 
the other. Mangwende illustrated the former by a rejection of aid tied 
to political favours and the latter by the Government’s commitment to 
changing the international economic system:
Some countries may try to use economic assistance to us as a lever to 
gain political influence over our government. They would be foolish not 
to do so, but we would be equally foolish if  we allowed them to 
succeed....[The] government, as yet another major element o f its 
foreign policy, has placed itself in the forefront of those developing 
nations seeking to establish a new international economic order.1®
In his first address to the UN, Mugabe made a clear connection 
between political and economic policy. The guiding principles of 
Zimbabwe’s foreign political and economic policy were, he said, 
organically linked both with the principles guiding domestic policies, 
and with those principles “which have guided our struggle.”19
One method of refashioning economic relations to allow for 
increased trade with friendly countries was the use of barter and 
counter-trade, since it reduced, if not eliminated the hard currency 
element of a transaction. Initial enthusiasm for such arrangements, 
favoured by a number of potential new trading partners was short-lived, 
however. In March 1984, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, 
John Landau, announced that the government would not normally enter 
into barter deals with countries able to pay in cash. The government 
preferred cash deals and had strict criteria for barter:
There are certain exceptions we would consider. For example, if  a 
country normally buys a million dollars worth of tobacco in cash, and
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they wanted another $5m worth on a barter deal, we would certainly 
consider that.2®
He stressed that barter deals had always to be conducted at 
government level through the barter committee. The only goods eligible 
for import through barter trade were vital imports such as machinery, 
spare parts and raw materials for industry. For goods going out of the 
country, the important criterion was that “they must be of a type we are 
not selling easily. Such goods vary from time to time.” Examples of 
bilateral trade commission discussions reviewed in later chapters reveal 
a diminishing interest in pursuing such arrangements, much to the 
disappointment of some potential trading partners.
Private Investment
One of the government’s difficulties in influencing the direction 
of trade was its lack of control over the mechanisms of negotiation and 
sale in individual transactions, other than those carried out through 
parastatals. Not only was industry in private hands, but significant assets 
were owned by non-resident corporations. In 1980, the total value of 
foreign capital in Zimbabwe was estimated at ZWD2.5bn, while 
domestic investment in 1980 was estimated at ZWD1.5bn, of which half 
was private and half state-owned.21 South African interests have 
traditionally owned considerable swathes of the Zimbabwean economy, 
including majority stakes in many of the publicly quoted companies on 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange.
Attempts to change this ownership profile have had marginal 
results despite an expressed intention to gain control of the commanding 
heights of the economy.
One route to this end is to encourage domestic private and public 
capital to buy out foreign interests. Unless the proceeds of the sale can
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be repatriated, however, the foreign capital remains in the economy. 
Until m id-1993, strict exchange controls limited the scope of this 
option.
A second approach, encouraging a diversification in foreign 
ownership, has been constrained by an ambivalent attitude, most often 
expressed at party level, to foreign ownership in general, by 
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, and by the availability of 
alternative investment opportunities for such capital.
The former Danish ambassador to Zimbabwe, Hans Biering was 
appointed head of the Danish industrialisation fund for developing 
countries in January 1983. On the subject of Danish investment in 
Zimbabwe, he noted that only one Danish company had managed to set 
up shop since independence. “It is difficult to start new ventures here,” 
he commented, adding that he hoped more projects would materialise , 
involving joint ventures and the transfer of technologies.22
The prominence of foreign capital, whether South African or 
other, in the Zimbabwean economy perhaps accounts for the somewhat 
esoteric definition of socialism provided by one formerly prominent 
cabinet minister: the struggle of national capital versus
international capital.
Structural adjustment
In m id-1990, the attitude to trade and investment underwent a 
major revision with the announcement of an econom ic reform 
programme designed to open the economy to market pressures. January 
1991 saw the publication of an economic reform programme, which for 
all the protestations of the government that it was home grown, 
resembled an IMF-inspired structural adjustment programme.23 The 
acronym ESAP (Economic Structural Adjustment Programme) was
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soon in common usage with a variety of unflattering alternative 
definitions, Extended Suffering for African People being one.
In July 1993, foreign exchange control restrictions were significantly 
eased. The initial response by foreign portfolio investors drove the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Industrial Index up over 60% in three 
months. The increase in foreign participation has not, however, 
heralded a significant change in ownership profile in Zimbabwean 
industry, as existing corporate and institutional holdings are, on the 
whole, not traded.24 
Summary
At the outset, the Zimbabwean government set itself an overt task 
of using the tools at its disposal to rectify domestic socio-economic 
iniquities and to extend its fundamental concerns to the international 
arena. In that regard, the government’s commitment to non-alignment, 
socialism and a new international economic order have been declared in 
various public fora.
At the same time, however, national sovereignty and the right to 
make decisions in the national interest have been stressed along with 
promotion of a free exchange of ideas and trade. These allow 
considerable room for manoeuvre in formulating policy on specific 
issues. While there has been some recognition of contextual constraints, 
they have not been offered as inhibiting factors in individual policy 
decisions.
ZANU(PF) has been presented as the ultimate decision-making 
body, but in practice, all major foreign policy is formulated in a top- 
down fashion with Robert Mugabe, first as prime minister and then as 
president, exercising full control over its design. The fact that he and 
his senior cabinet ministers are also high ranking party officials has 
allowed for the continued fiction of the party’s predominance.
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Although Mugabe has argued for a congruence between political 
and economic relations, this has involved attempts at extension rather 
than substitution of existing international economic links. Even in this 
modest respect, the results have been mitigated, particularly in respect 
of efforts to introduce alternatives to hard currency transactions.
While foreign portfolio investment has increased, there is no 
evidence that this has altered the basic ownership structure of 
Z im babw ean industry. W ith the governm ent’s com m itm ent to 
liberalisation of the economy in the course of structural adjustment, the 
option of increasing economic influence through nationalisation has 
been abandoned.
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Chapter four: Patterns of Involvement
A panoramic view of Zimbabwe's international links as they have 
developed since independence.
The political dimension
At the time of independence, the government set out to establish a 
far broader range of relationships than either the Rhodesian regime or 
the liberation movements had historically entertained. Some of these 
were forged out of solidarity, some out of expediency and a few out of 
necessity. All were rhetorically described as friendships. At the same 
time, identifiable enemies were few. South Africa and Israel were the 
only two receiving frequent attention in public pronouncements.
Y et other conceptual enemies - imperialism , constructive 
engagement, nuclear proliferation, the international economic order - 
were strengthened by the behaviour of states and governments who, in a 
bilateral context, were considered friends. Over the first decade of 
independence, some of the tensions between bilateral ties and 
multilateral positions reached breaking point. In other cases, initially 
promising bilateral relationships lost their shine as their potential impact 
on the bigger picture diminished.
The strength of particular friendships can be assessed in two 
ways: by the priority assigned to the establishment of formal relations; 
and by the endurance of the relationships them selves. A fter 
independence, the first head of state to pay an official visit to Zimbabwe 
was Samora Machel of Mozambique (4/8/80), followed by Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania (2/12/80), Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (7/5/81) and 
Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia( 18/2/82).
All except Mengistu were honoured by having streets in central 
Harare renamed after them. He and his delegation were nevertheless
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received “with fraternal warmth and enthusiasm.” An official report 
had the residents of Harare providing a welcome of:
ardent fervour which demonstrated the indestructible friendship and 
solidarity binding the Zimbabwean people to their Ethiopian comrades 
and their enormous admiration and respect for Chairman Mengistu Haile 
Mariam and the Ethiopian people.1
(Mengistu reciprocated this supposed admiration by choosing 
Zimbabwe as his place of exile after his overthrow.)
These relationships reflected a solidarity born of the 
independence struggle as well as ties of friendship between Mugabe and 
the leaders concerned. Relations with Kaunda were not however without 
friction since he was regarded as an ally of Joshua Nkomo, having 
harboured ZA PU ’s headquarters-in-exile and provided bases for 
ZIPRA.2
By the end of 1980, Mugabe’s embrace of non-alignment enabled 
him to announce to the nation a policy of diplomatic contact based on 
inclusivity:
On a bilateral basis, Zimbabwe has signed co-operation agreements with 
several African countries, as well as with Eastern and Western 
countries. Our policy of non-alignment enables us to be friendly on a 
bilateral and mutual basis, with Eastern as w ell as with Western 
countries, without jeopardising our sovereign will and freedom.^
He cited Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Britain, the United 
States, Ethiopia, Sweden, Belgium and West Germany as countries in 
which missions had already been opened, adding that “several other
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missions will no doubt be opened in 1981 in socialist and non-socialist 
countries.”
Priorities
The key issue in Zimbabwe’s foreign relations from the outset 
was the nature of the relationship with South Africa (see Chapter Five). 
Despite a subsequent hardening of tone, initial signals were mixed. 
Zimbabwe’s policy of good neighbourliness had, said Mugabe, been 
reciprocated by all its neighbours except South Africa:
whose aggressive intentions continue to manifest themselves as she 
goes on recruiting our men, adding them to over 5 ,000 whom she 
continues to harbour and prepare for aggression.4
He demanded that South Africa cease “her aggressive and 
delinquent behaviour in our region.”
Over the course of the following year, solidarity with liberation 
movements became a very visible touchstone of foreign policy. Mugabe 
spoke of continuing to give full political and diplomatic support to the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation which, in due course, he said, would 
be permitted to open a mission in Salisbury (Harare). He also confirmed 
his support declared at the previous OAU Summit in Sierra Leone for 
the Polisario and expressed the readiness of the Zim babwean 
government to accord diplomatic status to the Saharawi Republic in 
conformity with the recognition already given it as a sovereign state.
He reiterated support for SWAPO as the only authentic 
representative of the people of Namibia, insisted on the implementation 
of Resolution 435 of the Security Council on Namibia and stood firm 
behind the PAC and the ANC “in their revolutionary endeavours to 
bring democracy to South Africa.”
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At an oratorical level, solidarity with the PLO, SWAPO and the 
Polisario was consistently maintained. Other relationships have been 
described with varying degrees of warmth, depending on the occasion. 
During the first congress of the united ZANU(PF) in 1989, Mugabe 
took the opportunity to highlight certain aspects of the country’s 
international links, as seen through the eyes of the party. Focusing on 
Africa, he named those parties and movements with which ZANU(PF) 
had “ long-standing relations of solidarity and co-operation.” They 
included FRELIMO of Mozambique; UNIP of Zambia; the Botswana 
Democratic Party; the MPLA W orkers’ Party of Angola, Chama 
Chamapinduzi of Tanzania; the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia; the Malawi 
Congress Party; the Kenya African National Union; SWAPO which, had 
recently won an electoral victory in Namibia; and the ANC and PAC of 
South Africa.
At the time, all these parties except for the last three were in 
power, heading regimes ranging from democratic to dictatorial and 
from Marxist to ultra-conservative. The common link appears to be 
their pre-eminent role in the fight for national independence, rather 
than any obvious ideological affinity.
Mugabe went on to salute the victory of SWAPO in glowing 
terms but was the only regional head of state not to attend the Namibian 
independence celebrations three months later. His reference to the two 
South African movements meanwhile suggested a shift in position. 
ZANU had historically favoured the PAC, while ZAPU was closer to 
the ANC, with which it established in 1966 an ill-fated and short-lived 
military alliance for joint action. Mugabe’s statement of support was, 
however, non-partisan, possibly reflecting the fact that ZAPU was now 
incorporated in the united party:
84
W e of the united ZANU(PF) fully support the people of South Africa in 
their struggle for democracy and against the heinous apartheid system.
We do so because this is just and moral. We do so because the people of 
South Africa are our brothers and sisters and comrades-in-arms.
We support them also because the South African regime, which fought 
us alongside the Ian Smith illegal regime during our war of liberation, 
never really reconciled itself to the reality of a majority-rule government 
here in Zimbabwe or, for that matter, elsewhere in our region. Hence, 
the myriad acts of sabotage, aggression, terrorism and murder which the 
South African regime has perpetrated against us in virtually the entire 
period since our Independence.5
Diplomatic arrivals
No sooner had the Lancaster House Agreement been concluded 
than the process of renewing or establishing diplomatic links was 
underway. Most of these initial links were at consular level or lower; 
effectively, what Holsti has called "diplom atic substations.”6
In January 1980, Mozambique, New Zealand and Australia 
announced the establishment of liaison offices. On 25 January, a seven 
member Mozambican team led by Fernando Honwana, a close adviser to 
President Machel, who had played a key role behind the scenes at 
Lancaster House, came to Harare to observe the cease-fire and liaise 
with representatives of all facets of the economy.
On the same day, the opening of an Italian consulate general with 
a staff of four was announced to the delight of the sizeable Italian 
community in Zimbabwe.
By 10 F ebruary , 14 countries had appointed official 
representatives: France (Consul), Sweden (Liaison Officer), West 
Germany (Liaison Officer), Switzerland (Consul), Netherlands (Consul
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General), Australia (Liaison Officer), New Zealand (Liaison Officer) 
Italy (Consul General), Portugal (Consul General), USA (Consul), India 
(Liaison Officer), Britain (Liaison Officer), Greece (Hon. Consul), 
Zambia (Liaison Officer), and Mozambique (Liaison Officer). On 13 
March, the Dutch government announced its intention to recognise the 
new Zimbabwe government and assist in reconstruction immediately on 
independence. The next day, France announced the same.
By the 24 April 1980, six days after independence, more than 25 
countries had requested permission to set up embassies or high 
commissions. On 30 April, the first eight ambassadors and high 
commissioners presented their credentials to the President. The first -  
an intentional honour -  was the Mozambican ambassador, followed by 
the Tanzanian High Commissioner, the British High Commissioner, the 
Egyptian Ambassador, the Zambian High Commissioner, the Guinean 
A m bassador, the Swedish Am bassador and the Canadian High 
Commissioner. This g roup  included, sym bolically, the  m ost active 
fron t-line  sta tes  b u t also Britain, th e  colonial enem y w hich was 
n ev e rth e le ss  th e  ce n tra l functiona l pow er in th e  tra n s itio n  to  
independence.
Foreign legations
Zimbabwe’s representation abroad did not mirror this diplomatic 
influx. The first postings were announced in late June, two months after 
independence, and on 1 July, Zimbabwe’s first High Commissioners and 
Ambassadors were to take up their postings at six foreign missions. 
These were London, Brussels, New York, Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa, 
and Maputo, involving a total of some 40 diplomats.
The list of first appointments reflects a desire to lock into 
regional hubs. London remained significant not only as the former 
colonial power with a crucial role in bringing the country to
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independence through the Lancaster House process, but also as the site 
of the Commonwealth apparatus. Brussels was the centre of the 
European Community; New York had the UN, and Addis Ababa the 
OAU. Only Tanzania and Mozambique appear to have been chosen 
primarily for reasons of political affinity. Even then, the desire to 
explore regional alternatives to dependence on South Africa provided an 
additional spur. Witness Mangwende, Deputy Foreign Minister at the 
time, expressed a hope that a seventh mission would open in Lusaka 
subject to availability of funds and manpower. “I can say with 
confidence” , he commented, “that we have a bunch of fine chaps for 
these diplomatic postings.”7
The training of a second batch of 40 diplomats was set to begin in 
July. These, said Mangwende, would be posted to Beijing, Stockholm, 
Bucharest, and Lagos -  all providers of support to ZANU and its 
ZANLA army during the war. By January 1981, the first phase of 
diplomatic accreditation would be complete with the posting of 
ambassadors and high commissioners to Belgrade, Dakar, Bonn and 
Algiers. Apart from Yugoslavia’s support for the struggle, it was seen 
as a critical member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Dakar was a key 
point of contact with francophone Africa. The choice of Bonn reflected 
the economic importance of West Germany, a traditional trading 
partner, while Algiers provided a friendly point of entry to Arab 
countries. Diplomatic ties with South Africa were meanwhile described 
as being “under review”.
In the event, the initial postings were delayed. The first three - 
London, Washington and Addis Ababa - were finalised in late August. 
Diplomats finally flew out to UK and Brussels on 8 October. The 
ambassador to Belgium also served as permanent representative to the 
EC. One of his first major tasks was to finalise Zimbabwe’s accession to
the Lome Convention, which would afford easier entry for Zimbabwean 
exports to the Community.
On 23 October, leaders of missions were named for Mozambique, 
Tanzania, West Germany and Sweden. A counsellor was also named for 
Lusaka, which already had a high commissioner in Harare. In mid- 
November, the dispatch of a mission to the Zambian capital was 
announced for very practical reasons: to process the applications of 
large numbers of exiled Zimbabweans wishing to return home. By 21 
January 1981, Zim babwe’s High Commissioner-designate was in 
Lusaka, searching for suitable office accomm odation, with 300 
Zimbabweans a day queuing for travel documents. The appointment of 
ambassadors-designate to Senegal and Algeria finally took place in late 
June 1981.
The initial choice of foreign missions was debated in parliament 
in September 1981, when PK van der Byl, a former Rhodesian Front 
foreign minister in Ian Sm ith’s cabinet, questioned the need for 
diplomatic representation in countries “of no use” to Zimbabwe, 
singling out Ethiopia, Senegal, Tanzania and Algeria. He also pressed 
Mangwende, by then foreign minister, for a government position on 
Afghanistan. Mangwende replied that diplomatic representation could 
not be confined to areas of security and economic interest. Cultural, 
sporting and political factors had also to be considered. He stressed that 
relations with the rest of Africa took priority and that trade attaches 
would soon be appointed. A desire to follow political ties with closer 
economic links was evident.8
Despite the prudent pace of selection of foreign mission sites, the 
flood of diplomats to the Zimbabwean capital did not subside. In the 
first year of independence, presentation of credentials became a regular 
event. May 15th saw the reception of the Australian high commissioner
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and the West German ambassador. Five days later the ambassadors of 
Romania and the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) were 
at the President’s residence.
In June, the credentials of the ambassadors of India, USA, and 
Guyana were accepted, while the establishment of diplomatic relations 
was announced with Togo and the Vatican. Libya established a People's 
Bureau. The Danish foreign minister, meanwhile, told the Danish 
parliament’s finance committee that good prospects existed for trade 
with Zimbabwe involving inflows of coal, minerals and tobacco and 
exports of manufactures and industrial plant. He called for the rapid 
establishment of diplomatic relations. On 23 June, US ambassador 
Robert Keeley announced that the US aid plan for Zimbabwe was the 
second largest in Africa after Sudan and that it involved cash grants 
rather than loan funds.
Shadow boxing
The issue of South Africa's links was raised in an indirect 
exchange earlier that month. On 4 June, South African Foreign Minister 
Pik Botha declared that South Africa was in the process of establishing 
what Zimbabwe's attitude was towards diplomatic ties. The following 
day, Foreign Minister Mangwende announced that the Zimbabwean 
government had no “political relationship” with South Africa and that 
the future of the South African diplomatic mission in Harare was under 
“active consideration” .9 On 27 June, Mugabe told parliament that only a 
trade mission would be allowed to remain, but that the continuation of 
trade and economic relations was inevitable.10
Relations with South Africa continued to deteriorate. On his 
return from an OAU summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone in early July, 
Mugabe declared that he had ordered the South African mission to 
“wind up their affairs, pack up and go” , following reports of
89
involvement in mercenary recruitment.11 On 4 September, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs announced the closure of Zimbabwe’s diplomatic 
mission in Pretoria and consulate in Cape Town. The Trade Mission in 
Johannesburg was to remain open. The Zimbabwean government asked 
South Africa to close its diplomatic mission in Harare with the exception 
of the trade section. The two trade missions would then provide 
consular assistance (an arrangement which obtained until April 1994).
Other embassy openings meanwhile continued apace. On 11 July, 
the Chinese ambassador presented his credentials as did the Austrian 
ambassador. The same month, diplomatic relations at ambassadorial 
level were announced with Greece and Algeria. Zaire, Gabon, GDR, 
Ghana, Bulgaria, and Finland followed. By the end of the year, the 
absentees were more noticeable than the countries represented. Prime 
among the former was the USSR.
After a hiatus of several months, a new round of Zimbabwean 
appointments abroad was made in January 1982. Ambassadors were 
assigned to China, Romania and Yugoslavia, bringing the total number 
of Zimbabwean diplomatic missions to 15. Four weeks later, a trade 
representative to Mozambique was appointed, followed by an economic 
counsellor to Bonn with responsibility for promoting trade with 
Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania. On 24 
M arch, an am bassador was posted to France, with additional 
responsibility for UNESCO.
High commissioners to Nigeria and Tanzania (the latter a 
replacement for a cabinet appointee) and ambassadors to the USA and 
Japan were all dispatched the same month. The opening of more foreign 
missions was, said, Mangwende, hampered by lack of funds and 
personnel. An economic counsellor to Washington was nevertheless 
appointed in mid-June.
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Opening the fourth session of the first parliament in June 1983, 
Mugabe told MPs that over 20 diplomatic and consular missions had 
been established abroad, while over 60 countries and international 
organisations were represented in Zim babwe. He referred to 
Zimbabwe’s election to the United Nations Security Council for 1983/84 
as:
clear proof of the high esteem with which our young republic is viewed  
by the international community and of the faith placed in us by our 
friends.12
By April 1985, seventy four countries, including the PLO and 
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic had diplomatic representation in 
Zimbabwe. Of these, 12 ambassadors were based in other countries in 
the region. In eight cases, the ambassadorial post was vacant. Twelve 
international organisations had also by then opened offices in Harare.
Some of the early diplomatic arrivals reflected a formalisation of 
pre-independence support given to ZANU(PF). Beyond that group, the 
inward flow of diplomats could be seen partly as “keeping up with the 
Joneses” but more seriously as reflecting a perception of Zimbabwe's 
coming importance both regionally and within Africa and the non- 
aligned movement.
The economic dimension
At the end of 1980, the practical implications for foreign 
economic relations of the government’s commitment to socialism still 
remained to be addressed. The government, said Mugabe, had been 
working on its economic policy for quite some time and an official 
statement would soon be published, encompassing government’s view on 
foreign investment and the role of private enterprise:
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The path of our socio-econom ic policy is decidedly socialist. What 
remains to be worked out is the mode of application of socialism and not 
its reality.13
Other members of the government had previously been more 
precise. In a speech at the University of Zimbabwe, the Minister of 
Home Affairs, Herbert Ushewokunze proposed that “our ideas of 
socialism are closest to those of the scientific type” rather than the 
British Labour Party version or European social dem ocracy.14 
However, Zimbabwe’s first Minister of Trade & Commerce, David 
Smith had been a M inister in Ian Sm ith’s cabinet and was a 
“reconciliation” appointm ent. In September 1980, he set out 
Zimbabwe’s foreign trade position as follows:
Before the coming to power of the new government, we had already 
entered info trade agreements with Botswana and South Africa. The free 
trade arrangement with Botswana is an important regional co-operation 
agreement, while the trade preferences w e enjoy from the agreement 
with South Africa are invaluable to our industrial exporters.
Since the coming to power of the new government, a number of  
countries have submitted proposals to enter into trade agreements...In 
accordance with the country's policy of non-alignment, we have already 
signed agreements with Mozambique, Bulgaria, Romania and Iraq on 
the basis of most favoured nation treatment. Agreements are currently 
being negotiated with Zambia, Malawi and Yugoslavia. Trade contacts 
have also been established with China, North Korea, Pakistan and 
Tanzania. Zimbabwe is listed as a beneficiary of GSP (generalised 
system of preferences) schemes by US, Canada, Norway, Australia, 
Austria, New Zealand and Sweden.15
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From the outset, there was therefore a recognition of the 
importance of existing trade links, coupled with a policy of exploring 
the potential of alternatives. The first trade representatives appointed to 
take up their posts at the end of November in London, Bonn, Maputo 
and Washington reflected the former, as did the next two postings to 
Lusaka and Brussels. At the same time, a desire to develop new 
economic links was explicit. Speaking in Pyongyang in September 1980, 
Mugabe declared to Kim II Sung that:
The anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle must continue until both 
our regions are rid o f the remaining imperialist forces in their southern 
parts. Yet we have, in our case, now to use our independence as an 
instrument for achieving the economic goals of our revolution....It is in 
pursuance of this objective that we would wish to see our friendship and 
alliance being consolidated.16
The need to expand trade relationships was explained thus by 
Minister of Trade and Commerce Richard Hove in 1982:
Almost everything produced in Zimbabwe has a foreign exchange input 
and to earn the foreign exchange to provide this input, it is necessary 
that Zimbabwe has good and effective trade relations with the rest of the 
world.17
Trade patterns and political will
Since independence there have been some shifts in the direction 
and composition of trade (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). Yet attempts to 
fashion bilateral trade ties to reflect political friendships have rarely
resulted in mutual satisfaction for the parties involved. In some cases, 
initial obstacles prevented progress. In December 1981, for example, 
soon after the opening of a Libyan People’s Bureau in Harare, its 
secretary Omar Dallal offered to supply oil to Zimbabwe if an 
alternative transport route could be found. It wasn’t.
Other relationships began with promise but the potential remained 
unfulfilled. In late November 1984, a meeting of the joint committee on 
trade between Zimbabwe and India attempted to identify factors 
hindering trade between the two countries.18 In 1981, Zimbabwe’s 
exports to India - asbestos, wattle, low carbon ferro-chrome, nickel and 
nickel alloys - came to ZW D4.03bn. In 1983, this was down to 
ZWD1.72bn. Indian exports to Zimbabwe - packing, washers and 
sealing rings, synthetic fibres, engines, diesel tractors, industrial lathes, 
machinery, air and gas compressors and food processing machines 
-came to ZWD1.53bn in 1981 and ZWD2.68bn in 1983.
While subsequent years showed improvements in both directions, 
bilateral trade in 1990 accounted for roughly the same proportion of 
trade flows (0.6%-0.7%) as it did in 1981.
Some progress was made in reducing South Africa’s share of 
trade flows, though it remained significant as a trading partner and key 
as a conduit (see Chapter Five). In 1985, South Africa slipped into 
second place in the export market, buying 11.4% of total exports and 
subsequently competed with UK and Germany for the top position. 
Since the removal of sanctions on South Africa, however, it has once 
again clearly re-established its position as top trading partner. In the 
import market, South Africa, UK, USA and West Germany remained 
the top four suppliers throughout the period under review.
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TABLE 4.1
EXPORTS 
Composition (%)
1981 1983 1985
food prods. 15 15 16
beverages/ 25 23 24
tobacco 
crude materials 19 18 19
fuels/electricity 1 2 1
oils/fats - - -
chemicals 2 1 1
manufactures 27 33 32
c la ss if ie d  by
materials
machinery/ 2 1 2
transport 
misc. manu 10 7 4
IMPORTS 
Composition (%)
1981 1983 1985
food prods. 2 2 4
tobacco/ -
beverages
crude materials 3 4  4
fuels/electricity 21 21 24
oils/fats 1 1 1
chemicals 14 14 15
manufactures 19 15 16
c la ss ified  by 
materials
machinery/ 32 34 29
transport/
equipment
misc manu 8 9 7
1986
19
25
16
1
2
32
2
4
1986
2
1
6
15 
1
16 
14
38
7
source: CSO
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TABLE 4.2
EXPORTS
DIRECTIO NS)
1982 1985 1987 1990
South Africa 17 11 10 9
UK 10 13 13 11
USA 8 6 6 7
West Germany 8 10 10 12
Japan 3 5 5 5
Botswana 3 4 6 6
IMPORTS
DIRECTIO NS)
1982 1985 1987 1990
South Africa 22 19 21 20
UK 15 10 12 12
USA 10 10 9 11
West Germany 8 7 9 7
Japan 5 3 4 5
Botswana 3 3 6 4
Source: CSO
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Aid and Investment
In January 1989, President Mugabe was awarded the Africa Prize 
for Leadership in London. In his address, he described the task of 
reconstruction at the time of independence:
Massive financial and material resources were urgently needed to 
address both the immediate and long-term problems facing the country.
The most pressing task was the mammoth task of restructuring the basic 
socio-economic infrastructure which, inter alia, included destroyed 
roads, bridges, lines of communication, homes, schools and health 
centres. There were hundreds of thousands of returning refugees and 
war-displaced communities and individual persons all in dire need of 
resettlement into viable and productive societies. *9
While several bilateral aid agreements were forthcoming in the 
first year of independence, a co-ordinated response to the rebuilding 
needs of the country was lacking. In March 1981, the government 
therefore convened a special conference on reconstruction and 
development, known as ZIMCORD, to attract the desperately needed 
assistance, particularly in the form of grants and soft loans.
The Government successfully  explained Zimbabwe's case and 
requirements to the international community....We felt deeply indebted 
and grateful to all our friends for the generous and timely response to 
our appeal for assistance.2®
At the time, the need for ZIMCORD was presented in somewhat 
starker terms by Economy M inister Bernard Chidzero. What was
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required, he said, was a one time massive injection of resources into the 
economy:
The response of the international community in providing assistance to 
Zimbabwe has so far been very disappointing. Since independence, a 
total o f ZWD 196.9m (USD300m) in the form of loans and grants has 
been pledged. Of this, ZWD131m is grants of which only ZWD52m or 
39.7% has been received. ZWD65.2m represents loans, of which only 
ZWD462,000 or 0.7% has been received.21
Zimbabwe, said Chidzero, was approaching donors with an 
urgent appeal for aid totalling ZWD1.2bn, covering public sector 
programmes over the period 1981 to 1984, as specifically outlined in 
the ZIMCORD agenda. The estimated total financial investment 
requirements, both private and public, of the economy over the same 
period were put at ZWD4bn of which approximately half was in the 
public sector.
The conference, which was regarded as a success, indicated the 
degree of goodwill existing towards the newly independent country (see 
table 4.3). Almost ZWD1.3bn was pledged, rising to ZWD1.8bn with 
post ZIMCORD pledges. Confirmation of pre-ZIMCORD commitments 
accounted for ZWD365m. Of the initial sum, 53% came in soft loan 
form and 47% as grants. Some 94% came from Western sources: 
ZWD 177m from UK and ZWD 172.6m from USA.
The rejection of either explicit or implicit political conditions on 
aid has been rhetorically firm from the outset. Yet where such rejection 
has occurred on occasion, it has been ex post facto. The most significant 
example concerns the suspension of the US aid programme in the mid 
1980s (see Chapter Seven).
TABLE 4.3
ZIMCORD PLEDGES
DONOR PLEDGE (ZWD) DONOR PLEDGE(
African 39.8m Iraq 1.9m
Development Bank
Arab Bank for 31.3m Ireland 0.045m
Economic
D ev e lo p m en t in
Africa
Australia 14.6m Luxembourg 1.9m
Belgium 8.0m Netherlands 16.2m
Canada 33.3m New Zealand 0.174m
China 17.5m Nigeria 12.4m
Denmark 12.5m Norway 11.3m
EEC 120.0m OPEC 6.3m
Egypt 1.3m Saudi Arabia 3.1m
Finland 5.2m Sierra Leone 0.056m
France 71.4m Sweden 55.4m
West Germany 62.3m Switzerland 66.3m
Ghana 0.63m UK 177.0m
Holy See 12.5m UN 26.4m
Italy 23.1m USA 172.6m
Japan 3.08m World Bank 287.5m
Jersey 0.075m Yugoslavia 2.8m
Kuwait 32.5m Commonwealth 2.9m
source: Status Report on External Development Assistance to Zimbabwe (Ministry o f  Finance 
Economic Planning and Development)! 986
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The largest multilateral donor at ZIMCORD was the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Developm ent, whose presence in 
Zimbabwe’s donor profile has remained high. From 1980 to 1989, the 
government signed 15 loan agreements with the World Bank amounting 
to USD541m in direct assistance. Most of the World Bank loans have in 
turn attracted co-financing grants from bilateral donors.
Summary
The Zimbabwean government’s approach to foreign relations 
since independence could be described as one of extension and attempted 
reordering rather than substitution.
Formal relations were forged with a wide spectrum of countries. 
South Africa and Israel were the only two singled out for blanket 
vilification. Africa received initial priority in terms both of official 
visitors and the establishment of Zimbabwean missions abroad. Beyond 
that, however, the first non-African missions were to UK, USA, 
Belgium, West Germany and Sweden. Of these, only the last could be 
said to have actively supported ZANU(PF) in the independence struggle.
Arguably, the economic aspect of ties with this group of countries 
-  whether as trading partners, investors or donors -  was more 
important to the Zimbabwean government than political affinities. These 
links were consolidated as new links were forged.
While attempts were made to bolt an economic dimension on to 
many of the newer bilateral political relationships, primarily through 
the establishment of trade commissions, these efforts had little sustained 
impact on overall trade patterns.
South Africa presented a special case demanding a continuation of 
economic ties in the face of overt political hostility. This was achieved 
through the reciprocal maintenance of trade missions serving, at the 
same time, a quasi-consular role.
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Aid was sought and received from a variety of sources, both 
multilateral and bilateral. Beyond the actual establishment of diplomatic 
relations, aid programmes do not seem to have influenced Zimbabwe’s 
policy positions. On occasion, the government has been prepared to 
jeopardise certain bilateral aid flows in defence of its position on 
specific issues.
1 Ministry o f Information Press Statement, 23/2/82
2 However, by the time o f  Kaunda’s defeat by Frederick Chiluba in the general election o f 1991, the 
relationship had warmed sufficiently for Mugabe to regret Kaunda’s departure.
3 Policy Statement No. 2: PM ’s New Year Speech to the nation, December 31, 1980 (Ministry o f  
Information and Tourism) January 1981.
4 ibid
5 Report to the Central Committee, 1989 (Not published; copy obtained privately)
6 K Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis 4th ed. (Prentice Hall International: 
London) 1983, pp168-169.
7 Herald 27/6/80
8 reported in Herald. 18/9/81
9 Herald 6/6/80
10 Hansard 27/6/80
11 Herald 8/7/80
12 Herald 21/6/83
13 New Year Speech, 1980
1-4 Ministry o f Information Press Statement, 5/8/80
13 Ministry o f Information Press Statement, 5/9/80: Speech (read on his behalf) to International 
Economic Conference on Zimbabwe
16 Policy Statement No 1: PM Addresses State Banquet in North Korea, October 9, 1980 (Ministry of 
Information and Tourism) October 1980
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17 Herald 9/11/82
18 Minutes o f Joint Committee Meeting, in India File, Bilateral Treaties Section, Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs, Harare (accessed by formal request)
19 Speech on receiving Africa Leadership Prize, Royal Commonwealth Society London, January' 1989. 
(Author’s notes - present as journalist)
20 ibid
21 Ministry o f Information Press Statement, 11/2/81
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Chapter five: Zimbabwe in the Region
a) South Africa
The conflict between political and economic imperatives; changing trade 
patterns; transport links; advocacy of sanctions; sanctions and the 
Zimbabwean economy; relations since the unbanning of the ANC, PAC 
and SACP.
b) Mozambique
M ozambique’s special role in the independence struggle; Samora 
Machel's influence on government strategy at independence; Beira 
Corridor and Maputo rail link; Rhodesia and RENAMO; Zimbabwe and 
REN AMO; limits of solidarity
c) Regional Organisations
Southern African Development Community; Preferential Trade Area; 
SADC v. PTA; trade with other SADC countries
a) South Africa
During the 1980s, it was on the issue of South Africa that the 
Z im babw ean governm ent was most often accused o f policy 
inconsistency. While supporting sanctions against South Africa and 
chiding countries which did not apply them, Zimbabwe continued to 
trade with South Africa. This was pointed to as a sign of hypocrisy.
Defenders of the frontline states argued that Zimbabwe did not so 
much trade with South Africa as remain dependent on it as a result not 
only of trade flows but of infrastructural links. The maintenance of such 
a relationship was itself seen as part of a South African strategy to 
inhibit greater commitment by frontline states to active support of 
liberation forces. In defence of the apartheid system, following the 
collapse of Portugal's colonial rule in Africa in 1974, the South African 
Ministry of Defence under the then Minister P W Botha developed a
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Total Strategy for the region. The strategy advocated, inter alia , 
economic and other action in relation to transport services, distribution 
and telecommunications, with the objective of promoting or enforcing 
political and economic co-operation in the southern African region.
A concerted sanctions policy coupled with support for the 
SADCC countries was seen by South Africa’s neighbours as a way of 
lessening this dependency. Sanctions were one way of raising the price 
of apartheid both economically and psychologically.
Writing in the Winter 87/88 issue of Foreign Affairs, Mugabe 
outlined both the economic and military dimensions of the crisis. 
Although Zimbabwe did not allow military operations against South 
Africa to be launched from its soil, Mugabe defended the right to fight 
for independence, citing the half-century of non-violent struggle by the 
ANC from its foundation in 1912 and the precedent of the US and 
Europe under occupation. He also pointed to incursions into 
neighbouring countries by South African Defence forces to highlight the 
direct impact of apartheid on the region. At the same time, then, 
Mugabe exposed the dilemma behind the rhetoric: on the one hand, 
action against the apartheid system was imperative not only for the well­
being of the South African population as a whole but for the security 
and health of the other countries in the region; on the other, the limits 
of action by these countries were defined by the very dependence they 
sought to address.
Economics
The Zimbabwean economy depends on South Africa not only for 
a substantial percentage of its trade, but more significantly as a conduit. 
Key transport and telecommunications traffic passes through South 
Africa, indicating the extent to which the country’s economic 
infrastructure is built on the existence of close links with its powerful
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neighbour. Disengagement was therefore both slow and partial, limited 
by the ability of its regional allies to construct collective viable 
alternatives.
Although South Africa's diplomatic mission was closed in 1980, 
diplomacy of a kind continued through the presence of trade missions. 
Zimbabwe inherited a foreign debt of ZWD353.3m of which over 
ZWD38m was owed to South Africa. Staggered payment was agreed 
upon. Sports ties were severed but tourism continued, with the trade 
commission in each country assuming responsibility for the issue of 
visas.
The rapid pace of change in South Africa which the 1990s 
ushered in eased the pressure for economic disengagement, while at the 
same time posing a challenge of political and rhetorical adaptation: how 
to acknowledge that the situation was dynamic without yielding to the 
euphoria that the abolition of apartheid was imminent.
A new charge arose that Zimbabwe had been slow to recognise 
new realities. M ugabe insisted that diplom atic relations were 
unthinkable until a transitional democratic government was established. 
On the question of sanctions, he maintained an ambivalence, arguing 
the need for relentless pressure on the South African government, while 
recognising the vital nature of bilateral economic links.
Early signals
During the first decade of independence, it is on the question of 
relations with South Africa that constraints were most overt and painful 
as they clearly worked counter to government objectives.
Although a final and definitive rupture was avoided and, some 
would argue, impossible anyway, relations between South Africa and 
newly independent Zimbabwe rolled rapidly downhill. Speaking in
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Pyongyang on his first state visit abroad in 1980, Mugabe struck a note 
of pragmatism in reference to South Africa:
My country has, in spite of South Africa's aggressive activities, 
committed itself to a policy o f peaceful coexistence with all its 
neighbours including South Africa itself. Acting, however, on the basis 
of principle and in accordance with the OAU Charter and Resolutions, 
our young republic has refused to maintain any political and diplomatic 
relations with South Africa, though recognising as all our other 
neighbours have done, the reality of existing economic ties with and 
dependence upon South Africa.1
At the same time, however, he hinted at how unpalatable he found 
that link:
It is our belief that political independence cannot have any real meaning 
and significance to our people unless it were accompanied and 
reinforced by economic independence as w e l l . 2
South African pressure on Zimbabwe, designed at the very least 
to illustrate the latter’s dependence, if not actually effect a regime 
change, drove home the potential ramifications of all-out bilateral 
conflict, but also led to a hardening of political positions. Chan outlines 
a variety of actions undertaken by the South African government in 
1981 to put the economic squeeze on its northern neighbour:
First Pretoria threatened to terminate a trade agreement that provided 
significant benefits to the Zimbabwean economy (preferential customs 
duties for Zimbabwean exports to South Africa, as well as guaranteed
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quotas for some products). N ext it threatened to send home the 
approximately 40,000 Zimbabweans who work in South Africa. Then it 
precipitated a transport crisis and squeezed Zimbabwe’s supply of 
essential fuel by withdrawing a large number o f locomotives, freight 
trucks, and tanker cars that were on loan to Zimbabwe’s railroad. 
Although the South African government claimed these actions were 
dictated by its own domestic needs, the foreign policy purposes in 
respect to neutralisation of neighbouring states were in fact quite clear. 3
Subsequent actions, both covert and overt, continued to give the 
issue of apartheid a regional dimension. In October 1985, before the 
UN General Assembly, Mugabe criticised the complacent attitude of the 
major western powers to the need for radical change in South Africa. 
Unity of purpose, he argued, was particularly vital when dealing with 
hotbeds of tension and conflict in the world:
Regional conflicts have, if incorrectly handled, the capacity to engulf us 
all in a major catastrophe. And of the many regions of tension and 
conflict today, few challenge the United Nations system with such 
poignancy as the tragic situation prevailing in Southern Africa....The 
hallowed principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
and the cardinal principles that states shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state are all violated by the apartheid 
regime of South Africa....The Pretoria regime's continued existence 
poses a threat to international peace and security. Apartheid is in every 
sense and meaning a crime against humanity and a threat to international 
peace and security o f the same genre and origin as nazism, its spiritual 
and philosophic ancestor.4
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Mugabe described the unwillingness, of those great powers that 
“wield such obvious influence over South Africa” to flex their muscles 
in support of change as one of the greatest betrayals to the United 
Nations system and the concept of the brotherhood of man. He accused 
the major powers of indifference and cynicism which emboldened the 
South African regime, singling out the United States and the UK, 
appealing to them to “stop being the misguided protectors of this evil 
regime.”
Attitudes to South Africa became a significant yardstick in 
relations with other countries. Of all the strains that appeared in 
relations with the UK and the USA in the 1980s, disagreements over 
South Africa were responsible for the nadirs. Zimbabwean ire at 
perceived indifference was based not only on a declared abhorrence of 
apartheid but on the destabilising impact of South African policy in the 
region. In the case of Zimbabwe, said Mugabe, South Africa had a dual 
strategy:
The first is to recruit, train, finance, equip and deploy dissidents and 
malcontents whom they infiltrate back into Zimbabwe to spread 
destruction and fear. A special radio station has been installed in the 
Northern Transvaal for use by these bandits which daily beams hostile 
propaganda against my Government. The second is to use the bandits in 
Mozambique known as Mozambique National Resistance Movement to 
cut all of Zimbabwe's outlets to the sea through Mozambique, whether 
by rail, road or pipeline. South Africa's continued use of rebels in 
Mozambique is a flagrant violation o f the solem n and binding 
undertaking she entered into at the time of the signing of the Nkomati 
agreement. B esides trying to overthrow the G overnm ent of
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Mozambique, the second aim of these bandits as directed by Pretoria is 
to make Zimbabwe and other landlocked Southern African states 
become totally dependent on South Africa.5
The strategy was designed to make hostages of the frontline states 
in any moves to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against 
South Africa. The argument could then be made that the black people of 
South Africa and the majority-ruled independent States surrounding 
South Africa would be the first to suffer if sanctions were imposed 
against South Africa.
Mugabe rejected the argument and urged UN members to apply 
sanctions without hiding behind the vulnerability of the frontline states:
We accept that there is a price to be paid for the liberty of our brothers 
and sisters in South Africa and Namibia. For our part, we are prepared 
to play our full role. But equally we expect the international community 
to shoulder its responsibility to the region for the consequences of any 
decision and action it may take, including mandatory sanctions, in 
fulfilment of its duties and obligations to the people of South Africa.
Throughout the 1980s, Mugabe fought an uphill battle to give 
practical effect to this commitment. Internationally, he had the task not 
only of persuading countries to impose sanctions at some cost to 
themselves but to compensate the frontline states which would certainly 
suffer as a result. Domestically, it was not clear that the rest of the 
cabinet was willing to back compete severance of economic ties.
In November 1985, Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero outlined 
in detail the nature of Zimbabwe’s economic interaction with South 
Africa.
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Because of the long existing trade, investment and financial 
arrangements, there was, he said, an almost umbilical relationship 
between the two economies, although significant achievements had been 
made since independence in reducing the high degree of dependency on 
South Africa.
Even so, the econom ic fortunes of the two countries are closely  
intertwined. To begin with, Zimbabwe has very high trade ratios - the 
country is closely and almost inextricably linked to developments in the 
outside world. In 1984, our total exports including to South Africa were 
25.5% of our GDP, compared to 28.2% in 1979 and 1980 respectively, 
representing a slight decrease in dependence on the outside world. But it 
is still significant.
Similarly, our imports as a percentage o f total consumption stand at 
about 20% compared to 23% and 27% in 1979 and 1980 respectively.
This is the more significant considering the nature of the imports: fuel, 
industrial raw materials, machinery and equipment, etc.6
Imports from South Africa consisted mainly of basic items such 
as machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and manufactured 
goods and mineral fuels. Exports to South Africa were largely from the 
secondary sector, particularly textiles and clothing, but also included 
tobacco, cotton and other crude materials.
The Zimbabwean economy, said Chidzero, was vulnerable to 
actions which might disrupt trade relations. Although it would not 
collapse, it would function at a reduced rate, generating unemployment, 
shortage of goods and general hardship.
In all this, access to the sea was vital. If Beira and Maputo, the 
two main ports in Mozambique, had been open and fully functioning,
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these routes would be preferable but “unfortunately, as things stand at 
the moment, the Chiqualaquala line is virtually inoperable because of 
disruptions and sabotage by the MNR and we are forced to concentrate 
on the use of Beira, which can only carry a maximum of 30% of our 
total trade and that at fairy high cost in view of the defence and security 
arrangements.”
In 1982, lines through Mozambique carried 53% of Zimbabwe’s 
exports and imports and South African routes 47%. In 1983, the figures 
were 46% and 54% respectively. In 1984, due largely to deterioration 
on the Maputo line, the figure was 33% for Mozambique and 67% for 
South Africa. In 1985, the bulk went via South Africa.
Chidzero singled out transport as a critical area if sanctions were 
imposed. If South Africa closed routes and increased disruption on the 
Chiqualaquala line, appropriate anticipatory measures would be 
necessary to ensure traffic through Beira. Although plans were afoot to 
rehabilitate both the port and the transport route itself, the implication 
was that Beira could not be considered a realistic alternative for the 
bulk of Zimbabwe’s trade traffic.
Financial relations perhaps provided g rea ter room  for 
manoeuvre, with a two way relationship in terms of financial flows: in 
1984, in respect of total services (freight insurance etc), South Africa 
received over ZWD83m. To this could be added ZWD19m in terms of 
profits, dividends and interest remitted to South Africa plus another 
ZWD63m in pensions, annuities and pension commutations, giving a 
combined total of ZWD165m. Inflows from South Africa amounted to 
ZWD23m. Chidzero suggested that some leeway could be available with 
skilful handling. In addition Zimbabwe owed South Africa some 
ZWD200m. Yet, he suggested, it was unlikely that withholding such 
flows would cripple the South African economy.
I l l
As Table 5.1 indicates, trade flows with South Africa did not in 
the event suffer any significant disruptions despite political intentions. 
On the other hand, the figures do reflect a modest degree of success in 
another policy choice: that of denting South Africa’s relative dominance 
as a trading partner.
From the beginning in earnest of the reform process in South 
Africa, the priority given to this policy choice declined. In 1990/91, 
South African exports to Zimbabwe rose by 40%, stabilising at around 
ZAR1.55bn in 1992, according to figures from the South African 
Department of Customs and Excise (see table 5.2). Zimbabwean exports 
to South Africa meanwhile grew by 62%.
112
TABLE 5.1
SOUTH AFRICA 
exports to imports from
year ZWD m % of total year ZWD m % of total
1980 59.4 17.1 1980 104.7 27.4
(Aug-Dee)
1981 192.2 21.6
(Aug-Dee)
1981 279.7 27.5
1982 137.8 17.1 1982 239.4 22.1
1983 192.0 18.7 1983 259.9 24.5
1984 232.2 18.3 1984 231.8 19.3
1985 166.5 10.8 1985 273.2 18.9
1986 211.1 12.4 1986 351.2 21.4
1987 185.4 9.8 1987 361.5 20.8
1988 248.1 9.8 1988 393.5 19.2
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 321.7 8.9 1990 902.1 19.9
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
TABLE 5.2
South Africa - Zimbabwe trade 1992 (Rand millions)
MAJOR SECTOR Zim to SA SA to Zim Zim trade deficit
Base metals 97 384 281
Machinery 38 301 263
Chemical prods 13 252 239
Transport equip. 9 155 146
Plastics, rubber 25 97 72
Textiles 139 79 [60]
Food, tobacco 167 30 [137]
Mineral prods. 80 50 [30]
Wood prods. 52 11 [41]
All goods 763 1,553 790
source: South African Department of Customs & Excise
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b) Mozambique
M ozam bique has been in tim ately  linked w ith political 
developments in Zimbabwe since UDI, initially in supporting sanctions 
evasion during the UDI years, then in harbouring ZANU(PF) and 
ZANLA during the crucial years of the independence struggle, and 
finally in exerting its influence to ensure that the Patriotic Front saw the 
Lancaster House process through to the end.
Opening the first Zimbabwe-Mozambique friendship week in June 
1980, Mugabe said that the two countries had discovered each other on 
the battlefield. The relationship was, he said, deepened in the north­
eastern offensive in 1972-73, “which we were able to launch from the 
liberated areas of Mozambique.”7
It was a friendship that grew out of a change of appreciation by 
FRELIMO of the differences between ZANU and ZAPU. Machel 
initially considered ZANU to be a breakaway from the legitimate 
liberation movement. Even then, the decision in 1974 to replace 
Ndabaningi Sithole as leader of ZANU was not initially well received by 
the frontline states whose presidents were making strenuous efforts to 
unite the Zimbabwean nationalist movements under a single banner. The 
late Maurice Nyagumbo, a veteran nationalist involved at every stage of 
the movement’s development, describes a meeting in Lusaka in late 
1974, soon after the decision to suspend the Rev. Sithole had been taken:
We parted company with Dr Nyerere at midnight. We then went to see 
President Samora Machel but could not get him at his house. He later 
arrived at our lodge at about one o ’clock Friday morning. At the 
beginning he was very hostile towards us. Through an interpreter, he 
too expressed his disgust over the decision of the executive in prison to 
suspend Rev. Sithole. He minced no words as to what he intended to do
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if  we had maintained our decision: he was going to order the arrest of 
our two thousand five hundred men-of-war who were at present in their 
reserve bases in Mozambique. I must admit that he was the only man 
who succeeded in intimidating me.®
As the military operations from Mozambican bases intensified, 
the relationship warmed, By the time of independence, Mozambique was 
seen as a steadfast ally, which had endured significant pain for its policy 
of solidarity.
The Rhodesian governm ent was meanwhile nurturing the 
Mozambican National Resistance Movement, alternatively known as the 
MNR or RENAMO. In 1976, Voz de Africa Libre began broadcasting 
to Mozambique from Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation transmitters. 
In August and September of that year, the first MNR received military 
training at Bindura. The radio station went off the air in February 1980 
and by the middle of the year was transmitting again from the Transvaal 
in South Africa.9
After independence the relationship between the Mozambican and 
Zimbabwean governments remained close. When in March 1984, the 
Mozambican government reached the Nkomati non-aggression accord 
with South Africa, involving the removal of the ANC as an effective 
force from Mozambique, there was some consternation from anti­
apartheid forces. Mugabe nevertheless defended the Mozambican 
decision. While expressing understanding of ANC disenchantment with 
front-line state support for the Nkomati accord, he said that the latter 
were too weak to provide the ANC with the bases it needed.
Trading places
From a geographical perspective alone, Mozambique would 
provide greater attractions than South Africa as a conduit for
116
Zimbabwe's trade. The ports of Beira and Maputo are both nearer than 
any South African alternatives and served by parallel road and rail 
links. The railway line from Harare to Beira was put through in 1900 
and has traditionally played a key role in moving Zimbabwe’s overseas 
trade. Since the mid 1980s, therefore, Zimbabwe has invested 
considerable resources in rehabilitating M ozambican routes as 
alternatives to South Africa. Priority projects have been the upgrading 
of port facilities and defending the transport routes themselves from 
attack. In November 1982, Zimbabwe sent troops into Mozambique to 
help defend the Beira corridor. They remained in that role until the 
negotiation of an accord between FRELIMO and the MNR in the early 
1990s .
To rehabilitate the line and the port, a tripartite project was 
initiated in 1986. The Beira Corridor Group Ltd (BCG), registered in 
Harare, represented the business sector in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi 
and Botswana. The International Beira Group, registered in Oslo, was 
to represent international business interests, while Beiracor Ltda, 
registered in Beira would act as a co-ordinating company. The BCG 
officially began trading in April 1987. At its first AGM in September 
1987, the ability of the Corridor to carry cargo was put at 30% of 
Zimbabwe’s overseas trade.
Rehabilitation under the aegis of the Beira Corridor Group was, 
however, under constant threat from the MNR - ironically created by 
the Rhodesian intelligence service for sabotage against the Mozambican 
government and then taken over and nurtured by South Africa in 1980.
The independence and integrity of Zimbabwe has been described 
by Mugabe as inseparable from that of Mozambique. Apart from 
genuine solidarity and gratitude for Mozambican sacrifices to the
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Zimbabwe liberation struggle, Zimbabwe has a vital interest in seeing a 
functioning infrastructure in Mozambique. As Mugabe put it in 1987:
An early decision o f my government was to maximize Zimbabwe's 
usage of our most convenient trade routes through Mozambique.
At the time of our independence no Zimbabwean trade passed through 
the Mozambican rail and port system, but by the end of 1983 almost half 
o f our trade was transiting Mozambique. Today South African- 
instigated sabotage has cut that figure back to less than 20
percent South Africa has set out to destroy system atically our
alternative communication routes to the sea and ensure our continued 
dependence on their ports and railways.10
In October 1992, a truce was eventually signed between the 
Mozambican government under Joachim Chissano and the MNR leader 
Afonso Dhlakama. Mugabe’s personal involvement alongside that of co­
intermediary Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya (considered closer to the 
MNR) was seen by both sides as an essential element in bringing the 
process to that stage. By the end of 1992, the process was sufficiently 
advanced for Dhlakama to pay an officially reported visit to Harare to 
discuss implementation of the truce of with Mugabe.
Peace in Mozambique was clearly seen as essential for the future 
prosperity both of Zimbabwe and the region as a whole. The MNR had 
wreaked havoc not only in Mozambique but in Zimbabwe’s eastern 
region, which had also begun to absorb large numbers of Mozambican 
refugees. M ugabe’s involvement indicated a recognition of these 
imperatives rather than a change of heart towards a man who he had 
previously described as a “ senseless bandit and puppet of 
imperialism.”11
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Trade flows
Alongside a deepening political and strategic relationship, efforts 
have been made to increase the level of trade between Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique. They have not been particularly successful (see table 5.3).
A series of agreements was concluded in August 1980, covering 
energy, electricity, trade and payments mechanisms. Under an 
arrangement between the respective central banks on 7 August 1980, 
each was to open a freely convertible account in local currency with the 
other.
A detailed trade agreement with Mozambique was signed on 20 
August 1980. The two sides agreed to do their utmost to increase trade 
especially in a list of goods mentioned in two attached schedules. Most 
Favoured Nation treatment was to be granted. To avoid the possibility 
of abuse of the treaty, each side could ask for a certificate of origin for 
the goods concerned. A joint commission was established to monitor 
progress.12
By the time of its fourth session (26-28 November 1986), the 
permanent joint commission still had little positive to report. Since the 
implementation of the trade agreement, there had been very little 
improvement in trade figures between the two countries. Hope was 
expressed that a new trade plan, signed on 19 June 1986 and operational 
from 15 July 1986, would improve the situation. The commission 
exhorted the two governments to encourage trade. To that end, 
Zim babwe agreed to extend a ZW D50m  line o f credit to 
Mozambique.13
At the 5th session (7-8 December 1987), the Mozambican delegation 
indicated that exporters of meat, fruit, cotton and tobacco were not 
utilising the port of Beira. The Zimbabwe delegation explained that the 
facilities prevailing did not meet the requirements for these products.14
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TABLE 5.3
MOZAMBIQUE
exports to imports from
year ZWD m % of total year ZWD m % of total
1980 n/a n/a 1980 1.4 0 .4
1981 11.2 1.3 1981 18.8 1.8
1982 17.2 2.1 1982 9.5 0 .9
1983 15.3 1.5 1983 9.1 0 .9
1984 10.5 0.8 1984 0.1 —
1985 20.6 1.3 1985
1986 54.4 3.2 1986 n/p n/p
1987 70.3 3.7 1987 n/p n/p
1988 75.6 3.0 1988 n/p n/p
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 132.8 3 .7 1990 n/p n/p
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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The commission also noted that a tripartite road authority 
including Sweden had not materialised because the Swedish development 
authority SIDA had not provided money for vehicles. The Mozambican 
side said that in view of the delays it would prefer bilateral arrangement 
with SIDA.
As far as bilateral trade was concerned, ZWD40m of the line of 
credit had so far been disbursed. However, the Mozambicans indicated 
that they had internal difficulties due to the shortage of complementary 
products necessary for utilising those goods imported under the line of 
credit. The Zim babweans com plained for their part that the 
commodities listed under the trade plan were not all available.15 The 
Mozambican members of the commission said they were having trouble 
running the trade plan and the line of credit simultaneously.
The Commission noted that the Zimbabwean government had 
decided to classify displaced Mozambicans as refugees solely for the 
purpose of obtaining donor funding, notably from the UNHCR. 
Zimbabwe continued to receive displaced Mozambicans and planned to 
set up a fifth camp, near Chiredzi. The rate of influx was increasing and 
the monthly expenditure was well above ZWD340,000.
By end-1987, there were some 40,000 displaced Mozambicans in 
the camps. The strain on the Zimbabwean economy of coping with a 
growing refugee problem while maintaining a costly military presence 
in Mozambique itself was no doubt an additional factor that encouraged 
Mugabe to respond positively to Chissano’s entreaty that he take up the 
role of intermediary in arranging a negotiated settlement.
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c) Regional Organisations
The two regional organisations, SADC (formerly SADCC) and 
Comesa (formerly the PTA), were initially at the core of Zimbabwe’s 
strategy of weaning itself as far as possible off its dependence on its 
Southern neighbour. Although broader opportunities such as those 
provided by Lome have been grasped, the greatest effort has gone into 
strengthening regional opportunities.
As early as September 1980, Mugabe explained to a meeting of 
SADCC ministers that over-dependence on South Africa in respect of 
transport, communications and a variety of goods and services was 
neither a natural phenomenon nor the result of a free market economy:
The future development o f our economic systems must aim at reducing
economic dependence not only on the Republic o f South Africa but also
on any single external state or group of states.16
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC) was consolidated into the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in 1992. It has been regarded as one of the most 
efficient regional organisations in Africa. Its four initial objectives, set 
out in Lusaka in December 1980, were:
(1) to co-ordinate the reduction of dependence on metropolitan 
powers, and especially on South Africa.
(2) to create and operationalise equitable economic integration 
among member countries.
(3) to be the unit for mustering internal and external resources 
important to affecting national, interstate, and regional policies useful in 
reducing dependence and in establishing genuine co-operation among 
members
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(4) to be the bargaining unit for securing financial and technical 
support from private and public sources in the international arena.17
Mugabe has described the creation of SADC as a recognition of 
regional and economic reality. With six of the members (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe) landlocked, the 
only alternative transport routes to those provided by South Africa are 
through Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola. Much of South Africa’s 
trade surplus with the region depends on rail and port revenues. The 
upgrading of alternative routes and ports, in particular the Mozambican 
ports of Beira and Maputo, was therefore seen as central to the 
reduction of dependence on South Africa.
The mutuality of interests among the member countries derived 
from an abhorrence of apartheid. To the extent that that produced a 
common desire to reduce economic ties with South Africa, the nine 
founders, subsequently joined by Namibia, set about constructing the 
necessary pillars for such a reduction, with each country taking 
responsibility for one aspect of regional infrastructure and providing 
the resources to maintain its obligations. The transport function of 
SADC was, for example, overseen by Mozambique through the 
Southern A frican T ransport and Communications Commission 
(SATCC). Zimbabwe oversaw the SADC food security programme.
The formation of SADC was an attempt to fashion an economic 
reality from a political imperative. In 1991, Simba Makoni, then 
Executive Secretary of SADC, described “reduction of dependence” as 
the organisation’s first objective.18 Economic dependence on South 
Africa was above all politically unpalatable.
While SADC remains perhaps the best example of a functioning 
regional IGO in Africa, its continued relevance has depended on a re­
definition of its objectives. Even prior to the emergence of an
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acceptable South Africa, Mufune identified three factors which had the 
potential to subvert the common interest that bound the ten members 
together:19
(1) The BLS group of countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland) 
as well as Malawi maintained a special status with South Africa and 
needed to compete for the maintenance if not enhancement of that status 
through SACU (the South African Customs Union) and/or the Rand 
Monetary Area.
(2) The members had differing abilities to apply sanctions. In 
this respect, three groups could be discerned: those in closed 
preferential systems with South Africa (above), those trying to diminish 
contacts (Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe) and those with minimal 
trading contacts (Angola and Tanzania).
(3) The similarities in export structures presented a barrier to the 
creation of a genuine economic community.
Appreciations of Zimbabwe’s role within SADC vary. Sylvester 
passes a globally positive judgement:
It is generally acknowledged today that Zimbabwe is a good SADCC 
partner. The country has lived up to its commitments in food security 
and agricultural research and has been known to extend assistance over 
and beyond its formal SADCC obligations.
In other respects, however, the Zimbabwean role in SADC has 
come in for criticism. Until South Africa joined SADC in 1994, 
Zimbabwe was the member with the strongest industrial infrastructure. 
It also accounted for by far the highest proportion of regional trade: 
almost half of the intra-SADC trade originated there and another 30%
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of the trade consisted of imports into it. Zimbabwe was thus a partner to 
almost 80% of the total intra-SADC trade.21
Zimbabwe with its significant industrial base has tended to see the 
region as an alternative market to South Africa, but has been less keen 
to import from it. This criticism is perhaps more applicable to the PTA 
(see below), which set out to provide a common trading area. SADC did 
not include this as one of its formal goals. It is nevertheless a logical 
extension of the type of economic realignment which the Community 
sought to promote and the fact that Zimbabwe was a net exporter within 
both gave rise to a degree of resentment among other member states.
The imminence in 1992 of a negotiated settlement in South Africa 
and the ANC’s subsequent election victory in April 1994 led to a great 
deal of introspection within the organisation. The name change signalled 
a change of emphasis. SADC is now a trading bloc with the ultimate aim 
of inclusive regional economic integration, with South Africa playing a 
full part.
The Preferential Trade Area
The Treaty establishing the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern African States (PTA) was signed on 21st December 1981 as a 
first step towards the creation of a common market. In November, 
1993, a new Treaty, founding the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern African (COMESA) was signed in Kampala, Uganda by 
sixteen PTA countries, including Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The COMESA 
Treaty entered into force on 8 December, 1994, upon its ratification by 
eleven signatory States. The PTA was formally dissolved on that date 
being replaced by COMESA.
Unlike SADCC, the PTA structure was, from the outset, much 
more in line with conventional attempts at building an economic
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community. The PTA treaty was modelled on that of ECOWAS, the 
West African economic community, with economic union to be achieved 
through the elimination in stages of both tariff and non tariff barriers.
In 1983, some 5.7% of Zimbabwe's total exports went to PTA 
countries, while imports from PTA members amounted to just over 
3.2%22. The PTA (now Comesa) Clearing House, a multilateral netting 
facility for trade payments, operates from and through the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe. Final settlement is done through the Federal 
Reserve Bank, New York.
Many of the constraints on intra-SADC trade apply with a 
vengeance to the PTA. In addition, there is a perception among 
members that Zimbabwe and Kenya, the two economies with the largest 
manufacturing base stand to benefit unduly.
Although it achieved some limited success in encouraging intra- 
regional trade, the success of the PTA in the first decade of its existence 
was not resounding. Lancaster suggested that it may have been a victim 
of its own ambition:
It is not yet clear whether the PTA will follow ECOWAS in the latter’s 
failure to implement fully its economic integration policies and simply 
become something of a political umbrella under which member states 
conduct regional diplomacy. Although an increasing number of states 
have joined the PTA, members have thus far used it relatively little as a 
venue for regional diplomacy. The PTA may already be too large to 
serve such a purpose effectively, as its nineteen member states represent 
central, southern and East Africa.2 3
Apart from running the Comesa Clearing House, Zimbabwe has 
given greater prominence to SADC in the resources it commits to it.
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The establishment of Comesa, to which South Africa does not belong, 
has brought a greater degree of incompatibility to the aims of the two 
organisations. With the reinvention of SADC as an engine for the 
economic integration of the entire Southern African region, members of 
both organisations, including Zimbabwe, as coming under pressure 
from both bodies to choose on over the other.
In tandem with efforts to promote regional trade through 
multilateral initiatives, the Zimbabwean government has entered 
bilateral treaties with other SADC members. Case studies of 
Zimbabwe’s trade with Tanzania, Botswana and Angola suggest that 
these efforts have been hampered by a lack of hard currency and the 
absence of a mutual coincidence of wants.
Tanzania
In the struggle for Zim babwe’s independence, Tanzania had 
played a crucial role as a source of support and training. Once 
independence had been achieved, a desire to convert political goodwill 
into effective trading links was therefore understandable.
At the second session of the Zimbabwe-Tanzania joint commission 
of co-operation in Harare in 1983, what was described as a temporary 
set-back in trade between the two countries was attributed by Economy 
Minister Bernard Chidzero to the “inadequacy of foreign exchange” . At 
the end of the session, a joint action programme was signed to attack the 
inadequacy.24
A detailed Trade Plan was to be operational from 1 January 1984. 
The Zimbabwe Banking Corporation (Zimbank) and National Bank of 
Commerce of Tanzania (NBC) opened reciprocal accounts for the 
purpose. Under the plan, Tanzania would supply sea foods, hardwood, 
sisal, twine and cordage, spices, common salt, meerschaum products, 
aluminium circles, cold rolled steel sheets, aluminium coils, textiles and
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berets. Zimbabwe would provide foundry coke, dairy cattle, hurricane 
lamps, baby napkins, dried yeast, animal drawn implements, blair 
pumps, sanitary-ware, baby foods and copper oxychloride.
The implementation procedure provides an illustration of why 
bureaucrats and entrepreneurs are often at loggerheads as a struggle 
develops between detail and simplicity:
Zimbabwean exporters interested in participating had to make a 
specific application through Zimbank to the Export Payment Section of 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. Where commodities for export 
required an export licence or permit, a separate application was to be 
submitted through the relevant ministries.
Tanzanian importers of Zimbabwean goods would open Letters of 
Credit in Zimbabwe dollars with the appropriate branch of NBC where 
they would hold their accounts. The branches of NBC would then advise 
the LoCs to Zimbabwean exporters direct through Zimbank. On 
shipment date, the Zim babwean exporter would present export 
documents to Zimbank, which would verify them, pay the exporter and 
debit the account of NBC maintained in its books.
For imports of Tanzanian goods, an application was required to 
the Ministry of Trade and Commerce for an import licence. Once 
approved, the reverse of the above procedure was to be followed.
Although Zimbabwe was chosen to supply building materials, 
ceramics and sanitaryware for a major Tanzanian construction project 
in February 1984, the volume of trade actually decreased for the year as 
a whole (see table 5.4). Thereafter, Tanzania has not even featured in 
the published trade statistics.
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TABLE 5.4
EXPO RTS TO  TA NZA N IA
year ZW Dm % o f  total
1980( Aug-Dee) n/p n/p
1981 1.4 0.2
1982 5.9 0.7
1983 3.3 0.3
1984 3.0 0.2
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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Angola
In November 1982, the Angolan ambassador to Zimbabwe, Andre 
Miranda commented that since the signing of a co-operation agreement 
a month earlier, trade between the two had more than doubled.25 
Angola had imported more than ZW D lm  of tobacco and ZWD 18,850 
of agricultural equipment. Zimbabwe was meanwhile said to be studying 
which commodities it wished to import from Angola. W hether that 
decision was ever made is not recorded, but imports from Angola have 
not featured in the published trade statistics (see table 5.5).
Botswana
Diplomatic relations at High Commissioner level were only 
established at the end on May 1983. Trade between the two has grown 
but has not been promoted with any great enthusiasm (see table 5.6). 
Relations were strained by the continued existence of a large 
Zim babwean refugee population in Botswana and governm ent 
accusations that ex-ZIPRA members were launching dissident attacks 
from bases in Botswana. President Quett Masire made a solidarity visit 
in October 1982, but the Minister of Home Affairs, HH Ushewokunze 
raised the issue of ex-ZIPRA combatants crossing into Botswana for 
refuge. A Botswana High Commissioner to Harare was only appointed 
on 11 October 1985.
Report card
Ultimately, political affinity at a government level appears to 
have had little impact on economic relations as far as regional trade is 
concerned, though it has allowed for the rehabilitation of transport 
routes through Mozambique.
In the case of South Africa, political antipathy encouraged the 
development of an economic agenda which explored alternatives to the 
maximum.
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TABLE 5.5
A N G O LA  
exports to
year  ZW Dm % o f  total
1980
1981 2.3 0.3
1982 2.8 0.3
1983 0.5 0.0
1984 12.4 1.0
1985 10.8 0.7
1986 3.2 0.2
1987 6.4 0.3
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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TABLE 5.6
BOTSWANA
exports to imports from
year ZWDm % of total year ZWDm % of total
1980 11.7 3 .4 1980 5.0 1.3
(Aug-Dee) (Aug- Dec)
1981 28.7 3 .2 1981 17.4 1.7
1982 25.5 3.2 1982 34.1 3 .2
1983 40.8 4 .0 1983 44.9 4 .2
1984 61.6 4 .9 1984 38.5 3 .2
1985 59.4 3 .8 1985 39.1 2 .7
1986 73.3 4.3 1986 77.9 4 .7
1987 104.9 5 .5 1987 99.2 5 .7
1988 128.6 5.1 1988 168.2 8 .2
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 213.5 5.9 1990 159.2 3 .5
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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These initiatives, whether regional or bilateral, did for a time, 
succeed in lessening South Africa’s relative dominance as a trading 
partner and carrier for Zimbabwe, though economic ties remained 
crucial to the latter’s survival.
The Zim babwean governm ent’s support for FRELIM O in 
Mozambique was partly a practical manifestation of the above policy 
and partly a result of political solidarity. Rehabilitation and defence of 
transport routes through Mozambique were high policy priorities as was 
the subsequent brokering of a peace deal between FRELIMO and the 
MNR. These were among the relative successes of Zimbabwean foreign 
policy in its first fourteen years. Expansion of bilateral trade with 
Mozambique was less successful.
Two regional organisations, SADC and PTA/Comesa, played 
some role in the Zimbabwean strategy of dispersal of dependence. 
However, Zimbabwe’s imports from other SADC and Comesa countries 
did not achieve anything like significant levels, though their importance 
as export markets grew in the early 1980s.
Despite regional co-operation within these two bodies, bilateral 
initiatives with other front-line states failed to boost trade ties in the 
long-run. Even where the government was investing energy as in the 
creation of SADCC and the maintenance of aspects of its programmes, 
efforts to boost bilateral economic relationships with other members 
foundered on an absence of sufficient coincidence of wants and an 
inability to drive the private sector down a politically pre-determined 
trade path.
SADC, to w hich Zim babw e has dem onstrated greater 
commitment, has now revised its raison d'etre and is set to develop as a 
regional trading bloc with South Africa as its engine.
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Chapter six: Zimbabwe and Britain
Adversity and co-operation in the transition to independence. Bilateral 
links. Clashes and co-operation on the international stage.
After years during which she progressively contributed by acts of 
commission or omission to the consolidation of white minority rule in 
my country, [Britain] rose to the occasion after the Commonwealth 
Conference in Lusaka....We recognised the significance and courage of 
her final act and join hands with her in reconciliation and friendship as 
we face the future. A  job well done is a job well done, whatever the 
wrongs and inconsistencies of the past might have been.1
In this extract from his address to the UN on Zim babwe’s 
admission to the Organisation, Mugabe summed up much of the 
ambivalence in the relationship between Britain and its former colony.
It is a relationship whose course, post-independence, has received 
comparatively little attention in existing literature. There are three 
possible explanations for this neglect. First, as the former colonial 
power, many aspects of the relationship were familiar to both sides and 
therefore lacked the novelty of some of the developing diplomatic ties. 
Secondly, and more cynically, the British agenda at the Lancaster House 
Conference won the day.2 Despite the shock of the ZANU(PF) victory 
to the British government, it had nevertheless successfully inserted the 
safeguards it advocated in the Constitution and therefore saw little need 
for aggressive promotion of its interests. Thirdly, the Commonwealth 
provided a multilateral forum in which the concerns of both parties 
could be addressed, thereby diminishing the significance of purely 
bilateral contacts.
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Yet apart from engineering the success of the Lancaster House 
Conference, the British impact on post-independence Zimbabwe has 
been crucial in three other respects: it has been the largest bilateral aid 
donor; has regained its pre-UDI position as one of the two largest 
trading partners (see table 6.1); and has been responsible for the 
welding of the disparate and conflicting military forces into a national 
army.
Even when conflict has arisen on other issues, the success of this 
last role has been acknowledged. In his first New Year’s Eve address to 
the nation, Mugabe singled out this achievement:
I wish to express my government's gratitude to the British Government 
for generously coming to our aid with a team of most able instructors.
And to the British instructors themselves, I wish to say thank you for 
the role you have magnificently played in helping us to form a single 
army.3
On 25 October 1984, Zimbabwe radio reported an announcement 
by the secretary of defence James Chitauro that the British government 
had agreed to Zimbabwe’s request to keep the British Military Advisory 
Training Team “a little longer”. BMATT was subsequently retained for 
training Mozambican forces on Zimbabwean territory (see below).
Even during the transition period, a pre-eminent British role in 
the post independence era was virtually assumed as a result of the 
Lancaster House Agreement. In late March 1980, some three weeks 
before independence, undersecretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
office, Frank Mills arrived for discussions on the training of the 
expanded diplomatic service, a task to be undertaken in conjunction with 
the Commonwealth secretariat. In May, a course was started under the
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TABLE 6.1
UK
exports to imports from
year ZWDm % of total year ZWDm % of
1980 18.7 5.4 1980 32.2 8.4
(Aug-Dee) (Aug-Dee)
1981 61.3 6.9 1981 101.9 10.0
1982 76.9 9.5 1982 162.0 15.0
1983 119.4 11.6 1983 121.7 11.5
1984 162.6 12.8 1984 143.5 11.9
1985 200.3 13.0 1985 151.1 10.4
1986 209.7 12.4 1986 179.6 10.9
1987 244.5 12.9 1987 200.3 11.5
1988 289.7 11.4 1988 220.5 10.7
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 394.9 10.9 1990 521.4 11.4
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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directorship of E.M. Debrah, Ghanaian High Commissioner in London, 
funded by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.
The new glow in the Anglo-Zimbabwean relationship had 
dimmed somewhat by the time of the first anniversary of independence. 
An early and brief spat concerned the terms of British aid. In February 
1981, Finance Minister Enos Nkala complained that Britain should turn 
its GBP75m three-year aid package into a grant or take it back. British 
officials expressed disappointment at the outburst. "We consider our aid 
programme is really substantial, given the economic constraints" said a 
foreign office source.4 The GBP75m, he pointed out, did not include 
GBP22m in debts written off, GBP34m in rescheduled debt, GBP3m in 
military assistance, G B P llm  for student training and GBP7m for 
railway electrification. Nkala more or less apologised and the matter 
was closed.
Another bone of contention was the perceived lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of the British government for the provision of funds to 
enable the purchase of commercial farm land for redistribution, as 
outlined in the Lancaster House Agreement. At a luncheon for British 
Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe in January 1985, Zimbabwe’s Foreign 
Minister Witness Mangwende said he was encouraged to note that:
Her Majesty’s Government is now willing to be more flexible with 
regard to the release of funds to be used in land acquisition and 
development.5
Ironically, cordial relations between the UK and Zimbabwe were 
most disturbed by issues outside the narrow context of their formal 
bilateral ties. In 1983, for example, a number of Zimbabwe Air Force 
officers were redetained on suspicion of complicity in sabotage,
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following their acquittal by the courts on the grounds that their 
confessions had been obtained through torture. The UK attempted to get 
the matter of the officers, who were dual nationals, raised by USA, 
Canada and Ireland during official visits by Mugabe in September 1983. 
Patel describes M ugabe’s response as “a passionate defence of 
Zimbabwe’s sovereignty even at the cost of British aid:”
We cannot, merely because a person is o f British stock, where such a 
person is a threat to our security, fear to arrest him because to do so is to 
provoke Margaret Thatcher and her government. My government is not
made of that kind o f weak steel if  that aid is given to us so that we
don’t exercise our rights as a sovereign state, a sovereign right in 
defence and protection o f our own security and not arrest those we 
believe to be a security risk, then that aid can go.6
Even if the original motive for UK government involvement was 
the origin of the four officers, the grounds for concern -  human rights 
violations and the overriding of the judiciary by the executive -  were 
not addressed by the Zimbabwean reaction. The potential for a 
deepening dispute was evident. In the event, aid was not withdrawn and 
relations were patched up at the Commonwealth Conference in New 
Delhi in November of that year.
The southern spoke
As with the United States, the low point of the relationship was 
reached not as a result of any strictly bilateral dispute but over the 
unwillingness of Britain to impose comprehensive sanctions on South 
Africa. On his return from a Commonwealth mini-summit in London in 
early August 1986, Mugabe announced that Zimbabwe would impose a 
complete sanctions package before the end of the year. This would
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involve a severing of air links and a ban on overflights of Zimbabwean 
territory by airlines serving South Africa. Although this package was 
never implemented, the threat of it led to an immediate deterioration in 
Anglo-Zimbabwean government cordiality. The UK press reported that 
the British government had threatened to retaliate against Air 
Zimbabwe flights to London if the overflight ban was imposed. Mugabe 
meanwhile accused the British government of racism and of acting out 
of economic self interest.7
Mugabe’s strength of feeling on the issue was heightened by South 
African destabilisation tactics against the frontline states, both directly 
and through the surrogate MNR in Mozambique. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, these had involved economic measures and direct sabotage, 
not to mention direct attacks on ANC members in Harare and 
Bulawayo.8
The sense of frustration was fuelled not only by abhorrence of 
apartheid per se but by a seeming insouciance on the part of the UK and 
US -  usually bracketed together in this regard -  about the impact of 
South Africa’s regional policies on its neighbours.
M ugabe’s pub lic ' militancy on the sanctions issue was not 
necessarily mirrored by his SADCC counterparts, even if they tacitly 
approved of it. His approach therefore placed him in the front line of 
the conflict with Britain when the matter came before multilateral or 
international fora such as the Commonwealth and the UN General 
Assembly.
When, however, in m id-1986, some Commonwealth voices were 
urging withdrawal from the organisation in protest at the British 
position on sanctions, Mugabe advised caution. He suggested that the 
disintegration of the Commonwealth would reduce pressure on South 
Africa for change.9
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Limiting the dispute
Although Britain and Zimbabwe remained on different sides of 
the fence over the treatment of South Africa throughout the first twelve 
years of independence, the sparring remained verbal.
Unlike with the US, differences over South Africa did not lead to 
a breach in the aid programme. Visiting Harare in February 1987, 
Chris Patten, UK Minister for Overseas Development offered a new 
development grant of GBPlOm. One quarter of this sum was to be spent 
on British goods and services and the remainder on mutually agreed 
development projects. The previous month, Minister of State at the 
Foreign Office Linda Chalker had offered support in Harare for a 
diversification of frontline states’ transport routes. The shift in emphasis 
coincided with the UK’s overtaking of South Africa as Zimbabwe’s 
principal export market.
When Margaret Thatcher arrived in Harare for an official visit in 
March 1989, she received a warm welcome from Mugabe. British 
prestige in the region had been boosted by the success of the training 
programme for Mozambican infantry run by British soldiers at a 
Zimbabwean military camp in the eastern districts. To some extent, the 
training programme dampened criticism of Thatcher’s vehement 
opposition to sanctions, which became less of an obstacle to improved 
bilateral ties. B ritain’s bilateral aid to Zimbabwe in 1990 was 
USD50.2m, up 29% from its 1989 contribution. This was by a long way 
the largest bilateral donation, accounting for 19.4% of all bilateral 
contributions received that year from 23 donors.10 In July 1991, Linda 
Chalker announced a GBPlOm grant for economic reforms in addition 
to the GBP30m in aid and soft loans committed for that year. In 1993, 
Zim babwe accounted for B rita in’s fourth largest bilateral aid 
programme.
142
As Zimbabwe’s largest aid donor via the Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA), the UK has, perhaps not surprisingly, tried to 
steer Zimbabwe’s development in directions of which it approves, 
notably political pluralism and a key role for the private sector. Even at 
times of tension, however, and the broader north-south context 
notwithstanding, it has done this essentially as a back-seat driver.
The ambivalence in the relationship between Britain and 
Zimbabwe stems on the one hand from the former’s historical role as 
coloniser and, in the eyes of ZANU(PF), midwife to the Smith regime 
and on the other, as the catalyst for a non-military resolution.
O f all Zim babwe's bilateral ties after independence, the 
relationship with the UK has followed the most predictable path. Given 
the long past relationship, the Brtish government was inured to even the 
most forceful expression of disagreement on Zimbabwe's behalf.
Despite harsh words over the UK policy on sanctions against 
South Africa, Britain remained one of Zimbabwe's two largest trading 
partners and its largest bilateral donor. The entrusting of the delicate 
task of creating a unified army to British military officers was an 
indication that, past conflicts notwithstanding, the Mugabe expected 
administration expected Britain to play a major role in supporting the 
post-independence dispensation.
1 PM Addresses United Nations: August 26. 1980 (Ministry' o f Information and Tourism) September 
1980
2 see Sylvester, p63
3 31/1/80, official transcript
4 Herald. 2/2/81
5 Herald. 7/1/85
6 in Patel, pp246-247
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Chapter seven: Zimbabwe and the Major Powers
a) USA
Diplomatic and trade links. Aid: generosity and manipulation. Bilateral 
quarrels on third issues.
b) The USSR
c) People’s Republic of China
Contrasts, pre- and post-independence. Trade and aid agreements.
a) The USA
There is a perception which has not quite reached the level of 
axiom that American presidents who are unpopular at home are often 
popular abroad and vice versa. In the case of Jimmy Carter and 
Zimbabwe this was certainly true. On a visit to the United States in 
August 1980, Mugabe paid tribute to the Carter Administration and to 
the people of the United States for their support in Zimbabwe’s hour of 
need:
It may not have been obvious to the rest of the world, but it was quite 
obvious to some of us that in your administration here we had a true 
friend.1
The US was the first country to provide bilateral assistance in 
1980 to the newly independent country with USD46m in cash transfers 
for immediate reconstruction of schools, clinics, dips, wells, roads as 
well as health, education and training. Although this sense of goodwill 
did not carry over to the Reagan Administration, the US remained 
alongside the UK one the two main bilateral donors in the first five 
years of independence. Disagreements accumulated but ironically it took
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a diplomatic incident involving ex-President Carter in 1986 for the aid 
programme to be suspended (see below).
Much of the deterioration in relations was a result not of 
disagreements on bilateral issues but of the perceived softness of the 
Reagan administration on the questions of South Africa and Namibia. In 
November 1982, then vice president George Bush visited Zimbabwe. At 
the ensuing state banquet, Mugabe thanked him for the US assistance 
received to date, but added that the USA, as a country which fought its 
own war of independence, should strongly support the principle of 
independence and side with A frica in the struggle to achieve 
independence for Namibia. He argued that the question was strictly one 
of decolonisation and rejected any attempt to create a link with other 
issues such as the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.
Some months earlier the same point had been made more 
emphatically during the state visit of M engistu Haile Mariam of 
Ethiopia, when the two leaders in a joint statement:
..emphatically rejected attempts by the Reagan administration and the 
racist South African regime to hold to ransom the independence of 
Namibia by linking the presence of Cuban Internationalist forces in 
Angola with the process o f decolonisation in Namibia.2
Zimbabwean government rhetoric began to hint not only at 
acquiescence on the part of the US administration to the South African 
regime but at tacit collaboration. At a banquet in Dar es Salaam in 
January 1983, Mugabe complained that the independence process in 
Namibia was being frustrated by the joint insistence of the United States 
and South Africa on the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola as a 
condition.
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The phrase “constructive engagem ent” coined by Chester 
Crocker, Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
never caught on in the region either as a term or a concept. It was 
widely regarded in the frontline states as a cloak for inhibiting radical 
change which might upset US strategic interests and was bracketed with 
the administration’s support for Jonas Savimbi’s UNIT A guerrillas in 
Angola as an obstacle to progress.
As a central plank in US regional strategy, constructive 
engagement may well have led on its own to a reassessment of US- 
Zimbabwe relations by both sides. Yet two unrelated disagreements 
served as a trigger for US retaliation in the form of aid cuts. In 
December 1983, American aid to Zimbabwe was cut by USD35m to an 
amount of USD40m. As Patel explains:
The publicly-articulated reasons were budgetary cuts in the USA and 
Zimbabwe’s attitude a) to the USSR downing o f a Korean airliner in 
September 1983 and b) to the American invasion of Grenada in October 
1983; i.e., Zimbabwe had abstained in the Security Council on a 
resolution condemning USSR and had co-sponsored a resolution with 
Nicaragua against the American invasion of Grenada.^
KAL007
The Korean Airline incident was one of the most controversial 
issues considered by the Security Council during Zimbabwe’s first stint 
on the Council in 1983/84. Following the shooting down of the 
passenger plane for violating a sensitive strip of Soviet airspace, world 
reaction was largely polarised between utter shock and condemnation 
and support for the position of the USSR in defending itself against a 
suspected spying mission.
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In the Security Council, a draft resolution tabled by USA, South 
Korea, Canada, Japan and Australia, joined by Belgium, Fiji, France, 
Italy, West Germany, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Thailand and UK sought inter alia to condemn the USSR 
for violating international civil aviation regulations. The USSR and 
Poland voted No; Zimbabwe, China, Guyana and Nicaragua abstained.
Given the lack of warmth in the relationship between Zimbabwe 
and USSR at that stage, the vote does not reflect any particular leverage 
that the USSR had on Zimbabwe nor was it an expression of solidarity. 
The overt reason given for Zimbabwe’s abstention was that it was 
simply expressing the consensus of the Africa Group which it 
represented on the Security Council.4 Two further factors may have had 
an influence: a desire to steer clear of what was shaping up to be a 
superpower confrontation; and a distrust of the flag under which the 
aircraft was flying (Zimbabwe had no diplomatic relations with South 
Korea at that point.)
The Zimbabwean position provoked a call for a strong, clear 
response from elements of Congress and USAID. Mugabe had stressed 
in a visit to the USA that Zimbabwe’s vote on KAL007 was the result of 
a collective decision of Southern African countries. However he also 
told Parliament in Harare that had Zimbabwe been able to act 
independently, it would have had to consider the situation on its merits. 
Once the issue had assum ed the nature of a rivalry between 
superpowers, he argued, non-aligned countries like Zimbabwe would 
necessarily stand aloof because they could not be seen to take sides with 
either the USA or the USSR. The US administration was not impressed. 
Grenada
Two days after US troops entered Grenada to remove Bernard 
Coard and his co-conspirators who had seized power from Maurice
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Bishop, Mugabe condemned the invasion as “an act of wanton 
aggression carried out in complete defiance of the UN Charter and the 
sovereign right of the people of Grenada” , who, it must be said, were 
not in a position to exercise their sovereign right. However, Mugabe 
extrapolated to draw an unfavourable comparison between US actions in 
Latin America and Southern Africa. He accused the US of arrogating to 
itself the role of universal watchdog of democracy, through its actions 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, while at the same time, lending 
support to the apartheid regime through its acquiescent policy of 
constructive engagement.5
The resulting cut in aid was greeted with disappointment but 
defiance. In his New Year’s Eve broadcast to the nation at the end of 
1983, Mugabe declared that:
..we firmly refuse to mortgage our Zimbabwean personality to any 
grants or form o f aid, for to do so is not only to become a mercenary 
state but also to turn the voice o f Zimbabwe into that of a resonant 
megaphone, and its actions at home and abroad into the guided dancing 
steps o f a manipulated puppet stated
Relations over the next two years were difficult. In February 
1985, the Acting US Ambassador Gibson Lanpher was reasonably frank 
with a Rotary audience in Bulawayo. The USA had, he said, given more 
than USD350m in assistance. The past five years had been a positive 
educational process fo r both. T here had, how ever, been 
disappointments:
We are troubled by your government's erratic course when it comes to 
the human rights question. And thick-skinned as we may be, we would
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have hoped for a more balanced treatment o f the US in Zimbabwe’s 
media. To refer to President Reagan as a naked imperialist is too much. 
Everyone knows he wears clothes.7
The USA had, he said, been unable to convince Zimbabwe of the 
wisdom of the American approaches to the twin problems of Namibia 
and South Africa. Further afield, Zimbabwe and the US had differed 
“more than we would have liked to” in the arena of the Security 
Council. He added that the USA would like to see more encouragement 
to domestic and foreign investment.
In May, US m eddling in N icaragua brought forth overt 
condemnation from Zimbabwe’s permanent representative to the UN, 
Stan Mudenge. The US embargo of Nicaragua violated the UN Charter, 
OAS Charter and UN resolutions. The USA, he said, was showing 
inconsistency in applying sanctions against Nicaragua but not against 
South Africa.8
Mugabe turned up the heat in an address to the UN General 
Assembly in October, read on his behalf by Foreign Minister Witness 
Mangwende:
We are appalled at the repeated interference in the domestic affairs of 
other states by some states members of this Organisation. In the case of 
Nicaragua, we witnessed the open threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of that country. There is a 
military and economic siege of that country, all because it has decided to 
be free to choose a socio-economic political system most suited to its 
own peculiar situation. The USA. Government finances, trains, equips, 
and deploys the contras into Nicaragua where they are committing
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murders, rape, and economic sabotage and making the lives of the 
people of that country a real nightmare.
We condemn in no uncertain terms such barbaric actions perpetrated 
against a small nation that can in no way pose any threat to the security 
and interests of the mighty United States. We call on the USA to 
observe the rule of international law in its relationship with Nicaragua 
and leave that country to pursue its chosen course.9
Mugabe called for full support for the efforts of the Contadora 
Group from all interested parties including the USA and reiterated 
Zimbabwe’s opposition to the invasion of, interference or intervention 
in the internal affairs of one country by another “be it in Grenada, El 
Salvador, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Mayotte, East Timor, 
Chad or Western Sahara.” He called on the interventionist states to 
withdraw their troops and let the peoples of those countries run their 
affairs free from any interference. He singled out for special mention 
the situation in the Korean peninsula, where, he argued:
...there will be no peace or security in the Korean peninsula as long as 
foreign troops and missiles remain stationed in South Korea, and Korea 
remains divided. Foreign interference must stop to facilitate and 
encourage South and North Korea to engage in meaningful discussions 
aimed at the peaceful reunification of that country. Reduction o f tension 
and potential conflict is in the interest at us all. W e therefore call for the 
start o f negotiations involving all the concerned parties, including the 
United States.10
Nadir
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In July 1986, a seemingly trivial diplomatic incident occurred 
which was to cause the final break in US tolerance of Zimbabwean 
criticism. Ex-President Jimmy Carter and acting ambassador Gibson 
Lanpher walked out of a lunch-time Fourth of July reception in Harare 
during a speech read by the Minister of Youth Sport and Culture David 
Karimanzira on behalf of the Foreign Minister. According to Lanpher, 
who had been Carter’s personal representative at the Lancaster House 
talks and was considered one of Zimbabwe’s strongest defenders within 
the State Department, a prior agreement had been obtained with the 
foreign ministry that the two governments would confine themselves to 
toasts at the reception, with Carter making a brief speech as a special 
guest. In the event, the Zimbabwean speech attacked US policy on South 
Africa, accusing it of platitudes and apologies for apartheid.
Having praised Carter’s daughter Amy for being arrested at a 
demonstration outside the South African embassy in Washington, 
Mangwende drew attention to the discrepancy between the declaration at 
the statue of liberty and the situation prevailing in South Africa. After 
the walkout, the speech continued to argue that South A frica’s 
aggression was a result of an unwillingness by UK and US governments 
to impose immediate and effective sanctions against South Africa in 
contrast to a more active approach in four other cases: Poland and 
Nicaragua, which were, in Zim babwean eyes, internal matters; 
Afghanistan, with a grain embargo on the USSR; and aggression against 
Libya. Earlier, the minister had commended, in a muted manner, US 
development aid to Zimbabwe.
At a press conference that evening, Carter said he regarded the 
speech as an insult to him personally and to the American government 
and people. The official responsible for such an inappropriate attack 
should apologise. Although admitting that he disagreed with many
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aspects of administration policy on South Africa and favoured strong 
economic and political sanctions, he said that a Fourth of July reception 
was the wrong place for an attack which would be interpreted as aimed 
at the United States as a whole rather than at a particular administration.
Noting that the USA had given Zimbabwe USD370m in aid since 
independence, Carter said that the speech would make it much more 
difficult for the Reagan administration to deliver the financial aid it 
would like to.11 No apology was forthcoming and US aid to Zimbabwe 
was suspended.
Injury to insult
In January 1988, a row broke out over a personal incident 
involving the family of a Zimbabwean diplomat in New York. On 12 
January, Foreign M inister Shamuyarira, who had swapped his 
information portfolio with Mangwende, demanded that the US release 
Terence Karamba, who had been held in foster homes over the previous 
month since being taken from school in Queens by the Department of 
Social Services Special Services for Children, following allegations of 
abuse by his father, an executive officer at Zimbabwe’s UN mission. 
The matter was finally resolved when Terence arrived back in Harare in 
March in the company of a Zimbabwean social worker after the US 
Supreme Court had cleared the way for him to leave the US.
It took a further year for fences to be mended sufficiently for the 
US aid programme to resume. This was done with a USD5m grant for 
small farm development, part of a larger three-year pledge of USD 17m. 
Commented US ambassador James Rawlings at the time:
Political relations between our two governments have improved over the 
past two years. Today’s signing would not have taken place in the 
atmosphere o f two years ago. ^
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Attempts had meanwhile been underway to repair relations. In an 
address to the Britain Zimbabwe Society in April, Foreign Minister 
Shamuyarira, who had been appointed since the Carter debacle, spoke of 
fundamental differences on Southern Africa, the Middle East, Central 
America and Afghanistan, but suggested that they should not prevent the 
two countries from working together. He compared the impact of 
disagreements on Zimbabwe’s relationship with Britain:
What I say to the American government is that we should, as we do
with the British, accept our differences.13
From then on official relations began to show signs of 
improvement. On presenting his credentials to Bush in October 1989, 
Zimbabwe’s new ambassador to the USA called on US business to invest 
in Zimbabwe. He said that Zimbabwe was satisfied with the level of aid 
to date, but hoped for more. Bush, in reply, said that Zimbabwe was a 
crucial leader in Southern Africa and provided a good example of 
mending divisions. He recognised, however, that Zimbabwe and the 
USA differed on the tactics to end apartheid.14 
Aid
In the first decade of independence, total US aid to Zimbabwe 
amounted to USD417.5m, of which USD354.5m (85%) took the form 
of bilateral aid. USD60m was channelled through SADCC, while NGOs 
provided a further USD3m. The largest item in the aid programme was 
the Commodity Import Program (CIP) totalling USD 168m. The CIP 
had a dual purpose of funding critical imports and channelling local 
counterparty funds to development projects.
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Imports from the US consisted mainly of manufacturing 
equipment, tractors, combines, heavy construction and lift equipment, 
data processing equipment and raw materials. Some 90% of CIP 
resources went to the private sector. Firms receiving such allocations 
were required to deposit an equivalent sum in local currency to the 
project concerned.
A letter from Foreign Minister Mangwende to Ambassador 
Robert Keeley on 22 March 1982 set out the understandings which were 
to govern economic, technical and related assistance. The government of 
Zimbabwe, said the letter:
..will take such steps to ensure the effective use of such assistance; it 
will co-operate with the US government to ensure that procurement will 
be at reasonable prices and on reasonable terms.
Will without restriction permit continuous observation and review by 
US representatives; will provide the US government with full and 
complete information concerning such programmes and operations.15
Zimbabwe would also bear a fair share of the costs of co­
operative technical assistance. The nature of these understandings was 
less conditional than some other bilateral aid programmes (see chapter 
eight), but as in the case of Swedish programmes, required tighter audit 
procedures.16 It is worth noting that even when political relations were 
at a low point with the aid programme suspended, the level of bilateral 
trade remained significant (see table 7.1)
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TABLE 7.1
USA
exports to imports from
year ZWDm % of total year ZWDm % of
1980 10.7 3.1 1980 27.8 7.3
(Aug-Dee) (Aug-Dee)
1981 69.8 7.9 1981 74.4 7.3
1982 63.6 7.9 1982 103.5 9.6
1983 68.7 6.7 1983 100.4 9.5
1984 79.0 6.2 1984 111.5 9.3
1985 125.8 8.1 1985 146.7 10.1
1986 97.4 5.7 1986 135.9 8.3
1987 129.5 6.8 1987 163.5 9.4
1988 186.1 7.3 1988 120.2 5.9
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 235.9 6.5 1990 516.4 11.4
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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Investment
Despite an ideological aversion to multinationals, the only 
example of a local acquisition by a US company was greeted with great 
approval. In 1984, Heinz bought Olivine, an edible oils manufacturer. 
At a luncheon in his honour hosted by the Heinz executive committee on 
3 October, Mugabe paid tribute to the company, which, he said:
...is viewed as an American pioneer in our young nation, because to 
date it is one of the few major USA companies that have confounded 
those profits o f doom who lack confidence in our country, by 
responding to our call for foreign investm ents.^
b) The USSR
The USSR backed ZAPU, or more specifically Joshua Nkomo, 
during the independence struggle. It had limited success in overcoming 
the negative impact of this position on relations with the ZANU(PF)- 
dominated administration. The presence of ZAPU ministers in the first 
post-independence coalition government was not sufficient to create a 
climate of rapprochement between ZANU(PF) and the Soviet Union, 
which was not represented at the independence celebrations.
Relations took several years to warm up despite tentative forays 
by Soviet diplomats. On 20 November 1980, the Herald reported that:
Mystery surrounds the presence in Salisbury of the Russian ambassador 
to Zambia who arrived for one week’s visit. ‘I just came to rest and to 
see Salisbury,’ he said. ‘I like your city. It is very beautiful.’
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At the end of his visit, the ambassador, Dr Vassili Solodovnikov 
said that his country now only had “diplomatic” relations with ZAPU 
and that he hadn't managed to meet the foreign minister.
Three months later, on 21 February 1981, an agreement was 
announced to establish Soviet/Zimbabwe diplomatic relations on a 
government-to-government basis only. A date was not, however, set for 
the establishment of embassies. The Soviet government did not send a 
delegation to ZIMCORD the following month, despite an invitation. The 
reason given by V alentin Udovin, the Soviet am bassador to 
Mozambique, was that diplomatic relations had only been established 
one month previously and that there was therefore no time to prepare.18
In early June, a four member diplomatic team arrived to set up an 
embassy. The Charge d ’Affaires Vladimir Silkin declared that his 
country welcomed “the victory of the Patriotic Front forces of your 
country.” This was clearly a compromise form ula, allowing for 
recognition of historical links while acknowledging new realities, 
though not the most recent reality that the patriotic front now survived 
solely as an appendage in the names of the parties ZANU(PF) and PF- 
ZAPU.19
A trade agreement with the Soviet Union was reached in January 
1984, providing for most favoured nation status, in particular with 
respect to customs duties and formalities, except where preferences 
were granted under a customs union, free trade area or bilateral treaty 
with a developing country. Unlike most similar agreements, this 
particular one included an article whereby:
Each contracting party guarantees non-divulgence of documentation, 
information and other data received during the period of implementation
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of this agreement to any third party without the consent of the other 
contracting party.20
This appears to be an attempt to ensure that relations were 
maintained strictly at an inter-government level, with no room for party 
involvement, particularly on the part of ZAPU.
A subsequent agreement on economic and technical co-operation 
took an inordinately long time to implement. Signed on the occasion of 
Mugabe’s first visit to Moscow in December 1985, it was ratified by the 
Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet on 30 March 1987 and by the 
government of Zimbabwe on 9 November 1987. The exchange of 
instruments finally took place on 16 February 1988.
A group of experts from  various m inistries of the two 
governments had meanwhile met from 17-28 February 1986. The 
minutes21 indicate an attempt to identify concrete areas of potential co­
operation. Specific offers were to be made on the following projects, 
subject to the approval of the competent authorities on both sides:
Energy: Technoprom Export would prepare and forward for 
consideration a technical and commercial offer for the expansion of 
Kariba hydroelectric power station and for the construction of the 
second phase of Hwange II power station; Zimbabwe would submit a list 
of projects for consideration by the Soviet side for the construction of 
power transmission lines.
Metallurgy: The Soviet side offered its involvement in training 
and geological investigation and the construction of various shops at 
ZISCO steel works, along with machine building.
The Zimbabweans were told that Soviet credit could be available 
for the supply of machinery and equipment and for carrying out the
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surveying and design works “on financial terms and conditions to be 
determined on a case by case basis.”
Pointing to what they claimed were Zimbabwean problems with 
servicing its foreign debt, the Zimbabwean experts expressed a wish to 
be provided with credits on softer terms and conditions as well as the 
possibility of repayment of credits through Zimbabwean export goods. 
There is no evidence that either side left the meeting with a sense of 
urgency.
A joint commission for economic, trade, scientific and technical 
co-operation held its first session from 29 May to 2 June 1989. The 
Zimbabwean delegation was headed by the deputy m inister of 
Information, Posts and Telecommunications. Such a choice of delegation 
leader suggests that the Zimbabwean government did not attach the 
highest priority to the meeting.
After analysing the volume of trade between the two countries, 
both sides agreed that the level of trade exchange was low. There was, 
they suggested, a need for sustained efforts to make trade organisations 
aware of possibilities. It was agreed that both sides would agree to the 
exchange of information through visits and exhibitions.
On the question of industrial co-operation, the Soviet side 
renewed its interest in participating in international tenders for 
rehabilitating ZISCO steelworks, when these were put out. The Soviet 
delegation also renewed its interest in power engineering projects, 
though they were informed by the Zimbabwean side that projects of this 
nature were also subject to international tender.
Even unilateral offers of a non-commercial nature were not 
received with great enthusiasm. An offer of ten doctors to be financed 
under the Africa Fund was accepted. An offer of technology in eye 
surgery was noted, but the Zimbabwean side indicated the need for a
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feasibility study before it could be implemented. What was really 
required, they suggested, was the basic technology for, cataract 
operations. The Soviet side also offered orthopaedic technology, which 
the Zimbabweans said was not required at that time. The Commission 
agreed that the offer could be explored further at a later date.22
Attempts continued to breathe life into the agreements reached, 
with a plan of action on cultural, educational, trade and scientific co­
operation signed on 11 December 1990.23 By then, however, a relative 
thaw in political relationships coincided with a downgrading by the 
Soviet Union of the importance of economic links with the frontline 
states and little progress ensued.
Since the break up of the USSR, Zimbabwe has opened diplomatic 
relations with a number of CIS and Baltic states, though these remain 
low profile.
c) People’s Republic of China
Sino-Zimbabwean relations post-independence have been rather 
low-key and do not reflect the importance of China to ZANU(PF)’s 
liberation struggle. In January 1982, on the occasion of a visit by 
Chinese Prem ier Zhao Ziang, ZANU(PF) National Organising 
Secretary and M inister of Mines Maurice Nyagumbo told a party 
meeting that Zhao should receive a rousing welcome “because of all the 
countries that helped ZANU(PF), China contributed most.”24. It was, he 
said, the first country to give assistance to ZANU(PF) and ZANLA. In 
the event, five people died and 30 were injured in the welcoming crush 
at the airport.
Apart from gratitude for significant help during the struggle, two 
other factors served to maintain Zimbabwe’s friendship with China. On 
the one hand, China is regarded in much of the third world as what
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Mazrui describes as “a kindred spirit” , having suffered sim ilar 
humiliations.25 To that extent, China has the tacit status of an honorary 
non-aligned country. On the other hand, it was regarded in the 1970s 
and early 1980s as an alternative socialist model for countries not 
attracted to the Soviet camp. Speaking on 9 January 1982 at a banquet in 
Zhao’s honour, Mugabe described China as:
...a model socialist state, whose level of development and distribution
of wealth is a source of inspiration to those o f us who are only now
beginning to embark on a socialist c o u r s e . 2 ^
China’s support for ZANU(PF), both before independence and 
once in power, was repaid politically when the Zim babwean 
government supported China’s repression of the Tiennenmen Square 
protests in 1989, while ZANU(PF) and the Communist Party of China 
agreed a protocol at the same time.
The document, signed on 8 November 1989, set out a wide 
ranging agenda for future co-operation.27 “Reaffirming the historic ties 
and friendship existing between the Zimbabwe African National Union - 
Patriotic Front and the Communist Party of China, encouraged by the 
development of relations between the two parties in recent years, 
desiring to promote their mutual understanding, solidarity and co­
operation,” the two parties agreed to a nine point set of aims, whereby 
they would:
(1) endeavour to develop their ties of friendly co-operation on the 
basis and principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect 
and non interference in each other’s internal affairs
(2) exchange delegations and share views on issues of common 
concern
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(3) exchange publications and documentation
(4) promote friendly relations and co-operation between the mass 
organisations of the two countries
(5) endeavour to consolidate and promote existing friendly 
relations between the two republics
(6) exchange reporters, give lectures and provide research 
personnel
(7) exchange views in international arenas
(8) invite members of the central committee of the other party 
for working holidays
(9) support National Liberation Movements in Southern Africa.
In retrospect it appears as if the protocol was at most a symbolic
expiession of solidarity, since there is no record of any of these aims 
being carried out in any formal sense.
At a government level, however, agreements have been far more 
tightly focused resulting in a comparatively high completion rate. Least 
successful has been the original trade agreement signed on 14 May 
1981. This set out to develop trade relations between the two countries 
on the basis of equality and mutual benefit; to “provide the widest 
facilities for the exchange of their products with a view to promoting 
reciprocal trade” ; to grant MFN treatment in respect of customs, duties 
and other trade formalities (except where advantages are granted to 
neighbouring countries to facilitate frontier traffic, as a result of a 
customs union, free trade area or trade agreement or where the goods 
and services do not originate in either country); and to allow re-export 
without prior approval. The parties agreed to take measures to ensure 
that prices for goods to be traded under this agreement be established on 
the basis of world market prices, “with payment in accordance with 
foreign exchange regulations in any freely convertible currency to be
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agreed upon.”28 A lthough the Zimbabwean delegation obtained 
substantial orders for tobacco and contracted to buy Chinese chemicals, 
the lack of sustained impact of the agreement may be gauged from 
Table 7.2.
Other agreem ents which depended largely on fulfilment of 
pledges by the Chinese government produced more tangible results. At 
ZIMCORD, China pledged some £12m. A protocol on economic and 
technical co-operation signed on 18 September 1981 provided for China 
to construct a 60,000-seat stadium, with expenses to be paid out of a 
previous loan agreement concluded in September 1980. On 11 January 
1983, China agreed to provide a further five-year interest free loan of 
Yuan 60m without any strings attached to finance additional expenses 
for construction of the stadium or other projects to be decided by 
consultation.
The used portion of the loan would be repaid in ten equal annual 
instalments over 10 years from 1 January 1993 to 2003 with export 
commodities or convertible currency as may be agreed between the two 
governments. The time limit for repayment could be extended. Further 
five year interest free project loans of 15m Yuan were agreed on 28 
August 1985 and 20 January 1987.
On 17 September 1985, a protocol was signed for the gratuitous 
supply of military equipment. China agreed to provide military 
equipment for 5000 troops with no strings attached. Such equipment 
included pistols, machine guns, submachine guns, anti-aircraft, rocket 
launchers and mortars.29
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TABLE 7.2
CHINA
exports to imports from
year ZWDm % of total year ZWDm % of total
1980 8.6 2.5 1980 0.7 0.2
(Aug-Dee) (Aug-Dee)
1981 24.6 2.8 1981 1.2 0.1
1982 1.5 0.2 1982 1.5 0.1
1983 8.0 0.8 1983 2.4 0.2
1984 26.1 2.1 1984 4.2 0.4
1985 58.5 3.4 1985 13.6 0.9
1986 48.0 2.8 1986 6.0 0.4
1987 30.4 1.6 1987 30.4 1.6
1988 30.2 1.2 1988 n/p n/p
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 59.6 1.7 1990 n/p n/p
source: extrapolation from CSO data
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Reviewing progress
The first session of the Sino-Zimbabwe joint commission on 
economic, technical and trade co-operation met in June 1986.30 
Unusually for such gatherings, it could express satisfaction at the co­
operation achieved, without being accused of gross exaggeration. 
Construction of the Zimbabwe National Sports Stadium had proceeded 
smoothly; and a garment factory in Chitungwiza, near Harare, had been 
completed and handed over with the requisite training programmes in 
place. It was agreed that a feasibility study on fresh water fish farming 
and small- to medium-sized water conservation projects be undertaken, 
while discussions considered the possibility of using the balance of the 
existing loan to finance another garment factory.
Zimbabwe agreed to provide preferential treatm ent where 
possible in the following projects where the Chinese felt competent: 
ZISCO rehabilitation project; coal-based ammonia manufacturing 
project; technical personnel to PTC; Kariba South power station project; 
road and railway linkage system in Harare, party headquarters in 
Harare, Connemara gold dump recycling; bicycle manufacturing; 
copper mining and processing; nickel mine prospecting; asbestos 
spinning plant; joint venture construction corporation; glassware plant, 
spark plug plant; and manufacture of machine tools.
On the question of trade the parties agreed to diversify 
commodities and expand volume on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefit in accordance with the needs and possibilities of both countries, 
with the aim of minimising the trade imbalance between the two.
On one score, the parties diverged, although not formally. 
Wherever possible, barter trade or countertrade was to be encouraged 
between the two countries. The Chinese submitted a draft of a protocol 
on barter trade, but by that stage, the Zimbabwean attitude to such
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forms of exchange had undergone a reassessment and now showed a 
clear preference for hard currency (see Chapter Four).
A new agreement on economic and technical co-operation signed 
on 5 June 1987 referred to the guiding principles of equality, mutual 
benefit, emphasis on practical results, and diversity in form and 
common development.31 The possibility of co-operation was envisaged 
in light industry, mining and metallurgy, energy including hydroelectric 
power, machinery, agriculture, construction, telecommunications, 
communications, chemical industry, alongside other areas that might 
arise. Forms of co-operation would include contracting for engineering 
and construction work, provision of technical services and transfer of 
technology, joint ventures, personnel training, provision of equipment, 
and other forms of co-operation acceptable to both sides.
Meeting again in August 1988, the commission expressed 
satisfaction at the completion of the sports stadium and noted that a new 
project, the Chinoyi Teachers College had started. The Zimbabwe side 
undertook to provide its Chinese counterparts with a definite proposal 
in connection with the construction and ancillary works of Kwasine gold 
dam by end-December 1988. The Zimbabweans stated that the 
construction of seven garment factories in different sites was under 
consideration.
A consultancy for the rehabilitation of ZISCO steelworks was 
awarded to China International Engineering Consulting Corporation, 
the fee being met for the most part out of the loan provided by China in 
1985. The remaining 25% of the fee was to be paid by ZISCO in local 
currency. Much of the rest of the meeting was given over to 
Zimbabwean requests for Chinese personnel including agronomists and 
doctors.
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On bilateral trade, the two sides expressed satisfaction, while 
acknowledging scope for growth. Forty percent of the receipts from the 
sale of Zimbabwean tobacco to Chinese corporations in 1988 was to be 
used by Zimbabwean companies to purchase Chinese commodities. 
Consideration would be given to a Chinese request that 50% of the total 
value of tobacco purchases for 1989 be used by Zimbabwean importers 
to purchase Chinese goods. However, the Zimbabwean side emphasised 
that this request was subject to further negotiations after a formal 
request had been submitted to the relevant Zimbabwean authorities.32
Sino-Zimbabwean relations since independence have not had the 
high public profile that might have been expected from  pre­
independence affinities. Attempts by the Zimbabwean authorities to 
exhibit political support for the Chinese position in the 1989 uprising 
did not receive popular backing. Rhetorical expressions of solidarity 
notwithstanding, however, Chinese aid to Zimbabwe has been project- 
based and most of the projects have been completed. Trade patterns, as 
expected, have been slower to change.
Three paths
The USA, USSR and China provide comparative contrasts in the 
relative importance of political will and economic imperatives in 
structuring Zimbabwe’s international relations.
Both China and the USA serve as examples where political action 
did produce a tangible economic result. In the case of the USA, 
rhetorical accusations of dubious motive for US policy in Southern 
Africa and Central America led to reductions and the temporary 
suspension of official US aid. Throughout the period 1983 to 1988, 
however, when relations could be described as troubled, the USA never 
accounted for less than 5.7% of exports and 5.9% of imports and was
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consistently among the top five export and import markets for the 
Zimbabwean economy.
The profile given to political relations with China in the first 
fourteen years of independence was lower than might have been 
expected, given the strength of Chinese support for ZANU(PF) in the 
pre-independence struggle. Nevertheless, the relationship was always 
praised as fraternal and efforts to create economic ties did yield some 
fruit.
Apart from economic assistance provided by China, trade 
increased in the first five years of independence. At its high point, in 
1985, the PRC was Zimbabwe’s 10th largest export market, accounting 
for 3.4% of total exports. Paradoxically, however, it was overtaken by 
Taiwan the following year. Taiwan -  to which ZANU(PF) was 
ideologically hostile -  was also a more significant source of imports 
than the PRC throughout the period under review.
The Soviet Union was never seen as a priority for intensifying 
either political or economic ties. Efforts by Soviet representatives to 
develop closer co-operation were largely resisted and as a country it 
featured little in government declarations of its foreign ties.
Relations with the United States were, when positive, presented as 
a series of bilateral events. Criticism of the USA, on the other hand, was 
largely contextualised in the framework of north-south tensions or the 
struggle against imperialism. The potential impact of such criticism on 
bilateral aid was acknowledged, but no deliberate attempts were made 
by Zimbabwe to disrupt its flow. Bilateral trade was, in the meantime, 
not an issue on which the government ever chose to pass public 
judgement.
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Chapter 8: Zimbabwe and Europe
Western and Eastern Europe: changing patterns of involvement. The 
cases of Sweden, France and Romania.
European countries cannot com fortably be grouped into 
convenient sub-categories when describing the warmth or otherwise of 
their relationship with Zimbabwe. Throughout the 1980s, central and 
eastern European states had varying degrees of success in fashioning 
close ties with the ZANU(PF) government. Romania and Yugoslavia 
both translated their pre-liberation war assistance to the winning party 
into strong bonds of friendship, the practical consequences of which 
were, however, limited. Other countries which were closer to the Soviet 
Union had more work to do to break through the residual distrust. 
Some, such as East Germany and Bulgaria, were more successful than 
others.
Among the non-communist countries, Scandinavia as a whole was 
considered historically sympathetic to the independence struggle. Other 
western European countries were suspected of having been less than 
rigorous in their opposition to the Smith regime.
In trade and aid terms, however, the latter group was potentially 
extremely significant. At the ZIMCORD conference, for example, EC 
members and the European Commission together contributed some 40% 
of total pledges.1 The spirit of reconciliation allowed them to receive a 
warmer welcoming embrace than some of their eastern European 
counterparts, which had backed the wrong part of the right side.
Sweden
In August 1981, the Swedish deputy minister of foreign affairs 
Lief Leifland said that Sweden had singled out Zimbabwe as one of the
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countries to which extensive Swedish aid and co-operation had been 
made available.2 Of all Zim babwe’s bilateral donors, Sweden has 
exhibited perhaps the least concern for any visible return to its own 
coffers, while maintaining strict conditions of accountability for the way 
its funds are spent.
A specific agreement on co-operation between the Swedish and 
Zimbabwean governm ents, signed in January 1982, provides an 
illustration:
For education, Sweden shall make available on a grant basis an amount 
not exceeding SEK58,500,000 for the period 1 July 1981 to 30 June 
1983, to be financed out of the total amount made available by Sweden 
for development co-operation with Zimbabwe in accordance with the 
Memorandum of Understanding of 7  October 1981.
Zimbabwe undertakes to submit to Sweden each year not later than 1 
September a progress report and a financial report on the utilisation of 
the resources made available under this agreement, during the previous 
financial year. Annual consultations shall be held between the parties in 
order to review the progress of the programme and to prepare plans on 
the basis o f the reports mentioned under paragraph 1 for the future 
utilisation o f Swedish resources...
The object o f the programme is to reach the population in the rural areas, 
especially to meet the needs of primary and lower levels of secondary 
education in the communal areas. The programme includes the 
following activities:
Zintech college in Sinoia including vehicles and paper - SEK9,200,000; 
Science kits for rural secondary schools - SEK8m; Teachers quarters, 
rural secondary schools - SEK 12.8m; Adult education, literacy, rural
173
skills training, staff training - SEK7m; Paper - SEK8m; Reconstruction 
of primary schools - S E K 1 3 . 5 m . 3
Sweden was also among the first donors to link aid to human 
rights issues. In March 1983, adverse press reports on massacres in 
Matabeleland, resulting from army action which was ostensibly against 
armed dissidents but which was either negligently or deliberately 
undiscriminating, led Sweden to postpone scheduled aid discussions.
Consultations on development co-operation between the two 
governments finally took place in Harare from 14 to 17 June. Tom 
Mswaka, heading the Zimbabwean delegation, painted a sober picture of 
Zimbabwe's economic performance in 1982, with a very sharp drop in 
all indicators compared to 1981. In addition, the balance of payments 
was under strain and disbursement of ZIMCORD resources had been 
slower than planned. The overall result of these developments was 
failure of the economy to generate export earnings for the purchase of 
imports in quantities adequate to support satisfactory levels of growth 
and development.
The Swedish ambassador, Bo Heinebach, provided a brief review 
of relations since independence. He emphasised the close relations 
between Sweden and Zimbabwe in all fields of activity. This did not 
preclude the possibility of problems in some fields, but the excellent 
relations made it easier to solve these problems in a spirit of mutual 
confidence.
A wide range of bilateral activities had taken place in various 
fields, said Heinebach, with a development co-operation programme 
taking a central role. He also mentioned that a large number of Swedish 
companies had shown great interest in the Zimbabwean market. Some 
had established Harare offices.
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The head of the Swedish delegation Mr Bo Goransson meanwhile 
reviewed the principles of Sweden's development co-operation policy in 
Southern Africa. He was critical of the way the Swedish aid programme 
had been implemented in the previous year. The Swedish government 
had decided to propose to Zimbabwe a two-year programme with a total 
SEK250m for 1983-85; he estimated that the balance to be carried over 
from the financial year 1982/83 was SEK85m, which meant that over 
50% of the available resources would have to be carried over. He 
considered this unsatisfactory. Valuable resources for development co­
operation remained idle when the country most needed them. This, 
Goransson suggested, was due to inadequate planning capacity, though 
to a certain extent, it reflected the ambition on both sides to scrutinise 
new and ongoing projects carefully. Sweden, he said, was willing to 
help Zimbabwe with personnel in the fields of monitoring and planning 
of projects.
Turning to the specifics of the Swedish programme, Goransson 
emphasised that co-operation would continue in the sectors of rural 
health and rural education in order to assist people in the communal 
areas. Assistance in the modern sector would continue through use of 
the personnel and consultancy fund as well as through the import 
support programme. This would make it possible for Zimbabwe 
gradually to increase its independence from South Africa. He also 
mentioned transportation as a new sector for support and reiterated the 
significance of NGOs as a natural and efficient supplement to 
government aid.
The two sides agreed that funds should be released quarterly in 
advance based on requests from Zimbabwe. They further agreed an 
import support programme of SEK25m for each of the financial years,
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tied to the import of equipment from Sweden. A procurement plan was 
promised before August for the following financial year.
The delegations discussed the com binations of Swedish 
concessional credits and import support funds. They agreed that when 
Swedish concessional credits were considered by Zimbabwe, the use of 
import support funds should not be considered when evaluating the 
tenders.
Distinguishing features
Goransson outlined the importance that the Swedish side attached 
to the proposed general agreement on terms and procedures already 
submitted to the Zimbabwean authorities for consideration. These were 
essentially designed to ensure transparency and accountability in the 
application of any aid disbursed and were not designed to influence 
procurement decisions. A number of significant terms distinguished the 
Swedish approach from other bilateral donors:
(1) When financial resources made available by Sweden were 
utilised for the procurement of goods and services, the responsibility 
for procurement would rest in principle with Zimbabwe. Sweden would 
assist, if the parties so agreed. However, to ascertain that resources 
made available by Sweden for procurement were used with due 
attention to economy and efficiency, procurement would wherever 
practicable, be based on formal competitive international bidding.
(2) When financial resources were tied to procurement in Sweden 
of Swedish goods and services, procurement would be made from the 
most competitive source of supply in Sweden and wherever practicable 
be based on formal competitive bidding.
(3.) Sweden would be given all appropriate information 
regarding procurement financed out of Swedish contributions and 
would have access to all relevant records and documents. Swedish
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suppliers of goods and services would whenever feasible be granted the 
opportunity to participate in the bidding for contracts financed out of 
Swedish contributions.
(4) Zimbabwe would furnish to Sweden all such information as it 
might reasonably request relating to the use of Swedish contributions 
and enable Sweden to visit the various activities and have access to the 
relevant documents.4
In parallel to aid disbursement, trade with Sweden did, in fact, 
increase. By mid November, 1984, Swedish trade with Zimbabwe had 
grown from some ZWD3m in 1980, when Sweden was one of the first 
countries to send an industrial delegation, to around ZWD16-17m. 
Private Swedish firms in Zimbabwe included Alfa Laval, Atlas Copco, 
Ericsson, Saab-Scania, ASEA and SKF.
Over the decade as a whole, however, trade between the two 
countries never attained levels reflecting the strength of the relationship 
in other areas. In fact, Sweden declined as an export market for 
Zimbabwe in relative terms, though its share of Zimbabwe’s imports 
reached a relative peak of 1.5% in 1988 (see table 8.1).
Though Sweden has been singled out for illustration as its 
approach is well recorded, other Scandinavian countries responded to 
opportunities and requests. In 1980/81, Finland was Zimbabwe’s largest 
buyer of sugar, but by 1984, it had stopped imports of Zimbabwean 
sugar as it had become uncompetitive on world markets.
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TABLE 8.1
year ZWDm
SWEDEN 
exports to imports from 
% of total year ZW1
1980 6.3 1.8 1980 2.4
(Aug-Dee)
1981 6.4 0 .7
(Aug-Dee)
1981 7.1
1982 5.9 0 .7 1982 8.8
1983 5.1 0 .5 1983 8.5
1984 13.0 1.0 1984 16.6
1985 12.2 0 .8 1985 16.0
1986 20.2 1.2 1986 18.4
1987 10.5 0 .6 1987 20 .4
1988 27.8 1.1 1988 31 .5
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a
1990 22.2 0 .6 1990 61.3
% of total
0.6
0 .7
0.8
0.8
1.4 
1.1 
1.1 
1.2
1.5 
n/a 
1.4
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
France
The victory of F ra n c is  Mitterrand in May 1981 was seen in 
Zimbabwe as a welcome development. At a reception in honour of the 
French Ambassador on 3 June 1981, Bernard Chidzero, then Minister 
of Economic Planning and Development gave an indication of one of the 
competing models of socialism being promoted in government circles.
We would like to establish socialism not through imposition but out of
satisfaction, and I think we will draw inspiration from the French.^
Trade and aid volumes both grew significantly in the early post­
independence years. Much of the trade was, however, aid-related and in 
contrast to Sweden reflected French concern that aid outflows should 
return to swell French order books. Taking stock in late 1983, the 
French commercial counsellor in Harare stated that in the previous four 
years, Zimbabwe’s exports to France had doubled while imports had 
increased sixfold. Zimbabwe’s exports consisted mainly of minerals 
(nickel, chrome and other non-ferrous metals) and agricultural 
commodities (tobacco, coffee, cotton) amounting to ZWD21m in 1982. 
Imports from France - worth ZWD54m at the end of 1982 - included 
electrical equipm ent, machinery, cars, spare parts, metals and 
chemicals.
Initial protocol
The first financial protocol between the Zimbabwean and French 
authorities was signed on 18 February 1981, before the May elections 
which brought Mitterrand to power. It contained the following notable 
provisions:
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(1) The French government extends to the government o f Zimbabwe 
credit facilities o f an amount not exceeding FRF250m to finance the 
purchase in France of French goods and services as follows:
[a] FRF25m for the purchase by the government or parastatals of light 
equipment not tied to specific projects
[b] FRF225m for the execution o f projects approved by both parties on 
a case by case basis.
(2) The financial facilities referred to are composed of:
[a] a loan from the French Treasury not exceeding FRFlOOm
[b] bankers credits guaranteed by the Compagnie d'Assurance pour le 
commerce exterieur (COFACE) not exceeding F R F  15 0 m . b
The following conditions applied for the purchases mentioned in 
(1) [a] above:
If the project was to be implemented directly by the government 
of Zimbabwe the loan and credits were extended to the government. If 
the project was under the aegis of a parastatal the same would apply, 
provided the government guaranteed the servicing of interest and 
repayment of capital.
In the case of (l)[b], a further possibility applied, if the project 
was undertaken by a private company. In that case the treasury loan 
would be extended to the government of Zimbabwe, while the bankers 
credits could be extended to the private company, provided the 
government guaranteed servicing and repayment.
The contracts would be financed through joint use of the loan and 
credits. Drawing rights on the treasury loan were fixed at 40% of the 
French content of orders for French goods and services. The use of the 
treasury loan was reserved for the financing of the downpayment to 
French suppliers. A downpayment of not less than 10% of the amount
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of each contract FOB was to be made when the order was placed, by 
drawing on the treasury loan. The bankers credits would cover the 
remaining 60% of the French content of the contract.
Each treasury loan under a specific contract carried interest at 
3% per annum on the outstanding balance and was redeemable over 25 
years by 36 successive and equal semi-annual instalments, the first one 
falling due 90 months after the end of the quarter during which the first 
drawing was made.
Interest accrued on each drawing on the treasury loan from the 
date of drawing.
The guaranteed bankers credits would be redeemable in seven 
years in 14 successive and equal semi-annual instalments for contracts 
under (l)[a] and 10 years under (l)[b], the first instalment falling due 
either on delivery or on the contractual date of competition of the 
project. The usual rates of credit for this type of agreement were to 
apply at the time of signing, to which the COFACE insurance premium 
would be added.
To be eligible for the above facilities, individual contracts with 
French suppliers had to be concluded at the latest on 30 June 1982. The 
amount could be not less than FRF150,000 for contracts under (1)[a] 
and FRF5m for (l)[b ], except in exceptional cases such as consulting 
services. No drawing on the Treasury loan could take place later than 
30 June 1984.
The French financial protocols dwelt more on the loan terms than 
on the purposes of the loan. They nevertheless proved particularly 
popular with the Zimbabwean government and were repeated. Of the 
seven Franco-Zimbabwean bilateral agreements archived for the first 11 
years of independence, six took the form of financial protocols, with the 
example above serving as a model.
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Certain of them were for specific projects such as the Protocol of 
27 January 1987 for a jo int project on tractor mechanisation in 
com munal lands, whereby the governm ent of France granted 
FRF800,000 to the government of Zimbabwe. Others contained a 
mixture of targetted and non-targetted loans.
On 10 November 1987, a protocol was signed to provide financial 
support for economic development and specifically, “to finance projects 
included in the development priorities of Zimbabwe.” Although 
following the model of the first protocol, the terms were somewhat 
softer. The loan would not exceed FRF410m and was to be used to 
finance the purchase of French goods and services as follows:
(a) A grant from the French Treasury for FRFlOm to finance an 
urban transport study for Harare-Chitungwiza (the latter being 
essentially a dormitory town).
(b) FRF400m credit facilities for the execution of projects agreed 
by both parties mentioned in the Annex below and for light equipment 
not tied to specific projects.
The financial package for (b) consisted of a loan not exceeding 
FRF198.03m from the French Treasury. COFACE credits could not 
exceed FRF201.97m.
The urban transport study was to be financed by the French 
government, while other projects were to involve joint use of loan and 
credit. Drawing rights on the Treasury loan were fixed at 50% of the 
French content for the orders of French goods and services, with credits 
covering the balance. The Treasury loan was to be used to finance the 
whole of the first instalment on each contract covered by the protocol, 
equal to at least 10% of each contract.
The loan was guaranteed for 30 years including a grace period of 
10 years and was repayable in 40 equal six monthly instalments. The
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interest rate was 2.5% per annum. The first instalment would be due 
126 months after the end of the calendar quarter during which each 
drawing was made.
Credits were given for 10 years, repayable in 20 instalments, the 
first six months after delivery or on completion of project. The interest 
rate applicable was to be the normal interest rate at the date of contract 
plus an insurance premium.
The latest date for contracts with French suppliers was 30 
September 1988, just under 11 months from the date of signature of the 
protocol. Contracts could be not less than FRF7m for main projects (see 
annex A)7, FRF2m for microprojects (see annex B)8 and FRF150,000 
for light equipment. No drawing on treasury loan and grants could take 
place after 30 September 1990.
On 27 June 1990, a protocol was concluded providing a 
maximum of FRF9.2m as a grant to finance the purchase of French 
goods and services related to a range of projects, including technical 
assistance for a vocational training centre (FRF1.2m), a dam feasibility 
study (FRF6m), and a Harare-Chitungwiza urban transport study 
(FRF2m). An implementation deadline of 31 July 1992 was set. The 
transport study received a further FRFlOm under a protocol of 6 
November 1991, provided the commercial contract was completed by 
31 December 1991. The very short delay suggests a rather desperate 
attempt to move the project along.
The attempts to tie French aid to French sourcing of project 
inputs did feed through into the trade figures (see table 8.2). France was 
signficantly more important as a supplier than as a market, though both 
import and export levels remained consistently above the relative levels 
(1% in each case) recorded in 1965.
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TABLE 8.2
FRANCE
exports to imports from
year ZWDm % of total year ZWDm % of total
1980 9.4 2.7 1980 7.8 2.0
(Aug-Dee) (Aug-Dee)
1981 13.1 1.5 1981 37.1 3 .6
1982 21.1 2.6 1982 54.1 5 .0
1983 16.3 1.6 1983 49.6 4 .7
1984 23.0 1.8 1984 50.9 4 .2
1985 20.1 1.3 1985 47.8 3.3
1986 21.1 1.2 1986 54.4 3.3
1987 21.1 1.1 1987 64.0 3 .7
1988 28.9 1.1 1988 64.4 3 .2
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 58.8 1.6 1990 93.7 2.1
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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Germany: West
Prior to UDI, West Germany was a significant trading partner. 
After independence, this position was officially re-established. On 
taking up his appointm ent in February 1983, Z im babw e’s new 
ambassador to West Germany Dr Eubert Mashaire said that West 
Germany was Zimbabwe’s fourth largest trading partner. “My role”, he 
said, “is simply promoting our interests in the economic and political 
fields and to maintain the good relations which now exist between the 
two countries.”9
At the same function, his counterpart in Zimbabwe, Dr Richard 
Ellerkman, said that since the establishment three years previously of 
diplomatic relations, there had been favourable developments in 
political, economic and commercial co-operation. West Germany 
bought tobacco, cotton, and other raw materials and sold machinery and 
other products. In the area of economic co-operation, he said Germany 
had concentrated on reconstruction of war damage in rural areas and on 
the provision of educational facilities. There were 700 young 
Zimbabweans studying in Germany in technical and vocational fields. 
By 6 November 1983, West Germany had given ZWD40m in financial 
aid.
East Germany
East Germany, having backed ZAPU, made an effort to come to 
terms with the new power networks and apart from Romania was the 
most successful of the CMEA countries at creating warmer ties. It was 
also willing to promote barter trade a time when the Zimbabwean 
government was receptive to the idea. As the latter’s attitude to such 
trade cooled, however, the level of exchanges dropped off. The volume
185
of barter between Zimbabwe and the GDR declined from ZWD15m in
1983 to ZWDlOm in 1989.10
Comparison
In the absence of barter deals, trade flows between East Germany 
and Zimbabwe did not achieve significant levels. West Germany on the 
other hand was a major supplier and purchaser of Zimbabwean products 
and one of the few trading partners to show a relative growth 
throughout the decade as a destination for Zimbabwean exports (see 
tables 8.3 and 8.4).
Italy
Although it has never achieved a high political profile in the 
country, Italy has had a more significant economic role than many of 
the more prominent political allies. In mid-1981, Italy’s ambassador to 
Harare observed that if all the projects under preparation were 
successfully implemented, Zimbabwe would be second only to Somalia 
on the African continent in the volume of aid received from Italy.11
With no prior political history in the region either to invoke or 
live down, Italian firms appear successfully to have exploited new 
commercial opportunities with the encouragement of the Italian 
government. By m id-1982, Italy ranked fifth as an importer from 
Zimbabwe, buying cotton, hides, asbestos, metal alloys, and tobacco, 
and ninth as an exporter, principally of agricultural and industrial 
machinery, electrical equipment, yarns and cloth. Although trade 
fluctuated, throughout the 1980s, Italy remained a net importer in the 
relationship rarely accounting for less than 5% of Zimbabwe’s sales 
abroad (see table 8.5).
TABLE 8.3
W EST G ER M A N Y
exports to imports from
year ZWDm % of total year ZWDm % of total
1980 37.5 10.8 1980 25.7 6 .7
(Aug-Dee) (Aug-Dee)
1981 73.0 8.2 1981 73.8 7 .2
1982 64.6 8.0 1982 88.6 8 .2
1983 79.3 7.7 1983 78.1 7 .4
1984 109.2 8.6 1984 82.3 6 .9
1985 153.4 9.9 1985 100.4 6 .9
1986 146.1 8.6 1986 163.2 9 .9
1987 193.6 10.2 1987 152.0 8 .7
1988 235.6 9.3 1988 194.4 9 .5
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 426.1 11.8 1990 332.5 7.3
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
TABLE 8.4
EAST G ER M A N Y
exports to imports fr
year ZWDm % of total year ZW1
1980( Aug- n/p n/p 1980(Aug- n/p
Dee) Dec)
1981 1.2 0.1 1981 1.2
1982 0.7 0.1 1982 1.5
1983 5.0 0 .5 1983 1.8
1984 11.1 0.9 1984 4.2
1985 21.1 1.4 1985 13.6
1986 48.0 2.8 1986 12.4
1987 7.4 0.4 1987 5.7
% of total
n/p
0.1
0.1
0.2
0 .4
0 .9
0.8
0.3
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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TABLE 8.5
ITALY
exports to im ports from
year ZW Dm % o f  total year ZW Dm % o f total
1980 15.9 4.6 1980 6.4 1.7
(Aug-Dee) (Aug-Dee)
1981 44.0 5.0 1981 21.1 2.1
1982 35.7 4 .4 1982 24.7 2.3
1983 53.0 5.2 1983 19.1 1.8
1984 64.3 5.1 1984 36.6 3 .0
1985 91.5 5.9 1985 43.8 3 .0
1986 100.3 5.9 1986 70.4 4.3
1987 83.7 4 .4 1987 52.5 3 .0
1988 168.5 6.6 1988 34.4 1.7
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 166.4 4.6 1990 99.6 2.2
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
188
Romania
As a supplier of military aid and training during the liberation 
struggle, Romania ranked as a special friend in the post-independence 
period. Nikolai and Elena Ceaucescu received the rare honour on their 
state visit to Zimbabwe in July 1983 of being awarded the freedom of 
the city of Harare. The nature of the relationship at all levels, personal, 
party and national, was warmly lauded on every available occasion.
In September 1980, President Banana conducted an official visit 
of friendship to Bucharest. Talks were conducted in an atmosphere of 
“warm friendship, mutual understanding and respect.” Banana conveyed 
his government and people’s deep gratitude for the:
...solidarity, political, diplomatic, moral and material support given 
during the hard years of struggle for national liberation and for the 
friendship and co-operation shown since i n d e p e n d e n c e . 1 2
Ceaucescu expressed “the deep satisfaction of the Romanian 
people in the brilliant victory in the heroic struggle for national 
liberation.”13 The two leaders signed long term agreem ents on 
economic and technical co-operation.
The Agreement on long term economic, industrial and technical 
co-operation was designed to facilitate the diversified development of 
such co-operation. Payment would be made in freely convertible 
currencies, with prices to be world market prices. A joint commission 
would be set up to examine ways of implementing the agreement. An 
accompanying long term trade and payment agreement provided for 
Most Favoured Nation status, with no quantitative restrictions on mutual 
trade. Goods to be exported to Romania under the agreement included: 
beef, veal and other meats; maize, wheat, soya beans, coffee, tea, sugar
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tobacco, copper, textiles, metals and minerals, crafts. Romanian goods 
earmarked for sale to Zimbabwe included tractors, combine harvesters 
and farming equipment, machine tools, metalworking and woodworking 
machines, textile machines, vehicles, aeroplanes, electrical and 
electronic goods and components and power transmission equipment, 
telecommunications equipment, road building equipment, medical 
equipment, and wine.
The search for common interest
Serious ambition was evident at the outset. At the first session of 
the joint commission in April 1983, the Zimbabwean side expressed its 
desire to set up an agro-zoo-technical and industrial complex in the 
Kadoma area. As a first step, this would involve the setting up of a 
dairy farm. The need for a detailed study was agreed.
In the field of industry, the commission reported that discussions 
had taken place on the assembly of Romanian vehicles in Zimbabwe. 
One or two Romanian vehicles were to be sent for technical assessment 
in Zimbabwe. If the result was satisfactory, both sides would act. The 
parastatal Industrial Development Corporation had already expressed an 
interest in two tractor models that had been tested. Studies were also 
underway on the manufacture of locomotives and rehabilitation of the 
oil refinery. Negotiations would meanwhile be speeded up in the field of 
civil air transport co-operation. Tests were being carried out on the 
possibility of assembling Romanian TV sets in Harare.
Reviewing the level of bilateral trade, both parties noted that the 
volume of bilateral trade had not developed to the desired level. It was 
further noted that the items listed for trade needed to be diversified. 
The competent trade organisations would therefore advance concrete 
proposals for developing the level of trade in the course of 1983 “in line 
with the good political relations.” The commission expressed satisfaction
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at the first barter deal recently concluded between the two countries and 
declared itself in favour of future deals, encompassing diversification.
To promote economic co-operation and trade, it was agreed that 
the government of Romania should consider establishing a development 
line of credit or protocol; that other financing be made available outside 
this; that barter trade be encouraged and that double tax treaty 
negotiations be undertaken.14
On the occasion of the Ceaucescu’s state visit, a joint communique 
was issued reaffirming the affinity between the two countries. The two 
leaders highly commended the peoples of the two countries for 
im plem enting the national programmes of economic and social 
development and the construction of a new society; recognised the 
lasting basis for co-operation; and agreed to increase efforts to expand 
economic links. A new agreement on long term economic and technical 
co-operation was signed, along with an understanding on co-operation 
between Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and Romanian radio and 
television, and agreements in the fields of geology and mining, science, 
sport and mass media. The communique laid some emphasis on the 
importance of inter-party relations:
The president of ZANU(PF) and the secretary-general of the Romanian 
Communist Party highly appreciated the existing militant solidarity and 
co-operation between the two parties established during the years of the 
heroic struggle waged by the Zimbabwean people for independence. It 
was agreed that on the basis and in the spirit o f the agreement of co­
operation between ZANU(PF) and the Romanian Communist Party, 
signed in Bucharest on 17 November 1981, the two parties promote the 
collaboration between them by promoting the exchange of experiences 
and continuing consultations on bilateral and international problems of
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mutual interest. They reaffirmed the resolution of ZANU(PF) and the 
Romanian Communist Party on strengthening co-operation o f  
communist and workers parties, socialist and social democratic parties 
and other progressive forces and movements for national liberation; 
unity of these forces w ill ensure social progress and peace in the
world.1 ^
The communique further pointed to a convergence of views 
between the parties and states on international issues. Serious concern 
was expressed about the arms race and nuclear war. South Africa was 
condemned and support reaffirmed for the Palestinian struggle under 
the PLO with agreement on the need for Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied territories.
The state visit provided the occasion for the elaboration of a 
programme of long term development of co-operation. Relations would 
be expanded on the basis of militant solidarity. The two sides noted 
“significant progress” in the following areas: technical assessment of 
Romanian tractors and vehicles; technical assessment of TV sets; 
preparation of a pre-feasibility study for the Kadoma agro-industrial 
complex; exchange of TV programmes; training and technical assistance 
in civil aviation, mining, geology and drilling, and in bilateral trade. 
They agreed to support the finalisation of negotiations of contracts in 
the agreed areas between 1983 and 1984. At the same time, they agreed 
to consider practical co-operation in the following areas: preparation by 
the end of 1983 of the project for the manufacture of locomotives; co­
operation in the development of coal resources (In this regard, the 
Zimbabwean side would communicate the decision to the Romanian side 
pertaining to co-operation in this area as soon as possible); co-operation 
in the field of energy development; co-operation in the establishment of
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mining co-operatives; exploration of tin ore deposits; co-operation in 
iron and steel industries; and an industrial and agricultural project. 
These areas were to be indicative, with a non restrictive character.
Zimbabwe expressed an interest in technology for gold extraction 
in areas of high antimony and arsenic content. Any other projects which 
would improve productivity, open new mines, and increase the 
beneficiation of raw materials before they were exported would also be 
seriously considered.
A substantial expansion in the volume of bilateral trade was 
envisaged. As regards trading in minerals, however, all negotiations 
would have to be through the government's Minerals Marketing 
Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ). Accordingly, barter trade would 
have to be directed to the relevant committee which would decide on its 
viability.
Paradise postponed
From such big oaks did little acorns grow. Discussions continued 
until after the overthrow of the Ceaucescu regime on the potential for 
co-operation, but the potential defined was never realised. Addressing 
the opening session of the Zimbabwe Romania Joint Commission for 
Economic Technical and Industrial Co-operation in Bucharest in June 
1984, the Deputy Prime Minister, Simon Muzenda surveyed progress to 
date. Since the first session in April 1983, he said, one barter deal 
exchanging ferrochrome for urea had been concluded; a second 
exchanging Zimbabwean ferrochrome for urea and glass had been 
approved and a third exchanging asbestos from Zim babwe for 
Romanian soda ash, caustic soda, synthetic rubber and carbon black was 
under negotiation.16
During the course of the next five days, the meeting reviewed the 
projects launched at the previous session. A proposal on the export and
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assembly of Romanian tractors had been finalised and submitted. The 
Zimbabwean side had not approved the project, but agreed to re­
examine it. Romania’s continued interest in the rehabilitation of the 
ZISCO steel plant was to be met through U sinim portexport’s 
participation in a competitive tender.
In the mining field, Zimbabwe had still to take a policy decision 
on coal co-operation. Samples had, however, been sent to Romania from 
Empress nickel dump to test the possibility of extracting further nickel. 
New areas of possible co-operation were mentioned including a drawn 
glass sheet factory, oil products storage facilities, a caustic soda factory, 
and extraction of aluminium silicate and kyonite. On the trade front, it 
was appreciated that further efforts were necessary to increase the 
volume of trade and diversify the range of goods.
The third session o f the jo int commission reporting on 6 
September 1985 declared that little progress had been achieved over the 
past year and agreed to intensify efforts. In order to speed up 
negotiations on certain tractor models that had been found suitable, 
Romania proposed that payment be made in asbestos.
The commission noted that further tests had been done on the 
Romanian ARO 244 cross country vehicle. Taking into account the 
performance of this vehicle and the interest shown by Zimbabwean end- 
users, the Romanian delegation asked the Zimbabweans to grant the 
necessary approval for the importation and local assembly of this type 
of vehicle. The Zimbabwean side responded that they were currently 
carrying out a vehicle rationalisation and standardisation programme 
with a view to reducing the models of vehicles in the country. A 
decision on the importation of the ARO 244 would therefore only be 
taken after this exercise was completed. The Romanian representatives
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meanwhile reconfirmed the availability of a USD 15m credit facility for 
the delivery and assembly of tractors, cross country vehicles and trucks.
The drawn sheet glass factory project was taken one step further 
with an agreement to send a Zimbabwean delegation to Romania the 
following month for further observation and discussion. Detailed 
discussion on the Kadoma agro-industrial complex was to follow a 
feasibility study. The Empress nickel dump tests proved negative and 
that particular project was shelved. Further sustained efforts on bilateral 
trade were called for as was the expediting of import and export 
procedures for goods already contracted. When trade figures were 
released, 1985 proved to be the worst year since independence for 
bilateral trade between the two countries (see table 8.6).
The fourth session of the joint commission met in Bucharest in 
October 1986 and was able to report a degree of progress17. Export and 
assembly of Romanian tractors in Zimbabwe had been implemented. 
The Zimbabweans agreed that import should be accelerated. The 
Romanians agreed to look at expanding the local content of the tractors. 
TV sets were to be subject to the next barter deal. The sheet glass 
factory project was described as ongoing. Usinimportexport was 
meanwhile said to have pre-qualified for the international tender for 
ZISCO rehabilitation.
No progress was achieved in the negotiations on the import of 
cross country four wheel drive vehicles and trucks, the motor 
rationalisation exercise being the culprit. The Romanian side was 
informed that when the implementation of the types and models came 
into effect, the already tested Romanian vehicles would receive due 
consideration. The ambitious Kadoma complex had meanwhile been put 
back, while the Romanians considered a revised feasibility study 
presented by Zimbabwe.
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TABLE 8.6
R O M A N IA  
exports to im ports from
year ZW Dm % o f  total year ZW Dm % o f  total
1981 1981 1.0 0.1
1982 2.7 0.3 1982 0.2 0 .0
1983 9 .5 0 .9 1983 2.9 0.3
1984 9.8 0 .8 1984 4.1 0.3
1985 4.2 0.3 1985 2.6 0 .2
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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The fifth session, in November 1987, showed signs of Romanian 
disenchantment.18 The tractor export and assembly was reported to be 
progressing well. The sheet glass factory, while still in construction, 
was now no longer on a joint venture basis though Romania agreed to 
supply a line of credit. Part of the Kadoma project had been 
implemented, though the dairy aspect was lacking resources. 
Zimbabwean representatives urged the Romanians to plug the gap. The 
Romanians said they would extend a line of credit rather than proceed 
with the project as a joint venture. The Zimbabweans, however, 
indicated that the Kadoma complex was originally planned on a joint 
venture basis and could only continue on that basis. The Romanians 
agreed to reconsider.
Romania offered to take Zimbabwean students on a commercial 
basis. The Zimbabwean side said that owing to economic constraints 
they could not take up the offer. On trade, the commission 
optimistically discerned a gradual trend and agreed to try and raise the 
level of exchange to ZWD15m on each side in the following year. In 
fact, since 1985, trade levels between Romania and Zimbabwe had been 
too low to appear in either the annual or quarterly published summaries 
of trade statistics.
The downfall of the Ceaucescus and the Romanian Communist 
Party did not herald the complete demise of efforts to stimulate bilateral 
economic exchange. There was. however, a change in underlying spirit. 
At the seventh session of the joint commission in May 1991, the use of 
h ard  c u rre n cy  w as reco m m en d ed  w herever p o ss ib le .19 
Barter/countertrade deals could only be negotiated on an ad hoc basis. 
To improve trade flows, it was declared that exporters in both countries 
should ensure that their goods were internationally competitive. It was 
announced that the sheet glass factory was now operational, but that the
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export of tractors to Zimbabwe in kit form had been discontinued. New 
projects were proposed but in no great detail. Without the fuel of party 
affinity, a decade of experiments to create economic sparks from a 
political dynamo ground to a halt.
Yugoslavia
The Yugoslavian contribution to Zimbabwe’s post-independence 
landscape is highly visible in Harare in the form of the gold coloured 
Sheraton Hotel and conference centre, which has been the site of 
numerous international meetings including the 1986 NAM conference 
and the 1991 meeting of Commonwealth heads of state and government. 
The hotel and conference centre, built by Energoproject of Yugosiavia 
at a cost of USD60m, was jointly financed by the governments of 
Yugoslavia, France and Zimbabwe and opened in late 1985.20 
Yugoslavia’s prior ZW D2.8m Zimcord pledge had already been 
fulfilled and the centre was regarded as a special gift (which can now 
double as a memorial to the country that gave it).
Before its disin tegration, Y ugoslav ia’s relationship with 
Zimbabwe rested on three pillars: its help during the pre-independence 
struggle; its attractions as a model, initially of a successful guerrilla 
campaign and subsequently of an independent socialist line; and thirdly 
as a founder of the non-aligned movement.
Trade, however, did not flourish. Yugoslavia does not feature in 
any of the published export statistics since independence and managed to 
reach a peak of 0.4% of Zimbabwe’s imports in 1984, before tailing off 
over the rest of the decade in both absolute and relative terms.21
Following the break up of the Yugoslav Federation, Zimbabwe 
retained some residual attachment to the rump regime in Belgrade. 
Security Council Resolution 713, adopted at ministerial level, urged the 
parties to the conflict in former Yugoslavia to stick to a ceasefire and
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imposed an arms embargo. Speaking at the Council meeting, 
Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister Nathan Shamuyarira said that the crisis 
was of concern to the non-aligned movement as Yugosiavia was both a 
founding member and current chairman. Zimbabwe, he said, was 
greatly disturbed by the tribal conflict in the country. It regarded 
Yugoslavia as a close friend which had supported its struggle for 
independence and on which it had tried to model itself in many ways. He 
supported the call for the arms embargo but urged caution about any 
future action, which should be in the area of humanitarian assistance 
only and taken within the context of the charter.22
Commenting on this vote in a subsequent interview, Shamuyarira 
explained:
On Yugoslavia, first and foremost, we felt that the EEC powers had 
precipitated the disintegration o f the Balkans by recognising Slovenia 
and Croatia too quickly, at the instigation o f Germany....We supported 
the resolution in the UN to stop arms going into Yugoslavia because 
Slovenia and Croatia were being armed by Austria, Hungary and, some 
would even say, by Germany through these c o u n t r i e s . 2 ^
He also touched on ethnic, religious and economic complications 
and reiterated that “Serbia alone should not be held responsible.”24
When in September 1992, Security Council Resolution 776 was 
adopted to enlarge the United Nations Protection Force for convoys 
transporting humanitarian aid and released detainees, Zimbabwe 
abstained along with China and India. Zimbabwe’s UN ambassador 
Simbarashe Mbengegwe emphasised Zimbabwe’s opposition to operative 
paragraph 2 of Resolution 770, reconfirmed in the present resolution, 
which called for the use of all means necessary to ensure delivery of
199
humanitarian aid. This, he argued, gave legitimacy to any party wishing 
to intervene to do so under the pretext of delivering humanitarian aid.25
Eastern Europe
Romania, despite its CMEA m em bership, m aintained an 
independent policy of assisting ZANU during the independence struggle. 
Those countries more intimately bound in to the Comecon structure had 
mixed results in building meaningful ties with post-independence 
Zimbabwe. Once a way had been found to overcome the political 
obstacle of these countries’ traditional support for ZAPU, relationships 
were spurred by the potential for trade exchanges which were not 
reliant on hard currency. Some barter deals were successfully 
com pleted notably with Hungary. However, as the Zimbabwean 
governm ent’s attitude to such trade exchanges cooled, so the 
relationships lapsed into formal courtesy.
The political formula which allowed diplomatic ties to be 
established in the first place can be found in the principles set out to 
guide Polish-Zimbabwean relations when these were officially cemented 
in February 1981 and subsequently duplicated in agreements with the 
Soviet Union:
“Non interference in each other’s internal affairs. On this principle, the 
two delegations emphasised that diplomatic relations between the 
Republic o f Zimbabwe and the Polish People’s Republic will be on a 
govemment-to-government basis only and that the two governments 
will not enter into any agreements, arrangements or negotiations with 
any organisation without prior consultation and explicit approval of each 
government.”2^
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Diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Zimbabwe were 
established on the same principle, the following month. An appropriate 
model had clearly been found to deny any leverage to these party-based 
governments’ historical ties to ZAPU . Foreign Minister Mangwende’s 
double-edged welcome to the Czechoslovak delegation recognised that 
“we can never forget the moral, political, diplomatic and - most 
important of all - material support that we received from progressive 
governments and movements the world over. For that, Zimbabwe shall 
ever be grateful to her socialist friends.” He was, he said, also happy 
that the Czech government “unreservedly recognised the popularly 
elected government of Zimbabwe.”27
Limits on the expansion of the relationship appeared early. On 
signing trade agreements with the Czech minister of foreign trade in 
March 1982, Richard Hove, M inister of Trade and Com m erce 
commented:
I am glad to learn that the Em bassy w ill have a trade 
section...Unfortunately, financial and other factors preclude Zimbabwe 
from posting trade officials in Czechoslovakia at the present t im e .2 ^
Bulgaria made the boldest attempt to move the relationship 
forward with four separate co-operation agreements signed between 
1980 and 1983. These initially generated some interest on the 
Zimbabwean side.
A further set of protocols governing extensive agricultural co­
operation between Zimbabwe and Bulgaria was signed in Harare in 
January 1984. Speaking in his capacity as party secretary for external 
affairs, Richard Hove had this to say about why certain aspects of the 
first two year old protocol had not been implemented:
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The reason for this is that Zimbabwe is a young country, and there is so 
much to do here at home that we could not com pletely fulfil the 
agreement. But please don't think we are not interested in this 
agreement. We are very, very interested. We take particular pride in 
developing our relations with socialist c o u n t r i e s . 2 ^
The first session of the Bulgaria-Zimbabwe joint commission was 
held in June 1984. Both sides reviewed the development of trade and 
noted with satisfaction an improvement in bilateral trade. The agreed to 
make endeavours to expand the volume of trade in convertible 
currency. Ad hoc barter was to be considered and credits were to be 
extended on a case by case basis for individual projects.30
By the time of the third session two years later, optimism had 
been somewhat tempered. Small scale rural industries proposed by the 
Bulgarian side as jo in t ventures were not necessary, Zim babwe’s 
delegation explained, as such technology was already available in the 
country. On barter and countertrade, both sides noted the current 
Zimbabwean government policy that barter and countertrade should be 
considered on an ad hoc basis. Hence the Zimbabwean government 
could not engage itself in long-term barter deals. The draft protocol 
submitted by the Bulgarian side on long term co-operation was rejected 
as not in keeping with current Zimbabwean government policy on 
barter trade.
A specific wheat-for-maize barter deal proposal had been under 
consideration. However, the Bulgarian side announced that the wheat 
crop intended for the deal had apparently been sold out following the 
Zimbabwean government’s delayed response on the matter. The two
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sides agreed that the deal should be finalised once the two crops became 
available. No record appears in the archives of its completion.31 
Footnote
In January 1990, Bulgaria’s outgoing ambassador Alexander 
Atanassov urged his audience to steer clear of empty socialist slogans. 
“Let those who benefit from socialism say so, rather than those who 
make the slogans,” he told guests at a farewell lunch in Harare. “When 
shops are empty, when people are not allowed to say what they want, 
what kind of socialism is that?” he asked. In reply, Witness Mangwende, 
then Information Minister, referred to the lesson of events in Eastern 
Europe for countries like Zimbabwe. “We are”, he said, “particularly 
keen to see how your country strengthens socialism, democracy and the 
economy.”32 
Summary
The European countries considered here fell into three distinct 
categories: those which had supported ZANU(PF) in the struggle for 
independence and which were consequently candidates for closer 
economic ties (Sweden, Romania, Yugoslavia); those which were 
regarded as at best ambivalent during the struggle (France, Italy, West 
Germany) and those which were seen as close to ZAPU (East Germany, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria).
Of these, the middle groilp of western European countries was the 
most successful at establishing strong economic links, combining both 
aid and trade. In the case of France, the financial protocols negotiated 
had a tangible impact on its relative importance as a supplier to the 
Zimbabwean economy. In public pronouncements by Zimbabwean 
government representatives, these countries were presented as friends 
on a bilateral basis, but were also considered as of dubious multilateral 
intent.
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While much effort was put into cultivating ties with the first 
group, only Sweden managed to established any sustained economic 
links, though at levels below Swedish expectations. Despite effusive 
declarations of solidarity both at party and state level with Romania, 
attempts at deepening the economic relationship foundered in the 
meeting rooms of the bilateral commissions themselves. Public 
declarations of solidarity were restricted to the political plane. 
Yugoslavia meanwhile made a tangible contribution to the Zimbabwean 
economy through a major prestige construction project, but this did not 
form the basis of a growing economic relationship. Nevertheless, 
Zimbabwe continued to support Yugoslavia in political fora, when its 
territorial integrity was in serious doubt.
The CMEA countries were perhaps the least well-placed to 
develop meaningful bilateral ties, in the absence of either political 
kinship or historical trade links. The most tangible results of bilateral 
negotiations on economic co-operation were agreements to convene 
more meetings.
1 T. Chimombe, Foreign Capital, in Mandaza (ed)p!32
2 Herald. 20/8/81
3 in Sweden File, Bilateral Treaties Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harare (accessed by formal 
request)
Terms and conditions as set out in the minutes o f bilateral consultations, 14-17/6/83, in Sweden 
File, Bilateral Treaties Section, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs 
 ^Copy o f speech provided by Zimbabwean embassy, Paris
 ^ in France File, Bilateral Treaties Section, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Harare (accessed by formal 
request)
7 Annex A: main projects
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Kadoma powder milk plant FRF50m to Dairy Marketing Board (DM B)
Additional equipment for the Bulawayo dairy plant: FRF30m to DMB
Power lines and substations in the Triangle-M oynezi-Beit Bridge area to Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority (ZESA)
Equipment for ZESA training centre: FRF7m 
Telex printers for PTC: FRF22m
Telephone lines and concentrators for rural areas to PTC: FRF7.2m Additional equipment for the 
Harare digital exchange to PTC: FRF20m Additional maintenance and ground handling equipment for 
Air Zimbabwe: FRF50m
Rehabilitation o f the coke oven battery for the ZISCO steel: FRF130m  
TOTAL = FRF321.2m
8 Annex B: Industrial microprojects - FRF39.4m
Light equipment not tied to specific projects - FRF39.4m  
Grant for urban transport study - FRF 10m
9 Herald. 4/2/83
10 Herald. 7/10/89
11 Herald. 4/6/81
12 Official report on visit (19-23/8/80) filed with ensuing Agreements at Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, 
Harare.
13 ibid
14 Memorandum of Understanding on 1st Session o f the Joint Commission, 27-29/4/83, filed at 
Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, Harare.
Joint Communique, 18/7/83, filed at Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Harare 
16 Press statement, 20/6/84
^  Minutes o f meeting o f  4th session o f joint com m ission, 16-20/10/86, filed at Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), Harare 
18 17-20/11/87 at MFA
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19 6-8/5/91 at MFA
Stoneman & Cliffe, p l5 2
21 Statistical Yearbook 1989 (Harare: Central Statistical Office) 1989, pp209-210
22 SC5309, 25/9/91
23 interv i e w  conducted by Dr Ibbo Mandaza, published in Southern Africa. July 1992 (Harare: SAPES) 
2 4 ibid
25 SC5468, 14/9/92
26 Press Statement o f Ministry o f Information, 20/2/81
2 7 Herald. 26/3/81
2 ^ Press statement, 9/3/82  
29 Herald. 19/1/84
39 Bulgaria File, Bilateral Treaties Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harare (accessed by formal 
request)
31 ibid
32  Reuters, 17/1/90
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Chapter 9: The Middle East
a) Israel/Palestine
Support for PLO positions. Trade with Israel.
b) Iran/Iraq
Responding - or not - to pressure. Constraints o f the NAM 
environment.
c) Iraq/Kuwait 
Taking sides.
a) Israel and Palestine
Since independence, Israel/Palestine has been one of the highest 
profile issues in Zimbabwean foreign policy and has received more 
media coverage than any other international issue bar South Africa. 
Official Zimbabwean policy is total support for the PLO under the 
leadership of Yasser Arafat. In the past this has involved condemnation 
of diversionary pressures - Syria has been named - and support for UN 
resolutions implying a two-state settlement. Occasionally, however, 
oratory and semi-official editorial comment have dismissed the 
legitimacy of the state of Israel.
The rejection of Israeli policy has been two-pronged, focusing on 
the one hand on Palestinian rights and on the other on Israel’s ties with 
South Africa. This was the common position of many African states in 
the 1980s. The two issues were cited by Peters as the main obstacles to a 
resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel:
For African states the question of Palestinian self determination is now 
the crucial issue in the conflict and many have made the restoration of 
their relations dependent on that issue.
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Of equal concern to Africans has been the development of Israel’s 
relations with South Africa and its contacts with the Bantustan 
Homelands. Since 1973 relations between Israel and South Africa have 
rapidly expanded. In 1976 the then Prime Minister of South Africa John 
Vorster made an official visit to Israel during which a series o f  
agreements on economic, scientific and industrial co-operation were 
signed. Israel’s co-operation with South Africa in both the economic 
and military spheres has hardened African attitudes towards her and has 
made the question of the resumption of relations more difficult. 1
For Zimbabwe, which came to independence when Israel’s pariah 
status was at its nadir, these two issues have had a special significance.
Perceptions of liberation are central to Zimbabwean foreign 
policy. Support for recognised liberation movements has been coupled 
with castigation of those countries whose support is seen as lukewarm. 
In both regional and international fora, much of Zimbabwe’s stage time 
has been taken up with expressions of solidarity. Furthermore, as the 
PLO was, until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, financially self-supporting 
to a large degree, it required only moral support. While the feelings of 
solidarity expressed by the Zimbabwean government were no doubt 
genuine, a combination of PLO financial independence and geographical 
remoteness from the struggle itself obviated the need for rationalisations 
of the limits of support as were required in the same period in relation 
to the South African liberation movements.
Israel and South Africa
Although during the 1980s, Israel and South Africa were often 
bracketed together in international political fora, there has been little 
made in Zimbabwe of the functional links between them. Official 
pronouncem ents have on the whole been limited to rhetorical
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comparisons between Zionism and apartheid rather than the perceived 
consequences of the so-called unholy alliance. Israel’s attitude to the 
issue of Palestinian self determination may well have been a more 
determining factor in frontline dealings with Israel than the latter’s 
relations with South Africa. With South Africa’s re-emergence from 
diplomatic isolation, memories of past behaviour are likely to fade even 
further.
Track record
Zimbabwe has been among the handful of countries to grant the 
State of Palestine full diplomatic recognition. Diplomatic relations were 
established with the PLO at ambassadorial level in March 1983. The 
following month, Ali Halimeh, the PLO’s representative in Harare, 
presented his credentials as charge d ’affaires. On 26 October 1983, 
Zimbabwe announced that Israeli passport holders would from then on 
require a visa prior to entering the country. Up till then they had, in the 
absence of diplomatic relations, been able to obtain such visas at the 
border.
Zimbabwe remained steadfast in its public support for the PLO 
throughout the 1980s. In December 1983, Foreign Minister Mangwende 
condemned “disruptive and reactionary forces sowing seeds of 
discontent within the ranks of the PLO” . This was at a time when 
Arafat’s leadership was seriously threatened. Mangwende urged the 
Palestinian masses to unite under Arafat.2
In late August 1984, Yasser Arafat landed in Harare on a state 
visit receiving a 19 gun salute on arrival. At the banquet the following 
evening, Mugabe described Zionism and apartheid as having become 
“birds of a feather” . In November, Ali Halimeh was upgraded to 
ambassador.
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The occasion of Mugabe’s address to the UN General Assembly 
(read on his behalf by Mangwende) provided an opportunity for an 
extended elaboration of Z im babw e’s position on the Palestinian 
question. The Middle East, he said, continued to be a cause of great 
concern:
Peace in that region remains elusive and will continue to be so as long as 
Israel is permitted to defy United Nations resolutions, calling for its 
withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, including the Golan 
Heights. W e condemn in the strongest terms possible the recent Israeli 
gross violation of Tunisia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the 
cold blooded murders and maiming of defenceless Palestinian refugees.
We warn that Israel’s bellicose behaviour and hegemonistic tendencies 
pose a serious threat to the stability o f the region as w ell as to 
international peace and security. We call upon Israel to end its 
expansionist policies and to start negotiations with the PLO, the 
legitimate and sole representatives of the P a l e s t i n i a n s . 3
Israel was in the Middle East, Mugabe stressed, and if peace was 
to come to that part of the world, all the people of that area, including 
the Israelis, had to observe, in good faith, the principles of good 
neighbourliness. He addressed the issue of nuclear capability, on which 
he had already spoken at some length in general terms:
We are aware that Israel has now acquired nuclear weapons technology 
and that it may already have the deadly weapon. We are also informed 
that some may have been deployed in the Golan Heights. This brings a 
new and more dangerous dimension to the area, as it may not be long
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before other states in the region also acquire the same capability and 
world peace will then be faced with a very grave threat.
This Body cannot wait until such a crisis arises. We therefore strongly 
support the call for an urgent international conference on the Middle East 
at which all concerned and involved in the dispute would participate. We 
believe that such a conference without the full participation of the PLO, 
is like trying to stage Shakespeare’s Hamlet without the Prince of 
Denmark.4
On 13 July, 1990, the government of Zimbabwe and the State of 
Palestine concluded an agreement on Economic, Industrial, Scientific 
and Technical co-operation.5 The contracting parties confirmed their 
common struggle against imperialism, Zionism, racism and apartheid, 
affirmed the usefulness of concluding long term contracts and agreed to 
make every effort to deepen and develop co-operation in the fields 
specified.
For that purpose, the contracting parties shall support activities o f the 
competent enterprises, organisations and institutions and within the 
framework o f the respective valid internal legislation shall grant all 
facilities necessary for such co-operation. The contracting parties shall 
within the scope of the economic possibilities and requirements of their 
two countries promote projects within their economic, industrial, 
scientific and technical co-operation, including those which are suitable 
for contribution to the development o f the exchange o f goods and 
services between the government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and the 
State o f Palestine. The contracting parties shall promote in particular the 
co-operation in the fields of industry, agriculture, animal husbandry,
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education and training, energy and mining, science and technology, and
any other fields which may be agreed upon by the contracting parties.
Co-operation was to comprise inter alia the following forms and 
methods:
(a) co-operation in the exploration, development, research, 
preparation, use and marketing of economically im portant raw 
materials
(b) promotion of industrial projects; the delivery and assembly of 
complete industrial plant and equipment
(c) technical and economic studies and preparation for investment 
projects as well as the necessary technical assistance, including the 
sending of Palestinian experts, especially in connection with the delivery 
of plant and equipment on the basis of commercial contracts
(d) exchange of scientific and technical results and purchase of 
technical information, especially in connection with the delivery of plant
(e) vocational training and upgrading of skills in connection with 
the implementation of projects
(f) inviting Palestinian executives for courses and symposia, 
scientific and technical activities, special exhibitions and trade fairs in 
Zimbabwe
(h) other forms and methods to be agreed.
The delivery of goods and services resulting from co-operation 
under the agreement was to be effected in accordance with the 
provisions of a separate trade agreement to be entered into. The parties 
agreed to meet alternately at appropriate levels in the capitals of the 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and the State of Palestine as 
and when desired.
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A letter from Ali Halimeh, Palestinian Ambassador to Harare, 
dated 20 February 1990, to the President of the State of Palestine and 
Commander in Chief of the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces, requested 
approval for the signing of the joint co-operation agreement. It would, 
the letter argued, “be a great political achievement and allow us to 
perform further economic joint agreements with the government of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe.”6 
Reassessment
Between 1990 and 1992, despite the reopening of diplomatic 
relations between Israel and most of the other front-line states, 
Zimbabwe showed no inclination to change its attitude in the absence of 
discernible movement towards the achievement of Palestinian self 
determination.
The first sign of change came during the 46th Session of the UN 
General Assem bly. R esolution 4686 proposed to revoke the 
determination contained in Resolution 3379 of 10 November 1975 that 
Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination. Zimbabwe 
abstained.
Following the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and 
the PLO in Washington in September 1993, much of the previous 
hostility dissipated. In late November, Nawaf Salamheh, Israeli Deputy 
Minister of Health, undertook a tour of Southern African countries as a 
special envoy of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. During his visit to 
Harare, the establishment of diplomatic relations was announced.
Trade
Given the political will for closer ties with the Middle East, it is 
ironic that Israel is the only Middle Eastern country to feature in 
Zimbabwe’s published trade statistics (see table 9.1). In 1985, 
Zimbabwe's exports to Israel amounted to ZWD8.83m, almost double
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Romania and more than any other country in the Middle East. This 
figure accounted for 0.57% of total exports, up from 0.5% in 1983. 
Israel does not feature in the 1985 import statistics. In 1983, however, 
Zimbabwe imported ZWD6.18m of goods from Israel, just under 0.6% 
of the total. Of this, 71% was in the chemicals sector. In ZWD terms, 
imports from Israel declined in 1984 and then rose continuously to the 
end of the decade. In 1988, ZWD 17m worth of imports accounted for 
0.85% of the country’s total import bill. Although ZWD33.2m was 
imported in 1990, this represented only 0.73% of total imports - still 
more than all other Middle Eastern countries, most Scandinavian 
countries (Sweden being the exception) and, closer to home, Kenya, 
Zambia and Mozambique.
Throughout this period, Israel and Zimbabwe did not have 
diplomatic relations and intergovernment contact was minimal. The 
recorded trade growth may have been facilitated by contacts between 
Israeli officials and businesses and the local Jewish community, which 
were tolerated by the Zimbabwean government. Alternatively, such 
trade may have been a “spin-off’ from the well-developed commercial 
links between Israel and South Africa during this period.
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TABLE 9.1
ISRAEL
exports to imports from
year ZWDm % of total year ZWDm % of total
1980 n/p n/p 1980 1.2 0 .5
(Aug-Dee) (Aug-Dee)
1981 3.1 0 .4 1981 9.0 0 .9
1982 7.9 1.0 1982 7.5 0 .7
1983 5.1 0.5 1983 6.2 0 .6
1984 8.9 0.7 1984 3.8 0.3
1985 8.8 0 .6 1985 5.1 0 .4
1986 n/p n/p 1986 8.7 0 .5
1987 n/p n/p 1987 12.3 0.7
1988 n/p n/p 1988 17.4 0 .9
1989 n/a n/a 1989 n/a n/a
1990 n/p n/p 1990 33.2 0 .7
n/p not published
source: Extrapolation from CSO data
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b) Iran/Iraq
The Zimbabwean approach to the Iran/Iraq war and the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait is a study in contrasts. In the former case, the 
Zimbabwean government was neutral to a fault. In the latter, it was 
from the outset a vocal advocate of tough action against the aggressor.
Iraq was the first of the two countries to open diplomatic 
relations with Zimbabwe, the ambassador presenting his credentials in 
November 1981. When relations with Iran were established in early 
1983, the ire of the Iraqi government was evident. Zimbabwe reiterated 
its stance of strict non-involvement in the conflict between the two. 
Foreign Minister Mangwende told a ZNA Staff College audience:
By non-alignment we mean that we reserve the right to examine issue 
areas of foreign policy on the basis of merit, and within the context, on 
each occasion, of either promoting or protecting our own interests. It is 
within this context that, despite pressures from external sources - and in 
particular, from one non-aligned nation [Iraq] with whom we have 
always enjoyed a close relationship - our Government decided to 
establish diplomatic relations with another sister developing country 
within the non-aligned movement [Iran], with whom we also share 
many common revolutionary aims. The reason for the pressure upon us 
was that these two sister, non-aligned nations are currently at war with 
each other, and there have been attempts by both sides, and their various 
supporters, to sway us to support either one side or the other. Instead, 
we have chosen to steer a middle, neutral course between the two, 
faithfully adhering to our own principles and those embodied in the 
meaning of non-alignment.7
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Neither Iran nor Iraq were major trading partners of Zimbabwe. 
The decision to adopt a neutral position therefore did not reflect any 
economic imperative. Nor, however, was Mangwende’s explanation 
entirely convincing, based as it was on a dubious reinterpretation of the 
term non-alignment, divorced from its cold war origins. It is more 
plausible that Zimbabwe’s reserve on this issue derived from an 
attachment to the Non-Aligned Movement as a positive force in the 
international system, rather than any principle of neutrality per se. Deep 
divisions in NAM over the Iran/Iraq war, if publicly aired, would have 
weakened the movement’s ability to play an effective role on other 
international issues.
Throughout the conflict, Zimbabwe never deviated from this 
position. In his UN address on M ugabe’s behalf in October 1985, 
Mangwende expressed concern at the continued conflict, but little else:
Mr. President, my Government is seriously concerned at the continuing 
war between the two sister countries, Iran and Iraq. We urge them to 
peacefully resolve their dispute and concentrate on rebuilding their war- 
ravaged economies.®
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c) Iraq and Kuwait
In early June 1992, Z im babw e’s foreign minister Nathan 
Shamuyarira explained thus Zimbabwe’s abstention in the Security 
Council resolution condemning Libya’s refusal to hand over two men 
suspected of planting the bomb which blew up a Pan-Am airliner over 
Lockerbie in Scotland:
On the question of Libya, we felt that...the international community had 
not exhausted all channels of resolving the issue before Chapter Seven 
of the Charter could be applied. The latter is a very extreme section in 
the Charter. And we also felt that the big powers, here the United 
States, Britain and France, were pushing a small power unfairly, were 
harassing (that is the word we used) a small power. W e felt strongly 
about that and that is why we abstained from supporting the UN  
resolution on it. But we are against terrorism, we are against air 
terrorism and we have made this clear to the Libyans....But on this 
particular case we supported the principle o f fair play for a small third 
world country.^
Similar arguments had been advanced by opponents of UN- 
sanctioned military action against Iraq, following that country’s invasion 
and annexation of Kuwait. On that occasion, however, Zimbabwe was 
not among them.
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. That same day, 
Zimbabwe condemned the invasion and called on Iraq to withdraw its 
forces without delay. Shamuyarira described Iraq's action as “in 
flagrant violation of the UN Charter, principles and objectives on non- 
alignment and all norms of international law.” He pointed to the 
negative impact of the invasion on the Palestinian cause:
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This sudden action by Iraq against its Arab neighbour can only serve to 
divert the attention of the international community from the worthy Arab 
cause of seeking for a solution to the plight of Palestinian people in their 
struggle for nationhood. *0
In an indication of the fora which he considered most 
appropriate to address the issue, he went on to urge the Arab League, 
the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United 
Nations “to exert maximum effort to find a peaceful solution to the 
problem, thus ensuring that the situation doesn't deteriorate further.”
The Herald ran a particularly vigorous editorial, where it 
suggested that:
The best hope for Kuwait is that the world is sufficiently incensed and has the 
backbone to back up condemnation with whatever is needed to make Iraq see 
sense and back off. As a bully, bullying tactics are all Hussein can be expected 
to understand.11
It soon emerged that Kuwait, despite a lack of diplomatic 
relations with Harare, supplied two-thirds of Zimbabwe's fuel needs. 
Nevertheless the government assured the country that it would find 
alternative sources and would suspend existing trade and educational 
agreements with Iraq until it had withdrawn from Kuwait.12 These 
included an Agreement on Economic, Trade and Technical Co­
operation, signed on 17 July 1980 and an Agreement on Cultural, 
Technical, Scientific and Educational Co-operation, signed on 10 
January, 1990. Shamuyarira said that although the two had been allies
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since the days of the liberation struggle, Zimbabwe supported the trade 
ban imposed by the UN.
Zimbabwe meanwhile made efforts to bring the matter to what it 
felt were the appropriate fora. On 7 January 1991, despite Zimbabwe’s 
position on the Iran/Iraq conflict, President Mugabe bemoaned the lack 
of influence of NAM on the situation in the Gulf. He had, he said, 
suggested to the Yugoslav president, then in the chair of NAM that a 
delegation be sent to Baghdad to persuade Iraq to withdraw. That, 
Mugabe said, “might have done the trick.” 13
Speaking at a civic reception in Kaduna, Nigeria the following 
day, Mugabe alluded to the possibility of military action. “We share the 
view that Iraq must withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait if war is to 
be averted in that part of the world,” he told his audience.14 Meanwhile, 
Zimbabwe remained hopeful of a negotiated solution and recognised 
that the Middle East would remain a dangerous place “unless efforts are 
made to find a permanent solution to the Palestinian problem.”
The Zimbabwean position drew public approval from the exiled 
Kuwaiti government. On 10 January, Yahya al Sumait, Kuwaiti Minister 
of Housing, at the head of a three-man delegation to Harare, declared 
that “we recognise the important role that Zimbabwe plays on the 
African continent and in the international community and we have come 
to express our gratitude and appreciation for Zimbabwe’s support.”
In the meantime, the issue of linkage between Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories was 
being raised by Iraq as a possible way out of the impasse. Opponents of 
military intervention, including the PLO, embraced such linkage 
enthusiastically. Despite solid support for PLO positions since 
independence, the Zimbabwean government rejected linkage, all the 
while arguing that it would continue to support the just cause of the
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Palestinians. On 26 January, Mugabe made another plea for Iraq to 
reconsider and withdraw.
In February, Zimbabwe took the chair in the Security Council. 
Meanwhile on 14 February, 15 NAM foreign ministers met in Belgrade 
to discuss the Middle East. Shamuyarira emphasised that the Ministers 
were not accepting linkage of Kuwait and Palestine but felt that efforts 
to solve the two crises could continue in parallel.
On 16 February, Zimbabwe along with fellow Security Council 
members Yemen, Cuba, India and Zaire argued that Iraq’s offer of 
withdrawal, despite its conditions, should be considered. Ten days later, 
however, Zimbabwe's UN representative and Security Council chairman 
Simbarashe Mbengegwe argued that “there is little we can do without a 
definitive reply from the Iraqis”. He called for a categorical and direct 
statement of withdrawal.
On 2 March, the Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs Tichaona 
Jakonya, who together with the Minister was the key micro-policy 
maker in the Ministry said that the government welcomed the general 
outline of the US draft on the Gulf but that several issues needed 
clarification before the draft was tabled at the Security Council.15 
Jakonya identified four areas requiring further work: the call for 
withdrawal of foreign troops should apply not only to Iraq but to all 
foreign troops; there should be clarification of the need for a post-war 
settlement of other Middle East problems such as the Palestinian issue; 
the question of reparations should be more clearly addressed; and the 
reconstruction programme should be more comprehensive. Zimbabwe, 
he said, would help in the redrafting.
Resolution 686, demanding that Iraq comply with the Council’s 
previous 12 relevant resolutions, was passed on 2 March by 11 votes to 
1 against (Cuba) and 3 abstentions (Yemen, India and China).
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Reservations were expressed during the debate about Resolution 678 of 
November 1990, which authorised member states to use all necessary 
means to restore international peace and security. In supporting the 
resolution, Mbengegwi argued that it was an important first step in 
normalising the situation in the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole. 
The Security Council having acted in this case with such speed, resolve 
and singlemindedness, should now do the same with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.16
Resolution 687 which set the terms for a formal ceasefire, found 
Cuba voting against and Yemen and Ecuador abstaining. Explaining 
Zimbabwe’s positive vote, its representative Raisedon Zenenga argued 
that the actions taken by the Security Council and the entire 
international community since 2 August equalled a justified response to 
a unique situation created by the invasion and illegal occupation of 
Kuwait by Iraq. The measures in the resolution had to be seen in that 
light. Some of the provisions of the document, which ordinarily would 
have caused enormous discomfort for the Zimbabwean government, 
were, he said, designed to ensure that there would be no recurrence of 
the tragedy. As far as the disarmament measures were concerned, 
however, he would have preferred the measures to apply to the region 
as a whole.
Regarding the requirement that Iraq inform the Council that it 
would not commit or support international terrorism, Zimbabwe 
understood that nothing contained in that provision referred or applied 
to the struggles of peoples under occupation for self-determination. This 
is presumably a reference to the Palestinian struggle17.
When, however, two days later Resolution 688 was put to a vote, 
dem anding that Iraq immediately end repression of its civilian 
population, particularly in K urdish-populated areas, and allow
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international humanitarian organisations immediate access, Zimbabwe 
abstained along with Cuba and Yemen, while China and India voted 
against.
Zenenga told the Council that a domestic political conflict lay at 
the core of the situation in the areas of Iraq referred to in the draft 
resolution. Although a serious humanitarian situation had arisen it was, 
he said, purely an internal matter as defined in paragraph seven of 
A rticle Two of the Charter. Prescribing specific measures for a 
government to take in resolving a domestic conflict was beyond the 
parameters of the Council’s competence as laid out in the Charter. The 
question of refugees should be dealt with by the appropriate organs of 
the UN.18
This abstention reflected Zimbabwe’s sensitivity to infringements 
on sovereignty rather than any softening in attitude towards a fellow 
NAM member. In August, Resolution 706 set the terms for the sale of 
Iraqi oil, including compensation requirements, to allow for the 
provision of civilian needs. Cuba voted against and Yemen abstained, 
both expressing grave reservations that the harsh terms would 
exacerbate a human tragedy. Mbengegwi, however, welcomed the step 
of creating a mechanism designed to address the needs of the victims of 
war both in Iraq and Kuwait as well as elsewhere. He did say that 
Zimbabwe could not fail to register its reservations regarding the 
provisions encroaching on national sovereignty. It recognised the need 
to ensure transparency in carrying out the terms of the resolution but 
believed that monitoring arrangements could have been put into place 
which did not encroach on national sovereignty.
In the final analysis, however, the Zimbabwean delegation took 
the view that no opportunity which offered the possibility of alleviating 
the suffering of innocent civilians should be allowed “to slip through
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our fingers.” 19 This view did not apparently extend to situations which 
Zimbabwe regarded as internal. Resolution 712 confirming the ceiling 
on Iraqi oil sales also received Zimbabwe’s assent.20 
Divergence and consistency
Although Zimbabwe’s position on the Gulf War was at variance 
with several of its NAM allies, Patel identifies five strands of 
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, beyond the key principles on which it is 
based, that impacted on its attitude to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.21 
First, it is “anchored in the animus of armed struggle, at great human 
and non-hum an cost, as a revolutionary method for gaining 
independence” , resulting in a “jealous guarding of independence and 
sovereignty” . Secondly, there is a high attachm ent given to 
“organisational machinery for collective action”, particularly the UN, 
which is seen as a sound option for the protection of the sovereignty of 
small states. Thirdly, especially within the OAU, there is the acceptance 
as valid of all colonial borders of African States. Fourthly, Zimbabwe 
has opposed regional destabilisation activities. Fifthly, Zimbabwe has 
supported movements for liberation from occupation. Of these perhaps 
the most important is the third point, since it explains Zimbabwe’s basic 
distaste for irredentist actions, particularly where the target is a 
member of the non-aligned movement.
What Zim babwe’s response to the Gulf crisis shows is that
attempts to portray the conflict as one pitting the imperialist west
against the third world, and the consequent expectations of solidarity, 
were not convincing enough to override perceptions that the actions of 
Iraq as the initial aggressor against Kuwait were in themselves
sufficiently inimical to the interests of the third world and individual
countries within it to warrant decisive action to reverse them.
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Summary
The M iddle East has been regarded by the Zim babwean 
government as essentially an arena for political rather than economic 
involvement, formal trade co-operation agreements notwithstanding. 
Support for Palestinian independence has been vocal and consistent. 
Until the signing of the Oslo accords and subsequent establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Israel and Zimbabwe, the former was 
regarded as a pariah, with criticism of Zionism and of Israel’s relations 
with South Africa a constant theme in government-owned media. Trade 
with Israel, more significant than with any other country in the region, 
received no public comment.
In adopting a position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq conflict, 
Zimbabwean representatives drew on the principles of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, whose influence on wider global issues it was keen to 
preserve. Iraq ’s invasion of Kuwait, however, elicited strong 
condemnation from Zimbabwe, whose views and voting record on this 
issue diverged from many of its traditional political allies.
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Chapter ten: Zimbabwe in IGOs
The OAU. UN General Assembly and Security Council
Zim babw e’s membership of a wide range of international 
governmental organisations passes for the most part unnoticed in the 
domestic political arena with three significant exceptions: the UN, NAM 
and the Commonwealth. A fourth body, the OAU, which might be 
expected to feature prominently in Zimbabwe’s international activities, 
is not in fact a focus of great attention.
The OAU
The most significant impact of the Organisation of African Unity 
on the organisation of Africa has been the recognition of existing 
colonial boundaries enshrined in its Charter. This far sighted and often 
unpalatable commitment has had a restraining effect on the military 
expression of secessionist and irredentist sentiment -  itself an inevitable 
legacy of arbitrary colonial carving. Where such sentiment has led to 
conflict, however, the OAU has been ill equipped to take a managing 
role in resolving the dispute. Nor is the OAU, with its diverse 
membership and underfunded executive in a position to bring a 
collective African voice to the world stage.
While paying lip service to the ideal of African unity, Zimbabwe 
has tended to use the OAU as a forum in which to pursue its pre-defined 
international agenda or as a mechanism for removing inconvenient 
disputes from the glare of stronger international lights. It has not, 
however, taken a leading role in the revitalisation of the OAU itself.
At the beginning of July 1980, prime minister Mugabe led the 
Zimbabwean delegation to the OAU Summit of Heads of State and 
Government in Freetown, Sierra Leone. In his maiden speech before the
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summit, he did not shy away from the issue of the day. His government, 
he said, stood behind “the gallant people of Western Sahara...My 
government has no qualms about recognising Polisario and their 
country.”1 In March 1982, Zimbabwe walked out of an OAU 
Information Ministers meeting along with Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, 
Mali, Mauritania and Mozambique, when the Polisario delegation was 
barred.
The Chadian civil war was another continental conflict which 
spilled over into the deliberations of the OAU itself. However, the 
failures of the OAU were not laid at the door of the members 
themselves. In November 1982, Mugabe appealed to the Chadian 
contenders to withdraw to allow a long delayed OAU summit to start. 
After the failure to reconvene, Mugabe, back in Harare, commented that 
“just a handful of people being manipulated from outside Africa” could 
not be allowed to “dash the hopes of the African people and prevent the 
OAU from fulfilling its obligations.”2 On the other hand, Zimbabwe has 
argued at the UN, that the OAU is the appropriate forum in which to 
address inter-African disputes, though where it has so argued, it has not 
been at the forefront of those seeking to place such disputes on the OAU 
agenda.
Committee work
One area of the OAU in which Zimbabwe took an active role 
from the start was the Liberation Committee, which had previously 
been a major focus of OAU work on pre-independence Zimbabwe. 
Southern Africa remained the Committee’s key concern. In January 
1981, Zimbabwe made its first contribution to a special OAU Namibia 
fund of USD50,000, handing a cheque to the SWAPO representatives at 
a Liberation Committee meeting chaired by Witness Mangwende.
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On 8 July 1982, Mangwende spoke before the 39th Ordinary 
Session of the OAU Liberation Committee in Arusha. He also presented 
a cheque of USD331,050 to the Special Fund for Namibia. He used the 
occasion to address the issue of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. In an 
emotional anti-semitic outburst, he declared:
It is not easy to be silent on the genocide o f our Palestinian and 
Lebanese brothers which is now being perpetrated by a people whose 
thirst for and pleasure in spilling blood appears to be unquenchable. We 
are witnessing now the commission o f crimes no less heinous than that 
suffered by Jews at the hands o f fascists in the gas chambers and 
concentration camps only a few years ago.3
Lip service
Although the OAU has not on the whole been the arena of choice 
for Zim babwe’s public interventions on the world stage, it has 
nevertheless been an object of warm praise. The attachment to what 
might otherwise appear as an ineffectual organisation can be explained 
in terms of its historical significance in sustaining the drive to 
independence across the continent. Speaking to the nation on Africa 
Day, 25 May 1987, Mugabe highlighted its success in this regard:
As we celebrate it, we are also celebrating the achievements of the OAU, 
especially in regard to the process o f the total decolonization o f the 
African continent. Whereas in May 1963, there were only 30  
independent African States, there are at present fifty-one member States 
of the OAU, with South Africa and Namibia as the only two countries 
still to be liberated.
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A s you are aware, the decolonization process is promoted by the OAU 
through the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation o f Africa, 
known in brief as the Liberation Committee with which all African 
Liberation Movements, including ZANLA and ZIPRA, have worked.
The Liberation Committee has left no stone unturned in seeking and 
raising material assistance for Liberation Movements and we ourselves 
derived immense assistance from it.
Today we must therefore also remember that our own Independence 
was assiduously worked for by the OAU and express to it our debt of 
gratitude.......
The oppressed broad masses of South Africa and Namibia can, together 
with the Liberation Movements which lead them, derive inspiration and 
comfort from the fact that the OAU cherishes their objective of freedom  
and democracy in the same way as they cherished our own and that the 
Liberation Committee continues to be active in assistance of the just 
struggle they are waging.4
The OAU has often been an arena for rhetorical flourish. At the 
OAU summit of Heads of State on July 1986, Mugabe used the occasion 
to launch an attack on the what he perceived as the hijacking of the UN. 
The west had turned the UN forum into a “lecture hall” , castigating 
Africans for inappropriate developm ent policies and economic 
mismanagement. “Some of us” , said Mugabe, “are fighting capitalism 
which to us represents or means a continuous outflow of our economic 
wealth to Europe.”5 He asserted that African countries should refuse to 
discuss their debts and economic problems individually with their 
creditors. This would weaken their position. While arguing for a 
collective approach in international fora, however, Zimbabwe has 
always been scrupulous in avoiding any upset to its creditors.
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Of all the international organisations in which Zimbabwe is 
active, therefore, the OAU does not appear to feature as one in which 
the country seeks an enhanced role. In an interview published in June 
1992, foreign minister Shamuyarira had this to say about suggestions 
that Zimbabwe was seeking the OAU chairmanship:
We are not angling for the chairmanship of the OAU...The Secretary- 
General asked a number of states if  they could host the next summit and 
we said we were sorry we could not do it because we had just hosted 
the CHOGM, and we felt we could not host another meeting.6
The UN
Zimbabwe was admitted to the UN on 25 August 1980. It has 
twice served on the Security Council, where it took seriously the role of 
representative of the Africa Group and consequently was more often 
than not a seeker after a consensus position. In the General Assembly by 
contrast, its voting pattern has been individual, but with more than a 
passing nod to bilateral friendships.
Security Council
In 1983, Zimbabwe began its first term on the Security Council. 
Its position on specific issues considered by the Council was 
retrospectively explained as founded on two broad approaches:7
(1) Zimbabwe always strives for consensus or unanimous 
decisions or resolutions.
(2) On the Namibian question, insisting on the implementation of 
SC Res.435 of 1978 w ithout am endm ents, preconditions or 
prevarications.
Consensus therefore is not a codeword for compromise on issues 
deemed of national importance.
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The following issues were dealt with during Zimbabwe’s first 
term and reviewed in an official summary of Zimbabwe’s positions in 
the Council:8 
Chad
As this issue was on the OAU agenda, Zimbabwe considered it 
most appropriate that the Security Council lend its support to regional 
initiatives. Given the lack of effective action by the OAU at the time, 
this position in all probability owed more to a desire to keep an intra- 
African conflict off the world stage.
Central America
Res.530 was unanimously adopted as it called for Security 
Council support for peaceful efforts to find peaceful solutions in Latin 
America by the Contadora Group and called for close cooperation 
between the Security Council and the Contadora. However, in March 
1984 Nicaragua again appealed to the Security Council. On a draft 
resolution, 13 members agreed (UK abstaining, US veto) that external 
intervention in Central America was an inadmissible violation of the UN 
Charter. All but three of the 34 countries that addressed the UN 
Security Council on the issue condemned the mining of Nicaraguan 
territorial waters. Z im babw e’s voting on Central Am erica was 
consistent with the position of the Non Aligned Group in rejecting 
external, provocation and aggression.
Grenada
Following the military invasion and occupation of Grenada on 25 
October 1983 by a joint force of US and Caribbean troops, the situation 
was considered at the request of Guyana, Nicaragua and a number of 
Caribbean members:
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During the formal debate, almost every representative who addressed 
the Security Council, including our own, expressed deep indignation 
and revulsion at this violation of the UN Charter and international law.
A draft, vetoed by the US was put to the Security Council by Guyana, 
Zimbabwe and Nicaragua, deeply deploring the armed intervention and 
calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops.
Zimbabwe's action on this issue was explained as stemming from 
a “commitment to the UN Charter which makes no provision for 
military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state” .9 Two days 
after the invasion Mugabe condemned the US led operation as “an act of 
wanton aggression carried out in complete defiance of the UN Charter 
and the sovereign right of the people of Grenada”. Since the violent 
overthrow of Maurice Bishop’s government, the people of Grenada 
were hardly in a position to exercise their sovereign right. However, 
Mugabe drew an unfavourable comparison between US interventionism 
in Latin America and detachment from the real problems of Southern 
Africa 
Palestine
Zimbabwe supported the “valiant liberation struggle and is 
opposed to foreign intervention in Lebanon.”
Iran/Iraq
This was clearly an issue on which Zimbabwe did not wish to be 
seen to be taking sides (see chapter nine). It therefore proclaimed 
impartiality:
Our own approach has been guided by the fact that we enjoy equally 
good relations with each of the conflicting parties, which are also 
valuable members of the NAM.
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Zimbabwe therefore limited itself to supporting the Secretary 
General’s efforts to find a just and lasting settlement. Security Council 
Res.552 of 1 June 1984 which called upon all states to respect the right 
of free navigation and the territorial integrity of States not party to the 
hostilities and condemned recent attacks on commercial ships en route to 
and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, saw Zimbabwe abstain 
along with Nicaragua, arguing that the resolution failed to take an even 
handed approach to the wider issue of the war.
Cyprus
In 1983, Res. 541 was adopted, calling for the revocation of the 
Declaration of the Republic of Northern Cyprus. Resolution 554 of 
1984, which Zimbabwe supported, argued that:
Secessionism, on the grounds of ethnicity, or on any other grounds 
cannot be entertained by the international community as no single 
country in this world can boast complete ethnic racial or cultural 
homogeneity.
KAL007
Its position on this issue was to cost Zimbabwe dear. It was “one 
of the most controversial issues considered by the Security Council”. A 
draft resolution tabled by USA, South Korea, Canada, Japan, Australia 
joined by Belgium, Fiji, France, Italy, West Germany, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Thailand and UK 
sought, inter alia, to condemn the USSR for violating international civil 
aviation regulations.10 The USSR and Poland voted No; Zimbabwe, 
China, Guyana and Nicaragua abstained. This vote, as explained in 
chapter seven, does not reflect any particular leverage that the USSR
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may have had on Zimbabwe, since relations between the two states were 
not particularly  warm. The official summary concludes that 
Zimbabwe’s voting in any international forum is a deliberate and 
sovereign expression, based on its perceptions of the issues. “Our 
foreign policy”, it argues, “is genuinely non-aligned” . Nevertheless, it 
continues, independence and sovereignty do not imply non-cooperation 
with other nations:
On the contrary, we co-operate with other members of the security 
council, especially the seven members of the Non Aligned Caucus. We 
consult closely with them, as we also do with fellow African members 
and those o f the socialist group. On such issues as the Namibian 
question, apartheid, destabilisation of our region and the occupation of 
Angolan territory, we naturally consult very closely with other Frontline 
states, whose views we take very seriously. However, the line of action 
which we finally take is our own, and one that will have benefited from 
our friends' view s.H
Second chance
Zim babwe’s second term on the Security Council ran from 
January 1991 to 1992. On the agenda at the outset was the situation in 
the Gulf. For part of the war - in the month of February - Zimbabwe’s 
UN representative Simbarashe M bengegwe was President of the 
Council. Zimbabwe’s approach to that conflict is discussed in more 
detail in chapter nine. It is perhaps, worth noting here, however, that 
Zimbabwe’s deviations from the majority vote in all the Iraq-Kuwait 
resolutions concerned not the substance of the conflict itself, but what it 
perceived as dilutions of the doctrine of non-interference in internal 
affairs.
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Other issues dealt with during Zim babw e’s second security 
council term included the overthrow of the Aristide government in 
Haiti. The Council condemned the grave events in Haiti and called for 
the restoration of the legitimate government. Supporting this view, 
Mbengegwe said that the OAS was committed to helping the people of 
Haiti and Zimbabwe supported these efforts.12 This is in keeping with 
the approach that regional conflicts where possible should be addressed 
by regional bodies and also suggests a desire to keep large powers at 
bay.
At the first ever Security Council summit meeting on 31 
December 1992, Foreign Minister Shamuyarira, in his capacity as 
special emissary of President Mugabe called for the Charter to be re­
examined. A new world order could best be constructed by rectifying 
flaws, closing gaps and updating provisions rendered obsolete by new 
international circumstances.
General assembly
An analysis of Zimbabwe's voting patterns in the General 
Assembly confirms that consultation does not necessarily mean 
agreem ent or convergence. The follow ing G eneral Assembly 
Resolutions indicate a divergence in Zimbabwe’s voting record from 
that of other members of NAM and the Socialist camp (Y=yes; N=no; 
A=abstention):
46/86: Vote to revoke the determination contained in Resolution 
33/79 of 10/11/75 that Zionism is a form of racism and racial 
discrimination: Y111-N25-A13. Y votes included: Botswana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, M alawi, M ozam bique, N am ibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, 
Yugoslavia, Zambia. N votes included: Algeria, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya. Abstentions included: Zimbabwe, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Tanzania.
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46/134: on the situation of human rights in Iraq: Y129-N1-A17. 
Y votes included Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Yugoslavia, 
Zambia. Abstentions included: Zimbabwe, China, Cuba, Indonesia, 
Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania.
35th  session: Rejection of the credentials of the representatives 
of Democratic Kampuchea (Pol Pot): Y35-N74-A32. Zimbabwe 
abstained.
36/5 : urges countries of South East Asia to exert renewed efforts 
to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South East Asia, 
once a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean conflict is 
achieved: Y100-N25-A19. Y votes included Zimbabwe, China, UK, US, 
Israel, Lesotho, Swaziland. N votes included USSR, Nicaragua, 
Mozambique, Libya, Angola, Ethiopia. Abstentions included Tanzania, 
Zambia, Malawi, Uganda.
37/6: on the principles of self determination of the Kampuchean 
people; authorises the ad hoc committee to carry out its mandate: Y105- 
N23-A20. Y votes included Zimbabwe, China, US, UK, Zambia, Kenya, 
Yugoslavia. N votes included USSR, Mozambique, Cuba, Libya, Syria. 
Abstentions included Tanzania, Algeria.
35/27: The right of East Tim or to self-determ ination & 
independence: Y58-N35-A46. Zimbabwe voted in favour.
36/50 : the right of self-determination for the East Timorese: 
Y54-N42-A46. Zimbabwe voted in favour.
35 /124: invites member states to contribute suggestions on 
international cooperation to avert new flows of refugees: Y105-N16- 
A I4. Y votes included China, Zambia. N votes included Mozambique, 
USSR. Zimbabwe abstained, as did Tanzania.
35 /185: to ensure respect for human rights in Bolivia: Y83-N9- 
A47. Zimbabwe voted in favour.
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35/188: concern for human rights in Chile: Y95-N8-A39. 
Zimbabwe voted in favour as it did on 36/155 and 36/157 concerning El 
Salvador and all subsequent resolutions on human rights in Chile, El 
Salvador and Guatemala.
37/3: considers the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq to be 
endangering international peace and security; affirms the necessity of an 
immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces as a preliminary to 
peaceful settlement of the dispute: Y119-N1-A15. Y votes included Iraq, 
USSR, US, Tanzania, M ozambique, China. Iran voted against. 
Zimbabwe abstained, along with Zambia, Syria, Nicaragua, Cuba and 
India.
37/200: Emphasises the indivisibility and inter-relatedness of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; stresses the responsibility of 
governments to secure the human rights of vulnerable or disadvantaged 
groups; urges concomitant efforts to establish a new world economic 
order: Y81-N38-A20. Y votes included Tanzania, UK, US. N votes 
included Zimbabwe, M ozambique, Iran, Ethiopia, Syria, Libya, 
Comecon countries. Abstentions included Iraq, Jordan, China, Nigeria.
The following resolutions were voted with the vast majority of 
members of NAM and the Socialist camp:
35/75: condemns Israeli policy in occupied territories: Y118-N2- 
A26. Zimbabwe voted in favour.
35/167: calls on states to accord to national liberation movements 
recognised by OAU and League of Arab States with observer status in 
international organisations, facilities, privileges and imm unities 
necessary for the performance of their function: Y97-N10-A29. 
Zimbabwe voted in favour.
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35/190: for a study of the criteria for voluntary aid distribution 
to victims of gross and flagrant violations of human rights: Y57-N39- 
A46. Zimbabwe voted against.
36/27: condemns Israel for bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor at 
Tammuz: Y109-N2-A34. Zimbabwe voted in favour.
Second thoughts
The following resolutions reflect an evolution in Zimbabwe’s 
voting patterns:
Afghanistan
Zimbabwe’s opposition to the presence of Soviet troops became 
more overt.
35/37: calls for immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan; appeals for aid for refugees: Y l l  1-N22-A12. Zimbabwe 
abstained, Zambia in favour, Mozambique against.
36/34: calls for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops 
from Afghanistan; renews the call for humanitarian relief assistance; 
reaffirms the Afghans’ right to self-determination: Y116-N23-A12. Y 
votes included Zimbabwe, China, Albania, Botswana, Kampuchea, 
Israel, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia. N votes 
included Comecon countries, Mozambique, Cuba, Libya. Abstentions 
included Nicaragua.
37/37: reaffirming 36/34. Zimbabwe voted in favour.
South Africa
35/206c: for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa: 
Y115-N10-A20. Y votes included Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Cote 
d ’Ivoire. Zimbabwe abstained, along with Botswana, Swaziland, 
Lesotho, Sweden.
35/206d: for an oil embargo on South Africa: YI23-N7-A13. 
Zimbabwe abstained.
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35/206: commends all governments who have implemented UN 
resolutions on apartheid; condemns those who continue to collaborate 
with South Africa; urges the international community to continue to 
isolate South Africa: Y114-N10-A22. Zimbabwe abstained.
After its first year of membership. Zimbabwe’s stance at the UN 
on South Africa hardened considerably and consistently. This may be a 
dual result of its assumption of a key role in explaining the position of 
the frontline states on the one hand and the net deterioration in its 
relations with South Africa on the other (see chapter five).
Mazrui, in considering the role of African countries in the UN, 
observed in 1977 that:
..while there have been occasions when the United Nations has made a 
contribution towards moderating the danger of war or facilitating the 
process of peace-making, it has been on the whole more effective in the 
struggle against colonialism, the campaign against certain forms of 
racism, and the quest for a more equitable global economic system. The 
tangible results in this third area are still very modest indeed, but the 
United nations has definitely become one of the battlefields for the war 
against economic injustice and underdevelopment.
However, clouds of uncertainty continue to hang over the destiny of the 
world body. Its ambition is much greater than its capacity, its potential 
more impressive than its accomplishments, its ideals more profound 
than its standards. *3
Mazrui’s observations remain valid and are likely to continue to 
be so, since the UN by its very universality provides one of the most 
accessible international fora in which to declaim, but one of the most 
difficult in which to drive forward a particular course of action.
240
In his wide ranging address to the General Assembly in 1985, 
Mugabe, through his foreign minister, assessed the challenges facing the 
UN and its success in responding to them. Despite lack of progress in 
conflict resolution, arms control, the debt crisis and economic 
development, he argued that the effort of working through the UN was 
still worth making:
There is no alternative to multilateralism - it is a fact of life dictated by 
the reality of interdependence, a reality that can only be ignored at our 
peril. A consensus for development is also a consensus for resuming 
dialogue on the institutional obstacles to the launching o f the global 
negotiations on the establishment of a new economic order. Indeed the 
people of the world and their governments have the potential of rising 
up to such a challenge and this solemn occasion should generate the 
necessary political will that would sustain that renewed commitment to 
development.14
1 For the Record No.2: PM’s Address to OAU, July 1980 (Ministry of Information, Immigration and 
Tourism) July 1980
2 Herald. 25/11/82
3 Press Statement o f the Ministry o f Information, 2/7/82
4 Official transcript, Ministry o f Information, Harare
5 Herald. 31/7/86
6 Southern Africa Vol5 no9 pp3-7
7 Press Statement 593/84/SD/M E, Ministry o f Information files
8 ibid
9 ibid
10 SC meeting 2476, 12/9/83
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11 PS593/84/SD /M E
12 SC 5314, 3/10/91
13 A. Mazrui, Africa’s International Relations. (London: Heinneman) 1977, p213
14 Policy Statement No. 16: PM Mugabe’s Address to the United Nations, October 7, 1985 (Harare: 
Ministry of Information, Posts & Telecommunications) October 1985
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Conclusion
Reasons for reticence. Provisional assessments
Few of the accounts thus far published of post-independence 
Zimbabwean development have been able or willing to make definitive 
judgements. Part of the problem is in delineating the government’s own 
targets against which to judge its performance.
This study has attempted to explore the principal factors, whether 
individual or common to other third world states, that shaped the way 
Zimbabwe forged its international links in the first fourteen years after 
independence.
Chapter One examined the economic and political legacy of the 
struggle for independence and the network of relations formed by the 
nationalist movements. This provided a broad indication of the degree 
to which the first post-independence government, dominated by 
ZANU(PF) might wish to refashion the country’s international 
relations. While maintaining an overt allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, 
M ugabe’s appointment of a broad-based cabinet in the interests of 
reconciliation indicated that transformation of the country’s economic 
ties would not be an initial priority. Nevertheless, there was a clear 
contrast between ZANU(PF)’s political friendships and the trade and 
investment patterns inherited at independence.
The second chapter outlined the constraints facing the new 
government in pursuing foreign political and economic policy. Some 
were identified as common to many LDCs. These included a scarcity of 
available resources, competing fiscal objectives, and the need to interact 
with the world market. Constraints specific to the Zimbabwean situation 
included the Lancaster House constitution, with its entrenched property 
clauses, and the country’s trade patterns themselves. The need to protect
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revenues derived from trade resulted in a reticence in tampering with 
existing trade patterns, though preservation of these ties could be seen as 
a consideration of the national interest and a foreign policy objective in 
itself. In the case of Zimbabwe, debt was considered of comparatively 
less significance as a constraint.
Counterparty perceptions of the importance of the relationship, 
which can be a limiting factor, actually worked in Zimbabwe’s favour 
in the first decade of independence as its geopolitical and economic role 
was seen by many countries as potentially significant both regionally 
and in international fora. This meant that Zimbabwe was often listened 
to, even if its exhortations were not acted upon.
The extent to which foreign relations reflect coherent policy will 
depend partly on the ability of policy makers to recognise the limits of 
their influence. Chapter Three explored the foreign policy making 
process in Zimbabwe. Despite official reference to ZANU(PF) as the 
ultimate decision-making body, the importance of Robert Mugabe, 
initially as prime minister and then as president was indicated, with the 
foreign minister providing commentary and the ministry supplying the 
functionaries. Economic relations were shown to have come under less 
direct central control.
The Zimbabwean government’s declared aim was to use the tools 
at its disposal to rectify domestic socio-economic iniquities and to 
extend its fundamental concerns to the international arena in the form of 
a commitment to non-alignment, socialism and a new international 
economic order.
At the same time, however, national sovereignty and the right to 
make decisions in the national interest have been stressed along with 
promotion of a free exchange of ideas and trade. These positions allow 
considerable room for manoeuvre in formulating policy on specific
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issues. While there has been some official recognition of contextual 
constraints, they have not been offered as inhibiting factors in individual 
policy decisions.
Publicly, Mugabe has argued for a congruence between political 
and economic relations. In practice, this has involved attempts at 
extension rather than substitution of existing international economic 
links. Yet results, even in this respect, have been modest.
The pattern of relations resulting from the Mugabe government’s 
attempts at diversification was set out in Chapter Four. This included 
the sequence of establishment of diplomatic relations, a geographical 
profile of sources of economic assistance and the role of private 
investment.
Formal relatiorts were forged with a wide spectrum of countries. 
South Africa presented a special case demanding a continuation of 
economic ties in the face of overt political hostility. While attempts 
were made to develop an economic dimension to many of the newer 
bilateral political relationships, these efforts had little sustained impact 
on overall trade patterns.
Aid was sought and received from a variety of sources, both 
multilateral and bilateral. Beyond the actual establishment of diplomatic 
relations, aid programmes do not seem to have influenced Zimbabwe’s 
policy positions. On occasion, the government has been prepared to 
jeopardise certain bilateral aid flows in defence of its position on 
specific issues.
Chapters Five to Ten highlighted specific elements of Zimbabwe’s 
network of international relations. Chapter Five discussed Zimbabwe in 
the Southern African region. South Africa and Mozambique were 
examined in some detail as presenting its two greatest dilemmas in the 
first decade of independence.
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Ultimately, political affinity at a government level has had little 
impact on trade relations with M ozambique, though common 
infrastructural commitments have yielded progress. The rehabilitation 
of the Beira Corridor and the brokering of a peace deal between 
FRELIMO and the MNR were among the relative successes of 
Zimbabwean foreign policy in its first fourteen years.
In the case of South Africa, active efforts were made to reduce 
that country’s relative dominance as a trading partner and carrier for 
Zimbabwe, though economic ties remained crucial to the latter’s 
survival.
Two regional organisations, SADC and PTA/Comesa, played 
some role in the Zimbabwean strategy of dispersal of dependence. 
However, efforts to boost bilateral economic relationships with other 
members of these groups foundered on an absence of sufficient 
coincidence of wants and an inability to drive the private sector down a 
politically pre-determined trade path. SADC, to which Zimbabwe has 
demonstrated greater commitment, has now revised its raison d'etre and 
is set to develop as a regional trading bloc with South Africa as its 
engine.
Chapter Six focused on the Mugabe government’s ambivalent 
relationship with the UK. This ambivalence stems from Britain’s 
historical role as coloniser on the one hand and as the catalyst for a non­
military resolution on the other.
Despite harsh words over the UK policy on sanctions against 
South Africa, Britain remained one of Zimbabwe’s two largest trading 
partners, its largest bilateral donor and, significantly, the provider of 
expertise and assistance in creating a new unified army.
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Chapter Seven examined the nature of relations with the USA, the 
USSR; and China, providing contrasts in the relative importance of 
political will and economic imperatives.
In the case of the USA, Zimbabwean accusations of bad faith on a 
number of non-bilateral issues led to reductions in official US aid, 
though trade links remained strong. The USA was consistently among 
the top five export and import markets for the Zimbabwean economy in 
the period under review.
Relations with the United States were, when positive, presented as 
a series of bilateral events. Criticism of the USA, on the other hand, was 
largely contextualised in a broader fram ework, be it regional, 
multilateral or global. The potential impact of such criticism on 
bilateral aid was acknowledged, but bilateral trade with the USA was 
not an issue on which the government ever chose to pass public 
judgement.
Sino-Zimbabwean relations were less publicly promoted than 
might have been expected, given the strength of Chinese support for 
ZANU(PF) in the pre-independence struggle. Nevertheless, ties were 
never presented as less than fraternal. Economic assistance 
notwithstanding, bilateral trade increased in the first five years of 
independence to the point where the PRC was Zimbabwe’s 10th largest 
export market in 1985. Yet it was overtaken the following year by 
Taiwan -  to which ZANU(PF) was ideologically hostile.
Closer ties with the Soviet Union, meanwhile, were never seen as 
a priority. Efforts by Soviet representatives to develop closer co­
operation were largely resisted.
Chapter Eight considered Zim babwe’s ties with the rest of 
Europe, and in particular, the cases of Sweden, France and Romania. 
Sweden was one of ZANU(PF)’s few active western supporters during
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the independence struggle and subsequently served as the model of a 
conscientious donor. France more overtly melded aid with self-interest, 
while Romania attempted to translate declared ideological affinity into 
meaningful economic links.
The European countries considered fell into three groups: 
supporters of ZANU(PF) in the struggle for independence and 
consequently candidates for closer economic ties (Sweden, Romania, 
Yugoslavia); those regarded by ZANU(PF) as at best ambivalent during 
the struggle (France, Italy, West Germany) and those which were closer 
to ZAPU (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria). The last 
group, like the USSR, suffered from an absence of either political 
kinship or historical trade links.
The “ambivalent” cluster of western European countries was the 
most successful at establishing strong economic links. These countries 
were presented as friends on a bilateral basis, even where they were 
considered as of dubious multilateral intent.
Of the first category, only Sweden managed to established any 
sustained economic links, though at levels below expectations. The 
relationship with Romania produced many warm words and detailed 
trade plans, but few of the latter were ever implemented in earnest. 
Yugoslavia at one point appeared to be laying a foundation for 
economic ties, but this was not sustained. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe 
continued to support Yugoslavia in political fora, when its territorial 
integrity was in serious doubt.
In Chapter Nine, aspects of Zimbabwe’s relations with the Middle 
East were considered in the context of three conflicts: Israel/Palestine; 
Iran/Iraq; and Iraq/Kuwait. Support for Palestinian independence has 
been vocal and consistent. Israel was regarded as a pariah until the Oslo 
Accords and was frequently castigated for its oppression of the
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Palestinians and for its relations with South Africa. Trade with Israel, 
more significant than with any other country in the region, received no 
public comment.
Zimbabwe’s neutrality in the Iran-Iraq conflict was posited on the 
principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, whose broader influence it 
did not wish to jeopardise. By contrast, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
elicited fierce condemnation from Zimbabwe, which took a different 
stance from many of its traditional political allies
Chapter Ten examined Zimbabwe’s participation in the OAU and 
the UN. Although Mugabe has often suggested the OAU as the most 
appropriate forum for the resolution of specific disputes, Zimbabwe has 
invested comparatively few resources in its OAU participation. The 
United Nations -  both the General Assembly and the Security Council -  
has, on the other hand, been the chosen forum for some of the 
Zimbabwean government’s strongest verbal interventions.
In all its international affairs, whether bilateral or multilateral, 
Zimbabwe, principally through Robert Mugabe, has expressed its 
commitment to an active political agenda. Periodically, the need for that 
agenda to have a consistent economic component has been declared.
With the “commanding heights” of the economy still largely in 
private hands since independence, the failure of evident efforts to bring 
Zimbabwe’s international economic relations within the government’s 
operational ambit is, in itself, not surprising. Yet it remains largely 
unexplained.
Any regime which values its standing among what it sees as its 
constituency will be subject to diverse pressures. Responding to these 
pressures is bound to bring conflicting statements of aims. Zimbabwe 
inherited a set of political and economic expectations deriving from the
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nature of the struggle for independence and a set of imposing 
constraints.
Nevertheless, in dissecting the Zimbabwean government’s approach to 
building its own set of relations, small markers of success or failure can 
be set up along the way.
Discrepancy in context
The argument has been advanced here that a discrepancy between 
political rhetoric and economic reality is inevitable for a developing 
country and that the task of state actors is to develop a coherent and 
credible explanation of their behaviour as they come to face the 
realisation that the fence around their field of action is too high to vault. 
In the case of Zimbabwe’s international relations, however, there is 
little evidence that the ZANU(PF) administration has attempted the kind 
of internal political audit that such an explanation would require. On the 
other hand, it is far from clear that a coherent explanation is available 
other than ex post facto .
As for the management of Zimbabwe’s international relations at 
an operational level, this has been accomplished with as much leeway as 
the particular forum in each case would allow. Where power has been 
perceived, it has been enjoyed. Where power has been lacking, there has 
been a tacit if grudging acceptance of its absence. Whether the whole 
process has been handled to the benefit of Zimbabwe’s citizens is a 
matter on which multiple juries are still out. If Mao thought it too early 
to judge the success or failure of the French revolution, it would be 
foolhardy to rush to judgement on the first decade and a half of 
Zimbabwe’s independence.
C onfronted w ith unpalatable realities, the Zimbabwean 
administration began in 1980 with some sense of its limitations in the 
international arena. Others have subsequently become evident. Both the
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government and citizens of Zimbabwe are still grappling to come to 
terms with the limits of their autonomy. That in itself is a dynamic and 
protracted struggle.
FIN
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